359

POETICAL ESSAYS.

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ON THE

FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

VIZ.

THE PRINCIPAL ERRORS AND CORRUPTIONS OF MEN.

THE EXCELLENCY OF REASON AND OF VIRTUE.

THE FREEDOM AND OTHER POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF THE SOUL.

THE FOUNDATION AND REALITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, AND OF HUMAN HAPPINESS.

WITH A

PRELIMINARY ESSAY,

IN PROSE:

CONTAINING A SUMMARY OF THE AUTHOR's PRINCIPAL TENETS, AND OF THOSE WHICH HE CONDEMNS;

WITH

NOTES EXPLANATORY, &c.

" Yet ye say the way of the Lord is not equal. Is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal?" EZEK.

" My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways." ISA.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. DEBRETT,

OPPOSITE BURLINGTON HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

M.DCC,XCI.

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BRITA
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A

PRELIMINARY ESSAY,

CONTAINING

A SUMMARY OF THE AUTHOR's PRINCIPAL TENETS, AND OF THOSE WHICH HE CONDEMNS:

WITH

VARIOUS OBSERVATIONS, &c.

THE author of theſe eſſays, early in life, on obſerving the opinions of men (of the learned as well as the unlearned) to be extremely various, often oppoſite, regarding even the firſt principles of religion and morality, was filled with the utmoſt aſtoniſhment and concern; and could not help frequently exclaiming, "Is under-"ſtanding given to man in vain? ſurely it cannot "be." By dwelling much on theſe and ſimilar reflections, he conceived an ardent deſire of finding out the *truth*, if poſſible, at leaſt in the fundamental principles of theſe moſt important ſubjects; and in reſearches for that purpoſe, he has

employed a conſiderable part of his time for many years, with unabating ardor, but with what ſucceſs the public muſt now judge. At firſt, his view was to ſatisfy his own mind on theſe moſt intereſting points; but when he had paſſed ſome time in the world, and found the moſt wonderfully unreaſonable and pernicious opinions, as they appear to him, making ſuch a rapid progreſs among men (men of abilities and learning not excepted), as gave him juſt cauſe to apprehend that they may ere long be generally received, unleſs they be timely and effectually oppoſed, by ſhewing them to be void of all reaſonable foundation. It was then that he firſt ſeriouſly thought of laying the reſult of his enquiries before the public, if he ſhould be able to do it in a manner nearly adequate to the ſubject; but his uncertainty of being equal to ſuch a taſk prevented his forming any abſolute reſolution regarding it for a conſiderable time, till repeated concern and ſorrow of heart, on obſerving the additional credit and eſtimation which ſuch opinions appear to gain daily in the world determined him to hazard it; hoping that, ſhould his abilities be found unequal to the undertaking, the goodneſs of his intention may plead ſo powerfully in his favour with the public as to induce them to excuſe the attempt. On this he fully reſts his hopes of pardon; for the opinions which he oppoſes appear

pear to him contrary to all ſober and careful experience, totally repugnant to the cleareſt dictates of reaſon *, and directly ſubverſive of true religion and morality: but leſt any one (who haply may not have conſidered as frequently as this author the tendency of thoſe opinions) ſhould imagine that he is raiſing monſters for the purpoſe of exhibiting his ſkill and valour in combating them, he begs leave to mention here the principal of theſe tenets, that the reader may form ſome judgment of the ſubjects treated of in the following eſſays, and of the author's undertaking and views.

Much has been ſaid, and with no ſmall degree of ſelf-applauſe and triumph, by European writers, of the very weak and abſurd notions which In-

* By the word *reaſon* this author (when he uſes it to ſignify a faculty or power of the mind) always means exactly the ſame as by the word underſtanding, which is the common meaning of it with all men; and aſſuredly every word of conſequence ſhould, on all ſerious and important occaſions, be carefully uſed in its moſt common meaning (except when it is uſed in a generally admitted figurative ſenſe); otherwiſe, notwithſtanding the cleareſt definition, the common habitual meaning will be every moment intruding itſelf, not only upon the reader's, but alſo upon the writer's mind, to the excluſion of the uncommon, though defined meaning.

The not obſerving this golden rule, has often been the cauſe of more confuſion, obſcurity and error, than can eaſily be imagined by any perſon who has not ſtudiouſly traced its effects, in almoſt all kinds of writing.

dians, and other unlettered, unenlightened nations entertain of the Deity, the fountain of juſtice and benevolence; and of their confuſed, and extremely imperfect notions of right and wrong; but however erroneous and groſs the opinions of theſe poor uninſtructed people may be; it is much to be feared that, upon a fair unprejudiced compariſon, it will be manifeſt that the moſt ignorant and uncivilized of them hold no opinions that are, that can be, more unreaſonable and extravagant than many of the favorite opinions of the greater part of our renowned philoſophers, and of many of our ſchool divines, at this day in Europe. Notwithſtanding the very great advantages which we enjoy, in having the learned ſciences within our reach, and more eſpecially in having the light and guidance of the Goſpel *offered* to us: that pure, that *rational* Goſpel, which, when rightly, when *conſiſtently* underſtood, is found ſo admirably adapted to promote the real, the permanent welfare of a rational being; to improve, exalt, and perfect his nature; to make him truly wiſe and truly benevolent, and thereby truly happy. But notwithſtanding theſe our invaluable advantages, it will appear, we apprehend, but too true, upon a thorough examination and a candid impartial compariſon, that ignorance itſelf, in all its native gloom and darkneſs, is ſeldom guilty of ſuch wonderful deviations from truth and common

ſenſe,

ſenſe *, as learned ſophiſtry, vanity, and preſumption. It is to our everlaſting ſhame, our juſt condemnation, that a clear light is come unto us Europeans, and that we have not only neglected, but purpoſely rejected its heavenly guidance; have wilfully and induſtriouſly ſhut our eyes againſt it; have loved even the darkneſs, and hated the very light, becauſe our deeds are evil.

Such are the errors, ſuch the deviations from all

* By common ſenſe this Author means that rational intuitive power of the mind, and in general that portion of reaſon or of the world, to perceive many truths ſo diſtinctly and clearly that they agree in them on moſt occaſions, nay on all occaſions, underſtanding, which enables all men, or nearly all, in every part except when thoſe truths contradict their favorite prejudices, or condemn thoſe wrong actions to which they are ſo deplorably attached as to be determined to continue in the practice of them at all events; for on ſuch occaſions common ſenſe itſelf is often blind: but as to the inſtinctive common ſenſe (which the learned Doctors Reid, Beattie, &c. have endeavoured to make uſe of, generally ſpeaking, for a laudable purpoſe; namely, that of refuting ſeveral ſceptical and pernicious opinions, as well as ſome others) this author much fears, nay, is fully convinced, that it has no exiſtence but in their and a few other philoſophers' imaginations; and that for many reaſons, but particularly two: 1ſt, Becauſe he has never found in himſelf ſuch a principle or law of our nature (as they are pleaſed to call it), as impowers us inſtantly, and, as it were, irreſiſtibly, to feel out moſt, if not all the fundamental and moſt important truths, without being able to give any reaſon why we believe ſo, rather than the contrary, except this remarkable one, namely, "That a law of *our*

all good ſenſe (as they appear to this Author), which he means carefully to examine in the following Eſſays, and to trace to their firſt principles and extraordinary conſequences; and his hopes are, that he ſhall be able, for the moſt part, to oppoſe thoſe principles with *clear*, *ſolid*, and *ſatisfactory* arguments and refutations. For let it not be thought impoſſible to give clear proofs regarding ſuch things, ſeeing it would be hard to ſuppoſe

" nature *forces* us to believe ſo, and that we cannot believe " otherwiſe."

And, 2dly, Becauſe he knows many perſons, who are not deficient in many of the natural endowments of the mind, that differ greatly in opinion from thoſe gentlemen with regard to the greater part of thoſe inſtances which they have produced as the certain infallible dictates of this irreſiſtible, but lately diſcovered *common* ſenſe. We call it lately diſcovered, becauſe it appears to be a modern invention: but who invented or diſcovered it firſt, the author of theſe eſſays undertakes not to determine; for though Dr. Reid be the firſt (as he believes) who has publiſhed it in the Britiſh dominions; yet, as that eminent French philoſopher, D'Alembert, had before introduced it in his " Diſcours preliminaire de l'Encyclopedie," in order, as he alſo thought, to prove by it the exiſtence of external objects, and there declares that ſeveral other philoſophers had held the ſame opinion before him, it is hard to ſay who was the inventor of it.

" Monſieur D'Alembert calls it " Un penchant inſurmontable " à aſſurer l'exiſtence des objects auxquels nous rapportons nos " ſenſations, & qui nous paroiſſent en être la cauſe;" and alſo " un inſtinct plus ſur que la raiſon même."

See Melange de literature, tom. i. p. 16.

that

that (endowed as we are with underſtanding by our bountiful Maker, and created in his image) we can never arrive at certainty in things which it concerns us to know above all others; in things of infinite and eternal concern to us. On the contrary, is it not moſt highly reaſonable to believe, that we aſſuredly may, unleſs, through wilful careleſsneſs, or purſuits of another nature, or violent, inveterate prejudices, we divert our thoughts from this moſt neceſſary enquiry; or, if we ſometimes enquire, do it in an uncandid and fooliſh manner, with the perverſe view of eſtabliſhing, at all events, our pre-conceived notions, our dearly beloved prejudices, inſtead of reality and truth. But this Author having (as he ſincerely hopes) no ſuch views, he will uſe his utmoſt endeavours to ſet theſe matters in a truly fair and clear light; and, in order to attain this moſt deſireable end, he will endeavour to keep conſtantly in his view the examples of Euclid and ſome other writers, who have ſucceſsfully undertaken to eſtabliſh truths upon the ſure foundations of indubitable facts. And as thoſe writers, to make their foundations more ample, deep and ſolid, have required their readers to grant them certain *poſtulata*, and laid down ſeveral axioms, which, when rightly conſidered, no perſon can reaſonably deny or doubt of; this author alſo requires the following poſtulates to

be granted; and lays down the following axioms, which, he hopes, can as little be denied or doubted of as any of Euclid's:

POSTULATES.

1. Grant it poſſible that Sir Iſaac Newton, Mr. Locke, Deſcartes, Mallebranche, Ariſtotle, and Plato were not infallible at all times during their lives; and that, therefore, they may have erred in ſome points.

2. Grant it poſſible that any other man, or body of men, may have erred in ſome inſtances where the contrary has not yet been demonſtrated, and until that be demonſtrated.

AXIOMS.

1. To believe any man, or body of men, to be infallible, becauſe we are told ſo by others, who have not yet been proved to be infallible themſelves, and on that account to give up the uſe of our underſtandings to follow implicitly their dictates, is building what is called an infallible faith upon a moſt fallible foundation *.

2. It

* This kind of faith may be compared to the ravings of a weak prince or chief, who, upon the invaſion of his country by powerful enemies, being diſordered in his mind through fear, ſhould dream of building impregnable caſtles, to oppoſe them, upon the ſands, or in the air: the body of the building may appear to his diſturbed imagination very fair, ſtrong, and fit

2. It never can be proved to any perſon that any particular propoſition, tenet, or opinion, is either *true* or *falſe* until that perſon be firſt made to underſtand, not only what is proved, but alſo the *reaſons* or *arguments* by which it is proved.

COROLLARY.—Hence it follows undeniably, that without the light and guidance of the underſtanding or reaſon, truth, error, and falſehood can never in any one propoſition be rightly diſtinguiſhed from each other.

3. Suppoſing any man, or body of men (any prelate, council, or ſynod for inſtance), to be infallible in framing articles of faith for the people, yet the faith of thoſe people muſt ſtill be *fallible* as long as they continue liable to miſunderſtand thoſe articles; which they muſt always be, until they become infallible themſelves.

4. No wiſe or juſt perſon, whoever or whatever he be, can deliberately require any other perſon to do what he certainly knows that he *cannot* do; *what* he knows to be impoſſible for that other perſon to perform. How much leſs, then, will the God of perfect wiſdom and juſtice require or command his children to do any thing which he knows that they cannot do; which he has not thought fit to give them a ſufficient *power* or ability to perform.

fit for the purpoſe; but the main point, the foundation, is not conſidered; could it be, the whole would appear to be very weak, fallible, and utterly unfit for any rational purpoſe.

5. An

5. An *infallible* faith in every article cannot juſtly be required of a *fallible* man; *diligence*, *ſincerity*, and fidelity are required of us; and not infallibility.

6. The faith and virtue required of every particular man, is no other than ſuch as may reaſonably be required of a perſon of his ſhare of talents, abilities, and advantages; or, in other words, by a perfectly rational and wiſe judge; nothing in the leaſt degree unreaſonable will ever be required of any one.

7. A perſon may know, with the utmoſt certainty, that a thing (himſelf for inſtance) exiſts without having any knowledge at all of the *manner* how it exiſts.

8. If a perſon can know with certainty when any particular ſenſation, motive, or object affects his mind, he muſt alſo know with the ſame certainty *when* it does not affect his mind.

9. There is not any number, quantity *, or thing, which can be equal to, or leſs than nothing; or every real number, quantity, or thing, is greater than nothing.

10. A greater quantity can never in any caſe be taken from a leſſer.

This

* Algebraiſts, and modern theoretical mathematicians in general, have exerted their utmoſt authority to bring into diſcredit the ſelf-evident truths contained in Axioms 9, and 10. Maclaurin alone (the moſt rational of all the algebraiſts this Author has ever ſeen) ſenſibly declares, in Part I. Chap. i. S. 7.

of

This is perfectly ſelf-evident to an unprejudiced and unpuzzled mind; but as prejudice often

of his Algebra, that the quantities called negative are no leſs real than thoſe called poſitive; but he alſo inconſiderately ſuffers himſelf to be hurried away by the torrent of prejudice and error when, in the preceding ſection of the ſame chapter, he talks of "a greater quantity being taken from a leſſer of the ſame "kind;" and the explanation which he there attempts to give of this by lines, ſhews the impoſſibility of it; for when the greater line is to be taken out of the leſſer, he is obliged to ſuppoſe the leſſer line ſo much increaſed as to become the greater: and a little farther, in the ſame ſection, he owns, that "we know nothing "analogous to it in quantity *abſtractedly* conſidered; and cannot ſubtract a greater quantity of matter from a leſſer, or a greater quantity of light from a leſſer." He might have added, nor of any thing in nature; for if ſuch a thing exiſts, a greater quantity of which can be taken from a leſſer quantity thereof, let it be named; and let it be ſhewn how that thing came to have properties the very reverſe to thoſe of other things; but that ſuch a ſubtraction is univerſally, in every inſtance, in every ſcience, for ever impoſſible, is demonſtrated under Axiom 10. Nor is it difficult to diſcover what (aided by inattention or want of due conſideration) was the original cauſe of theſe groſs and moſt palpable errors. As the maſters of grammar-ſchools, when their pupils make Greek or Latin verſes, very judiciouſly teach them to make nonſenſical verſes at firſt, until they become tolerably well acquainted with proſody, with the quantity of the ſyllables and the ſtructure of the lines; in like manner the teachers of algebra inſtruct their pupils how to manage readily the mere ſymbols and ſigns made uſe of in that ſcience, before they give them any meaning, or make them repreſent any real quantities. They ſhew them how to change the ſigns, join or ſeparate, increaſe or diminiſh the ſymbols according

often renders men incapable of perceiving the cleareſt truth in nature, let it be conſidered (and it

cording to the rules of ſubtraction, multiplication, diviſion, involution, and evolution, &c. which rules are called addition, ſubtraction, &c. of quantities, but improperly, for they are at firſt nothing more than addition, ſubtraction, &c. of the bare ſymbols only, without any reference to quantities or real things; and this is not only proper but neceſſary, in order not to puzzle the learner with compound ſymbols before he is made acquainted with the management of ſimple ones, or thoſe conſiſting of ſingle terms; and in order to their learning this, it is neceſſary to give them examples of ſimple negative as well as poſitive ſymbols: thus $-4a$, or thus $0-4a$, which if intended to repreſent any real things or quantities, would repreſent four things or quantities to be ſubtracted from nothing, which is impoſſible. Again, when they give ſuch examples as the following:

From -	$+a$	Or from	$0+1a$
Take -	$+9a$	Take	$0+9a$
Remainder	$-8a$	Remainder	$0-8a$

which if the ſymbols had here any reference to real quantities would repreſent nine things or quantities taken from one to which each of them is equal, and the remainder would be 8 quantities or things leſs than 0; all which is utterly impoſſible. But in ſuch examples they have no more meaning than the nonſenſical verſes of the young poets; but are very proper examples to teach young algebraiſts the ſkilful management of their ſymbols, their tools or inſtruments, before they come to apply them to any rational uſe, to any operation of conſequence; for when they are ſo applied the ſymbol muſt, if ſimple, be always poſitive; or, if negative, it muſt be joined to a poſitive quantity, or quantities at leaſt equal to, if not greater, than this *negative* or quantity to *be ſubtracted*, which in algebra is the true meaning

it may haply remove the unſettled prejudices of young men) that in two unequal quantities ſome part of the greater is always equal to the leſſer; let this part of the greater be ſubtracted from the leſſer quantity, to which it is equal, and nothing remains; but there remains a part of the greater to be ſubtracted from nothing, which is impoſſible. Again, ſince ſome part of a greater quantity is always equal to a leſſer quantity, if a greater quantity can be taken from a leſſer, a whole quantity may be taken from a part of itſelf; or, in other words, a whole quantity may

ing of *negative*, as Mr. Maclaurin has very juſtly acknowledged. In order to enliven, and to bring this matter nigher to common apprehenſion, the Author wiſhes to illuſtrate it further by a familiar example drawn from a common but very uſeful buſineſs; namely, that of a young fellow who is deſtined tocut from the face of man what in former days was conſidered as highly reſpectable, but is, ſome how or another, become contemptible and ridiculous in theſe our days. This uſeful artiſt, before he is ſuffered to apply his well-ſharpened inſtrument to the human chin, is often wiſely taught to move it repeatedly over the face of the repreſentative *block*; or, as they commonly expreſs it, to ſhave a block firſt before "he ſhaves a man." In ſo doing he certainly does not actually ſhave the block, though it be ſo called; for if he did, the block in that caſe would have a beard analogous to what many perſons imagine negative quantities to be: for inſtance, when the young operator had ſhaved the block once, it would have a beard one degree leſs than nothing or no beard at all, which the block had originally; and when ſhaved twice, the quantity of its beard would be twice leſs than nothing; when thrice ſhaved, three times leſs, and ſo on *ad infinitum*.

be

be taken away when but a part only and not the whole is taken, all which is abſurd. Therefore, &c. *Q. E. D.*

11. Nothing (or an abſolute negation of all exiſtence) can have no powers or qualities whatever, neither quantity, part, nor number, ſituation, figure, nor motion, cannot be multiplied or divided, or in any wiſe diminiſhed, nor can it have any connection with any real exiſtence, or be in any manner or degree the cauſe or occaſion of any thing. *N. B.* In arithmetic, ciphers, or [00] when on the left hand of integral numbers, or on the right of decimals, or when alone, repreſent or ſignify nothing; but when on the right hand of integers, they have as real and poſitive a meaning as the ſigns have in algebra; *v. g.* one cipher ſignifies that the integral number on the right of which it ſtands, is one degree above units, thus [20]; two ciphers, that it is two degrees above, thus [200]; three ciphers, that it is three degrees removed from units; and ſo on according to our rules of numeration.

12. Our manner of conſidering things, whether abſtractedly, by a general view, or experimentally, by examining particulars, cannot in the leaſt degree alter the *nature* of the *things* themſelves; therefore, whatever is *really* true in theory muſt *always* be true in practice; and whatever is actually falſe or abſurd in theory, muſt be ſo in practice, and *vice verſa*: for *truth*,

or

or a juſt repreſentation of things, or of the nature of things, can never be *falſehood* or untruth, which is an unjuſt repreſentation of them.

It is aſtoniſhing how many inſinuations we find, even in authors of note, which militate againſt this moſt clear truth.

Theſe two poſtulates only, and theſe twelve axioms, with a few others equally clear, hereafter introduced, being granted (which ſurely no man poſſeſſing the right uſe of his underſtanding can heſitate to do), the Author hopes that in the courſe of the following eſſays, together with the notes and illuſtrations, he ſhall be able to prove, by clear and deciſive arguments, that the opinions which here follow (with ſeveral others of a like nature) are totally repugnant to matters of fact, or the real ſtate of things, and to all juſt reaſoning and deductions from thoſe facts.

OPINION I.

That the paſſions are the only principles of action in man: that with the aſſiſtance of reaſon, or the underſtanding, alone, man can neither begin nor continue any action; much leſs act in direct oppoſition to the impulſe of any preſent paſſion or inclination.

"Reaſon the chart, but paſſion is the gale,"

ſays Mr. Pope; but he and all others who have talked thus, have not conſidered that if there were no other cauſes or agents but the chart and the

the gale to direct and manage a ſhip, it would very ſoon be loſt.

OPINION II.

" * That good and evil are nothing but pleaſure " and pain; or thoſe things which procure us " pleaſure and pain; that therefore were all future " rewards and puniſhments removed, men might " chooſe contrary things, and yet all men chooſe " right;" that is to ſay, that he who would chooſe to deſtroy his father, brother, or his friend and benefactor, in order to poſſeſs and enjoy his kingdom or eſtate, would chooſe right, as well as he who would chooſe to be obedient, dutiful, and loving to his father, loving and kind to his brother, grateful and affectionate to his friend and benefactor. But the Author of this Treatiſe is of opinion, that (putting future puniſhment out of the queſtion) the greateſt curſe which can befal any one is, to be capable of any enjoyment, eaſe, or unconcern, after committing ſuch iniquitous, barbarous, ſuch diabolical enormities; and that enjoyment or pleaſure is ſo far from being always right and good, that it is often an unequivocal mark of the loweſt degradation of mind and heart, of the total abſence of all moral good, of every valuable principle, of all that is *reſpectable* and praiſe-worthy.

* See Locke's Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, B. II. Chap. xx. xxi. and xxii. and the greater part of our modern philoſophers, and many divines.

That

OPINION III.

That it is the mere will of God alone, which renders any actions morally and religiouſly good, and others morally and religiouſly evil, wicked or ſinful, by commanding the former to be done, and appointing future rewards for the doers of them; and by forbidding the others, and appointing future puniſhments to be inflicted on thoſe who commit them *: hence it follows, that were God to reverſe his commands thoſe actions, which we now call juſt, equitable, grateful, benevolent, &c. would become evil, wicked and abominable; and our preſent injuſtice, cruelty, ingratitude, malevolence, treachery, lying, and every abomination would all become good, holy, and divine.

OPINION IV.

That the goodneſs, juſtice and mercy of God are not of the ſame nature as the goodneſs, juſtice and mercy of good men; but ſo very different from them, nay, ſo thoroughly contrary to them, that it is perfectly conſiſtent with his juſtice, goodneſs and mercy, to have doomed great numbers, many millions of his children, before their creation, by an eternal irreverſible decree, to endleſs and exceſſive torments, without any poſſibility of eſcaping them. (See all the defenders of predeſtination.)—But ſome there are, who, to ſoften, as they think, this tremendous decree, ſeem to

* See Locke, Paley, and many others.

admit a bare poſſibility, but no probability of eſcaping eternal torments to any but the elect alone, whoſe eſcape they make certain and infallible, and always take care to enrol themſelves in the number. This apology for ſuffering the greater part of mankind to periſh everlaſtingly for the want of that ſufficient ſaving grace, which is affirmed to be freely given to the elect alone, is not better than what might be ſaid in juſtification of thoſe parents among the ancient Romans, &c. and among many Aſiatic and African nations at this day, who cruelly and inhumanly expoſe many of their helpleſs new-born infants in the woods, fields, &c. to almoſt certain deſtruction; but the apologiſts for theſe unnatural parents might ſay, with at leaſt as much reaſon and juſtice as thoſe enthuſiaſts, that their deſtruction is not the fault of their parents, on account of the poſſibility that ſome *one* in ten thouſand of theſe unhappy outcaſts may happen to be pitied, taken up, nurſed, and educated by ſome humane ſtranger.

OPINION V.

" That finite Beings cannot comprehend or " know what belongs to an infinite Being, cannot " comprehend or underſtand even his moral at- " tributes; but that he is, ſtrictly and literally " ſpeaking, incomprehenſible to us; from whence " it follows, that we cannot prove or know but " that attributes the very reverſe of what we mean " by

"by the words juſtice, goodneſs, impartiality "and mercy may be the real attributes of the Judge "of all the earth." (See great numbers of the fathers of the church, and many modern divines and philoſophers).

OPINION VI.

"That there are no certain immutable ſtandards of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, of duty and undutifulneſs in nature; that the eſſences of theſe, as well as of other mixed modes, are nothing but abſtract ideas made by the mind, and made very arbitrarily, without patterns or reference to any real exiſtence.

"That being the workmanſhip of the mind, and not referred to the real exiſtence of things, there is no ſuppoſition of any thing more ſignified by their names, but barely the complex ideas the mind itſelf has formed, being all it would have expreſſed by them *."

In

* Mr. Locke, in chap. ix. § 7. of the ſame book, allows that the names of ſome few mixed modes may have ſtandards in nature; for he only ſays there, "the names of mixed modes for *the moſt part* want ſtandards in nature;" and in § 6. of chap. v. he ſays that "there is nothing more evident than that, for the *moſt part*, in framing theſe ideas, the mind ſearches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas it makes to the real exiſtence of things." In the very next ſection, viz. the 7th, he deviates ſtill further from his firſt opinion, and talks in a language utterly inconſiſtent with it; for there his words are thus; "though theſe complex

In conformity to *this*, though far from being Mr. Locke's conſtant ſettled opinion (as appears by the note annexed*), Dr. Hartley, in his Theory of the Mind, p. 333, as publiſhed by Dr. Prieſtley, deduces, "all moral judgments, approbations and diſapprobations, from aſſociation alone, and not from the eternal reaſons and relations of things."

According to which doctrine, *juſtice* (that is to ſay, true juſtice, not falſe notions of it, which are certainly various) and all real moral obligation is nothing certain, but varies extremely according to people's cuſtoms, notions, or prejudices; this the Doctor ſays expreſsly in page 355 of his Theory: "Man may alſo," ſays he, "inflict puniſhment *juſtly*, provided he does it according to ſome "definition of juſtice amongſt men previouſly ſettled and allowed." How many men are neceſſary to ſettle any definition of juſtice, the Doctor has

ideas are *not always* copied from *nature*, &c." where his meaning appears to be, that they are very often, though not always; and that ſuch was his meaning in this place, is confirmed by what he ſays a little further in the ſame ſection; namely, "that in making the ſpecies of mixed modes, men have had regard *only* to ſuch combinations as they had occaſion to mention to one another. Thoſe they have combined into diſtinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilſt others, that in *nature* have as *near* an union, are left looſe and unregarded;" and immediately after declares that the number of theſe left unregarded muſt be infinite *in human actions only*, to go no farther.

* See Mr. Locke's Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, B. iii. chap. 5. § 3, and 14.

not

not told us; but as he mentions, in the page juſt quoted, "compliance with the laws of ſociety" as one definition of juſtice among an indefinite number of others, he expreſsly allows each ſociety, whether nations or independent tribes, a *right* to ſettle or allow any definition of juſtice at their arbitrary wills and pleaſure, and that *thereby* it *becomes* real, true juſtice, according to which a man may juſtly act, even puniſh or put to death his neighbour or his brother, if he be ſo inclined. Thus juſtice becomes any thing whatſoever, as people pleaſe to ſettle or allow it to ſuit their own national views or corporate intereſt; and the moſt contradictory definitions of it by nations, or tribes, whoſe intereſts or ſelfiſh views claſh, muſt be *equally* true. At this rate, it was real juſtice in the Lacedæmonians to kill the unarmed Helots when they pleaſed, without any provocacation; and in them and other nations to kill weak and deformed children. The ſons of the Iſraelites were alſo juſtly put to death in Egypt. All nations or tribes, who live by piracy, rapine, and devaſtation, have alſo juſtice on their ſide, if they pleaſe to define it ſo; and all the wanton cruelties of a Nero, or a Muley Iſmael, are high and imperial juſtice, no doubt: nay, all the ſtudied tortures, executions, and ruin of many millions of ſcrupulous Chriſtians, from the death of Chriſt to the laſt *auto de fé*, muſt by this rule be ſignal ex-

amples of the juſtice of nations and ſocieties, imperial and regal, lay and eccleſiaſtical. It is ſaid in Geneſis, that before the deluge came, "the earth was filled with violence;*" this, according to the true philoſophical language, ſhould be corrected and rendered better thus,—and the earth was filled with *juſtice.*"

Dr. Prieſtley alſo, in his introductory eſſays prefixed to Dr. Hartley's Theory †, maintains that our "ideas of moral right and wrong" our judgments "of moral obligations" are formed from a great "variety of elements," ſuch as *force* the authorities of parents and maſters; in a word, from the prejudices of education, cuſtoms and habits, and not from our "views" of things, or of "certain actions and ſentiments." This opinion alone, he thinks, can account for "that prodigious diverſity in the ſentiments of mankind, reſpecting the objects of moral obligation."

He inſtances in our ſentiments of injuſtice and murder, which he repreſents as very different things in different countries. His word are theſe: "It is hardly poſſible to define any circumſtances "in which ſome part of mankind have not, with-"out the leaſt ſcruple or remorſe, ſeized the pro-"perty or taken away the lives of others." And the inference he draws from thence, is not that mens

* Which is repreſented as the cauſe of it. † P. 43, 44, &c.

ambition,

ambition, avarice and luſts, if permitted to get a thorough poſſeſſion of their hearts and minds, often render them deaf to the plaineſt and loudeſt calls of natural juſtice. No ſuch thing. His opinion is, that this is owing to the different definitions of juſtice and murder, in different countries, which, he ſays, "muſt vary in almoſt every one." From all which he concludes, that "our moral ideas cannot be, properly ſpeaking, *natural*, but muſt be *factitious*." "If the idea of moral obligation," (ſays the* Doctor, in his introductory eſſays above-mentioned, page 43) was a ſimple idea, ariſing from the view of certain actions or ſentiments, I do not ſee why it ſhould not be as invariable as the perception of colours and ſounds." The anſwer to this is obvious; namely, that had the great rulers of the nations, the high prieſts, and deſpotic monarchs of the earth, and others who ſubſiſt and thrive by deluding their brethren, found it to be as much their perſonal, ſelfiſh intereſt to make men reject the evidence of their eyes and ears, and of their underſtanding alſo, with regard to colours and ſounds, as they have often found it to be to induce men to reject the no leſs clear evidence of their inward perception and their underſtanding, with regard to the objects of moral obligation, we have no reaſon to doubt

* Introductory Epiſtles, page 43.

but the errors, follies, and extravagances of the human race would have been as great and as frequent reſpecting colours and ſounds, and other objects of our ſenſes, as with reſpect to morals; for we are not deſtitute, as things are, of many notable examples, not only of private perſons, but of ſocieties, ſects and nations, who have rejected the cleareſt evidence of their outward ſenſes on ſeveral occaſions. It was a well known maxim of the ancient ſceptics that their evidence is doubtful, at beſt, in all caſes; and one bold, ancient philoſopher, in defiance of the united evidence of almoſt all the ſenſes together, is ſaid to have maintained ſeriouſly, that there neither is, nor ever can be, ſuch a thing as *motion*. The innumerable teſtimonies, upon oath, given by people of every condition, age and character in all Europe, and perhaps in all the world, for many centuries, of the incredible and ridiculous wonders which they had ſeen, felt, and heard witches, wizards, or enchanters perform; together with the numberleſs oaths and aſſeverations of perſons of almoſt every deſcription in Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, Sileſia, and many other countries, declaring that they had ſeen and felt dead bodies which had been buried for many days, ſometimes for whole months, ſuck their blood; that they knew them well; and that, upon opening their graves, they found them as freſh as the moment they died, without

without any ſign of corruption or offenſive ſmell, and with their ſtomachs quite full of liquid, freſh, uncoagulated blood, which they had juſt ſucked from their veins; that this happened before multitudes, all of whom were ready, and many of them made affidavits in confirmation of what happened at the graves *. Theſe are ſtriking and deciſive proofs how far men in general can not only diſbelieve and reject the real evidence of their ſenſes (but alſo force them to become falſe witneſſes of what never had, nor can have an exiſtence), when thoroughly influenced and *deluded* by prejudices, or erroneous, fooliſh, *unnatural* aſſociation of ideas; from whence ariſe the endleſs and aſtoniſhing follies of mankind. By this we ſee what a charming ſource this aſſociation † of ideas muſt be from whence to draw moral truth; or any other,

* See the Hiſtory of the Vampires, by Don Auguſtin Calmet; King James's Dæmonology, and many other accounts of witches and witchcraft, &c.

† "This wrong connection in our minds of ideas, in themſelves looſe and independent one of another, has ſuch an influence, and is of ſo great force to ſet us awry in our own actions, as well moral as natural, paſſions, reaſonings, and notions themſelves; that, perhaps, there is not any one thing that deſerves more to be looked after;" ſays Mr. Locke, very juſtly, in Book ii. Chap. 33. § 9. of his Eſſay. In § 3d and 4th of the ſame chapter, he had before, with great truth, called this caſual union of ideas, "unreaſonableneſs, oppoſition to reaſon," and even "*madneſs*."

without

without conſulting nature and reaſon, the real ſources of every truth.

Monſ. Savary, in his Letters from Egypt, mentions a remarkable inſtance of the laſt-mentioned deluſion and folly, which happened in the Greek Iſlands; where a livid, rotten carcaſe, emitting the moſt offenſive ſtench (as well it might, having been buried about three months, in that hot country too), was taken out of the grave before thouſands of ſpectators, of all ages and conditions, who unanimouſly declared (and would no doubt have ſworn it if required, as others had often done), that it appeared to them as ruddy and freſh as when alive, and that it had not the leaſt offenſive ſmell. It has been aſſerted, from good authority, that ſome Indians who came to Europe (ſoon after the diſcovery of Canada), on their return home, when they related to their countrymen (reſiding ſomewhere near the Lakes) the wonders they had ſeen in this part of the world, were immediately checked by them, and perſuaded that what they ſuppoſed they had ſeen was impoſſible; that the Europeans were great enchanters, and had deceived their eyes with falſe deluſive viſions *.

Mr. Savary, whom we have quoted above by memory only, mentions that there is a ſtone in

* The Author had this account from Sir W. J.

Egypt,

Egypt, where all zealous Mahometans clearly diſcern the print of Mahomet's foot, though it be totally inviſible to all others.

Many, very many other accounts might be given of people, in all parts of the world, who perſevere in diſbelieving the conſtant and cleareſt evidence of their ſenſes when they diſagree with their ſtupid prejudices, their *falſe* aſſociation of ideas, many of which the diligent enquirer will, no doubt, recollect. But the moſt wonderful of all things, in this caſe, is, that any men but the moſt ignorant and prejudiced, the moſt blinded and enſlaved by *unnatural* aſſociations and wild unguided paſſions! eſpecially that ſuch men as Mr. Locke and Dr. Prieſtley ſhould overlook, even for a moment, a rule of ſuch ſuperior clearneſs, ſuch diſtinguiſhed ſelf-evidence as that of the natural, invariable difference between moral right and wrong; which has been noticed by the wiſeſt men in different ages, and, near 1800 years paſt, when the wickedneſs of the world had induced men to ſhut their eyes againſt it, was again ſet forth, and enforced by the higheſt authority in theſe words: "Therefore *, all things what-"ſoever ye would that men ſhould do to you, "ſo do ye alſo to them; for this is the law and "the prophets."

* This is literally tranſlated, word for word, from the original; therefore there is a Greciſm in it.

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This is the univerſal rule of right and wrong, the root, the foundation, the firſt principle of true religion and pure morality, or righteouſneſs! which are ever inſeparably connected in all inſtances without one exception. This is that true wiſdom which lifteth up her voice through all nature to all rational beings! this the eternal, moſt ſacred law of all laws! to the *teſt* of which every law, every rule, and every action of every moral agent will be brought, and by which they will be approved of, or condemned for ever! The truth of this great univerſal law ſtrikes the mind with as full and inſtantaneous a conviction as the following axioms of Euclid: "If to equal things "are added equal things, the wholes will be equal. "If equal things be added to unequal things, the "wholes will be unequal."—And this we beg leave to call the 13th axiom.

OPINION VII.

"That the opinions and judgments which men "form depend not at all upon their wills, but "that men are paſſive in forming all their judg-"ments of things or actions; which judgments "are ſaid to be the neceſſary reſults of the vari-"ous arguments or proofs, or the various views "of things which are preſented to their minds. (See Mr. Locke, Dr. Prieſtley, and many other philoſophers.) This opinion will appear very

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extraordinary, if we only conſider that the Author of Nature and his creation diſcover eminent wiſdom and truth; but that the greater part of the judgments which men form of them diſplay aſtoniſhing weakneſs, folly, and untruth; and particularly, that far the greater part of the religious judgments and opinions formed, and moſt earneſtly and eagerly entertained in the different countries, and among the different nations and ſects upon earth, are not only diſcordant and highly *inconſiſtent* among themſelves, but are directly contrary to thoſe firſt principles of wiſdom and goodneſs which we expreſs by the words impartiality, juſtice, and mercy.

OPINION VIII.

" That however purely generous and detached " from all conſiderations of ſelf ſome actions of " men may appear to be, yet in reality the view " of every man, the end which he aims at in every " action, is only ſome pleaſure, profit, or advan- " tage to himſelf. Even in thoſe actions which " wear the faireſt appearance of diſintereſtedneſs, " or of intending only the good of others, our " ſole view is to obtain thoſe pleaſing ſenſations " for ourſelves which we think, or know by ex- " perience, the contemplation of the *good* and " happineſs of others is apt to give us: without " which conſiderations the good or benefit of " others move or influence our actions no more

" than

" than the happineſs or even miſery of the once " beloved *object* influences many an ardent ad- " mirer when love is no more. In a word, that " man can have no view beyond *ſelf* in any action " whatever."—We hope, after having firſt re- moved ſeveral other errors which lie in the way, to prove that this opinion is as *falſe*, as it is *mean*, and *deteſtable*.

OPINION IX.

" That all the different nations of men upon " the earth have not naturally the ſame degree " of underſtanding, and are not of the ſame race " or ſpecies of beings in the ſcale of creation; " but that the Negroes, or Black men, in parti- " cular, are of a middle order, between Europe- " ans and ſome beaſts, ſuch as monkeys, &c." (See the Lectures of ſome famous anatomiſts, and ſeveral other writings.) But that the Negroes are of the ſame rank in the creation, of the very ſame race as the Whites, is evident from hence; that the intermarriages of the children of Blacks and Whites produce children as well as thoſe be- tween Blacks or Whites only; which is not the caſe with animals of a different race or nature, for they produce only mules, or monſters, and there the generation ends. And that the Negroes and Indians are inferior in natural underſtanding to any other nations does by no means appear, but

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is totally void of all probability; for no people poſſeſſing any degree of underſtanding ever held more abſurd and ſenſeleſs opinions on the moſt important ſubjects, as well as others, than Europeans in general have for many ages; many of which are obſtinately adhered to at this very day by the greater part of us.

Let Vanpiriſm, the belief of old women's commanding evil ſpirits, atheiſm, tranſubſtantiation, or cauſing *that* which has been *created, never* to have *been created*; ſcepticiſm; the cruel partiality attributed to the Deity, his transferring crimes from the guilty to the innocent, even to innocent children, and that in direct contradiction to our Saviour's declaration in their favour when brought to him; quantities, or things leſs than nothing; others taken out of nothing, and a great number more, many of which are mentioned in theſe Eſſays—

Let all this multitude of (what can we decently call them?)—of ſupreme follies, be our witneſſes in this caſe; as well as the ſavage, barbarous laws and cuſtoms of our anceſtors, from the fifth to the ſixteenth century, to mention no other period; for which ſee Dr. Robertſon's View of the State of Europe*, prefixed to his Hiſtory of

* This excellent treatiſe of Dr. Robertſon is a full confutation of Mr. Burke's wild, inconſiderate encomiums on the ages of chivalry and romance.

Charles

Charles V. See alſo the Spaniards conqueſt of Mexico, Peru, and other parts of America, together with the Tranſactions of ſeveral European Nations in the Eaſt Indies.

All which, well conſidered, we may ſafely conclude, that no *people* upon *earth*, with *advantages equal* to ours, could have fallen into greater ſtupidity, cruelty, nonſenſe, and barbarity, than the proud, inſolent, unfeeling Europeans have done.

OPINION X.

"That man has no ſoul or ſpiritual ſubſtance, "but conſiſts entirely of a body or material ſub- "ſtance, which material ſubſtance, or (as it is "commonly called) matter, according to the "account which ſome philoſophers give of "it, is every thing; but when we enquire "into the nature of it, and what it is com- "poſed of, they make it abſolutely nothing, "as Dr. Price, Dr. Prieſtley's friend, has juſtly "obſerved in his correſpondence with that gen- "tleman." This opinion will be repeatedly conſidered, and (as the Author hopes), ſatisfactorily refuted in the courſe of theſe Eſſays.

OPINION XI.

That we never do, or can ſee, or perceive any real ſubſtance or thing, any part of the real heavens and earth which God has created, or any thing therein contained; that we can only perceive

ceive images, pictures, or ideas * of them in in our brain, or a particular part of the brain, which philoſophers are pleaſed to call the *ſenſorium*; which images, pictures, ſhadows, or ideas of things, are ſuppoſed to be there formed in the following extraordinary manner; that is to ſay, againſt the ſurfaces of all bodies of a certain magnitude innumerable other bodies of an inconceivably ſmaller ſize †, are ſuppoſed to be driven with ſuch a force, that they thence rebound in continued ſtreams, and many of them happening in their courſe to hit our eyes and the nerves at the bottom of the eye, cauſe various tremulous motions or vibrations in thoſe nerves, which, being by them communicated to the brain and ſenſorium, there form all thoſe pictures or repreſentations of real outward things which pictures alone we perceive, though wonderful to tell, we never perceive, never have the leaſt glimpſe of the brain or ſenſorium itſelf, the *place* where all theſe images, forms, or repreſentations of all things are ſaid to be perpetually and clearly ſeen; nor do we ever perceive any of the innumerable motions in our brain and ſenſorium which are continually and moſt buſily there

* Mr. Locke's words are, "That we can perceive nothing but our own ideas."

† This is called the *Corpuſcularian* Hypotheſis, and a curious hypotheſis it is.

employed in drawing and painting this endleſs and wonderful variety of ſuch exquiſite figures as no painter on earth could ever perfectly imitate. This is very ſurpriſing, being the reverſe of all our experience of the whole courſe of nature in every ſimilar inſtance; but what follows is ſtill more ſo.

All theſe forms or images (as they are called) which are perceived by us, are ſuppoſed, nay, are confidently declared, by many to be real, true pictures, or repreſentations of the various parts of the material world, and of all things therein contained; and moſt aſſuredly, if they be not true repreſentations of them, we have no real, no true repreſentations at all of the created world itſelf, or of any thing in it. But notwithſtanding this, when the philoſophers who ſupport this opinion come to give us an account of, to explain to us the nature of the outward real world, and of the actually exiſting things within it, we find theſe images or pictures of them (as they are maintained to be, and as their ſyſtem requires them to be), are no more truly ſo than than a grain of duſt, or the ſmalleſt ſpeck upon paper, is of the whole created univerſe; for we are aſſured by the ſame men, that all outward bodies, even thoſe which are repreſented to us under the figures or appearances of indiviſible points, are, notwithſtanding, infinitely, or for ever diviſible,

diviſible, and therefore contain, or are compoſed of an indefinite number of parts, bodies, or ſubſtances. The real created world, and all the real things therein, being thus (as theſe ſages contend), out of the reach of our immediate perception and examination, and the ſuppoſed repreſentations of them being infinitely inadequate, or no repreſentations at all, as juſt obſerved; the imaginations of proud, myſtical, puzzled mortals, being, in this manner, let looſe into a ſuppoſed inviſible creation, and being utterly uncontrolled by any real experience of this imagined univerſe, they form, at random, ſuch wild, lawleſs, extravagant notions, and give ſuch unreaſonable, inconſiſtent accounts of what they call the real world, as can hardly be equalled (as appears to this Author), by any others ever formed by the darkeſt ignorance, or through the greateſt natural diſorder incident to the human mind; ſuch, for examples, as the following:

That a bit of real created bread or wafer may be changed into the whole real uncreated ſubſtance of the deity, of him whom the heaven of heavens, the entire univerſe cannot contain *; and therefore, that one ſingle identical body may be wholly and entirely in one particular place,

* Or, as others ſay (who reject a change of ſubſtance) may be ſo *conjoined* or *intermixed* with the whole divine ſubſtance, as to form, in ſome ſenſe, but one ſubſtance.

and alſo in millions of other, and very diſtant places, at one and the ſame moment of time, whole and entire in each place, ſo that millions of bodies, each of them equal to a particular body, ſhall all together be but equal to it $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{10}$, or $\frac{1}{100}$, &c. of the whole number, ſhall be equal to the whole. Therefore, alſo, that what is paſt and done, may be made not to be paſt and done; that what has moſt truly and certainly been made or created (bread and wine for inſtance), may as truly be never made or created at all, being changed into the uncreated ſubſtance of the deity; ſo that *what* has really and truly *been*, may, notwithſtanding, have *never been* at any time; but that truth may be a lie, and falſehood truth, and that each of them may be neither the one nor the other. That all bodies, even the leaſt that we can have any conception of, are infinitely, or for ever diviſible, and that they all have ſuch and ſo many pores, that this whole world, if rendered perfectly ſolid, or devoid of all pores, might be contained (for aught any one can know to the contrary), in a ſpace much leſs than the eye of the ſmalleſt needle.—That ſpace itſelf has diſtinct parts, or "*partes extra partes*" (as they expreſs it), and that each conceivable part of it has, like bodies, an infinite number of other parts, and yet that ſpace cannot be divided or conceived to be ſo in thought

or

or imagination. That ſpace is an attribute of the Deity. Others, who deny this, hold, nevertheleſs, that ſpace is infinite, uncreated, coexiſtent with, and independent of, the Maker of all things.—See Dr. Clarke, Dr. Prieſtley, and innumerable philoſophers and divines.

O! how the mind is opened and enlightened by theſe things! but we have others, and, were it poſſible, greater wonders to recount.

OPINION XII.

"That man is under as irreſiſtible a force as "abſolute a neceſſity in all his thoughts, judg-"ments and actions as any *machine* of wood, braſs, "iron, and other ſuch materials can be in their "movements and operations:" that "God is "the only proper *agent* in the univerſe;" that he alone is the author (though he forceth nearly all men to believe the contrary) of all human actions (as they are ignorantly called), of every odious *lie*, of every *groſs folly*, of all infamous and abominable iniquity, treachery, ingratiude, and inhumanity! in all its degrees of horrible hard-heartedneſs, and unrelenting barbarity, &c. &c. All this is ſaid to be the work of the God of *wiſdom* and benevolence, who hateth a *lie*, and "is of purer eyes, than to behold iniquity with approbation;" who is perfect in wiſdom, and whom no folly can approach; and yet is made

by thoſe, who hold the above opinion, the real author of every *folly* and iniquity under heaven. Nothing that he has ever read, or heard of, has aſtoniſhed the writer of theſe Eſſays ſo much, or has appeared ſo unaccountable, as that any men, who are aſhamed of, and diſdain lying, treachery and other infamous vices, can have found it in their hearts to aſcribe all lies, abſurdities, and iniquities, to the God of wiſdom and goodneſs; and, certainly (as he thinks), if any extravagance of mind had been beyond the reach of man, this ſurely had been it. This moſt deteſtable of all opinions! for moſt hateful and abominable it muſt he, to every conſiſtent man, who really and ſincerely honours and loves his creator, his heavenly Father; and is truly aſhamed of, and ſincerely hates falſehood, treachery, fraud, cruelty, and every baſe iniquity. This author cannot conceive how it can be poſſible for any virtuous or decent man to think otherwiſe, unleſs his mind, his thoughts and ideas, be in the very extreme of inconſiſtency, confuſion, and contradiction: but wonderful as it may appear, there are ſome men who ſeem capable of ſuch palpable, ſuch glaring contradictions of mind; for in their general practice, they appear to hate lying, fraud, treachery, &c.—yet in their writings and converſations hold every action *bad* as well as good, the *worſt* as well as the beſt, to be done by him, who loveth

loveth righteouſneſs and hateth iniquity; and whom they declare (but with utmoſt contradiction) to be the object of their trueſt reverence and pureſt affection; that is to ſay, they profeſs to ſcorn, deſpiſe, and hate thoroughly, innumerable actions, and to love, with truth and ſincerity, the author or doer of them, the cauſe or contriver, from whom they all proceed; they alſo ſeem to entertain a conſiderable degree of indignation againſt the unhappy paſſive inſtruments made uſe of by the real author, to accompliſh theſe atrocious deeds, with as much reaſon as a man (if ſuch a man could be) who would transfer his whole indignation to a horſe forced to go over and kill his child; at the ſame time that he could love the rider who had driven him over and murdered the helpleſs innocent.

But many of thoſe who adopt this tenet of philoſophical neceſſity, are not ſo ſurpriſingly inconſiſtent! their only view in adopting it, being to ſoothe their conſciences, by annihilating every every idea of real guilt * in man; and, ſo to remove all ſelf-condemnation, the greateſt impedi-

* "The inquiſitive mind of man" ſays Mr. Locke, "will-"ing to ſhift off from himſelf, as far as he can, all thoughts of "guilt, though it be by putting himſelf into a worſe ſtate, that "of fatal neceſſity, &c." *Eſſay on Human Underſtanding, Book II. Chap. xxi. Sect.* 22.

ment and ruggedneſs, from the road to vice and ruin, to alluring but ſelfiſh and vicious indulgence, to ſhameful and fatal exceſs. The writer of this, has heard perſons of conſiderable knowledge and abilities, expreſs themſelves as follows: "If "I could have avoided many things that I have "done, what account can I give?" But, ſay theſe philoſophers, it is exactly the ſame thing whether the firſt over-ruling cauſe, force men to perpetrate the horrid evils above enumerated, or permit them to commit ſuch atrocious deeds, all of which, by his preſcience, he muſt have foreſeen, and therefore might have prevented; in which caſe, ſay they, we ſee no difference between force and permiſſion. But to the writer of this, there appears herein as great a difference as between any innocent and immoral act whatever. This difference has alſo been diſcerned, as themſelves affirm, by the greater part of our beſt writers, both moraliſts and divines, ſuch as Dr. Samuel Clarke, Archbiſhop Tillotſon, Milton, Locke, Lord Shafteſbury, and many others in modern times: if we ſay nothing of prophets, apoſtles and others, the moſt diſtinguiſhed in times long paſt; to whom it has appeared (as it does to this author) that between merely permitting men, after having earneſtly exhorted them to the contrary, to utter follies, lies, blaſphemies, &c. or to commit cruel, mercileſs actions; between this and abſo-

abſolutely forcing, or even teaching them ſo to do, there has appeared as great a moral difference as between any two things whatever; when (the beſt inſtructions, and moſt earneſt exhortations, having failed) there remain no other means of preventing them, than by maiming, deſtroying, or putting them in perpetual chains. And inaſmuch as the Meſſiah, who brought divine wiſdom again from heaven, has explained God's dealings towards us, by comparing them with the actions of our earthly parents; by his example and authority, may we not, in the like manner, ſay,—that the extreme moral difference between actually uttering and teaching lies, cruelties, &c. and merely permitting ſuch odious deeds, to avoid reducing men to the condition of chained ſlaves, or brute beaſts, remains the ſame with regard to the univerſal Father, as with regard to parents here below; whom no one ever charged with being the authors of their deſcendants' wickedneſs, or even blamed on that account, provided they have taught, exhorted, and encouraged them to avoid evil deeds; though all their deſcendants' folly and wickedneſs might have been prevented, had they avoided marrying; but they knew not with abſolute certainty, it will be ſaid, that their deſcendants would be wicked; they knew, however, with moral certainty, that ſome of them would be ſo, eſpecially in a corrupted

corrupted age. Are they, therefore, as guilty, as much the authors of their children, or grand children's iniquities, as if they had inſtructed and encouraged them to commit ſuch enormous acts? more eſpecially, ſtill, if they have, on the contrary, inſtructed and exhorted them to avoid ſuch abominable deeds? If *they* are not guilty, why is the heavenly Father? But he might have prevented all moral evil, ſay they, by changing men's diſpoſitions. Anſwer; not, without taking away all *truly free* choice, which would at once deſtroy the very poſſibility of all that we call virtue, excellence and worth, in human characters, of every thing in the *human*, which excels that of the *brute* character. An abſolutely free choice! cry they, "ſuch a thing cannot be, "or you take away God's preſcience, for it is a "contradiction, an abſolute impoſſibility, that "any act of another perſon can be foreſeen, if "produceed by a ſelf-determining power, a per-"fectly free choice."

This is certainly very roundly aſſerted, but, notwithſtanding that, is not ſupported by any proof; for however difficult it may be for us to conceive how this can be, that difficulty proves juſt nothing; for it is no leſs difficult for us to conceive how the all-wiſe, all-perfect God can know what pain of body, agony and diſtreſs of mind, nay the very pangs of a guilty conſcience, are;

re; which he certainly does, though it be utterly impoſſible for him to *feel* or to know them by experience. Nor need we wonder at the impoſſibility of our conceiving theſe things, if we conſider that it muſt appear a *contradiction*, an impoſſibility, to men born blind, that others ſhould be able to feel things far beyond the reach of their hands and fingers; for that muſt be the *idea* they have of *ſeeing:* nay, moſt perſons, who are ignorant of the rules of trigonometry, maintain it to be impoſſible to calculate great diſtances without meaſuring them as leagues and miles are meaſured on the high roads. From hence it appears, that we cannot know with certainty whether abſolutely free actions can be known before the Searcher of all hearts perceives the free agent's reſolution to perform them; nor probably can we attain to a certainty herein, unleſs it could be proved that God's foreſeeing each deceitful, wicked, and prophane act makes him the real author of all ſuch actions. If this could be demonſtrated, it would inevitably follow, that "to "foreſee free actions is a contradiction in the "nature of things;" for moſt certain it is, as certain as that there is a natural unalterable contradiction between good and evil, between gratitude and ingratitude, between benevolence and cruelty, between falſehood and truth, that the perfectly wiſe and good God, in whom no contradiction

tradiction or folly can have place, cannot be the real author of ſtupid *follies*, of ſcandalous andunnatural* *lies*; ſuch as denying his own exiſtence, for example (as Pliny and many others have formally done); nor of the eruelties, unnatural barbarities, and other horrible abominations, with which the earth is curſed in every age. *Life* and *death* could as ſoon *co-exiſt* in the ſame *individual being*, as ſuch contradictions of character or attributes in a Being of perfect wiſdom.—Of which a great deal more hereafter, when we come to conſider the teſtimonies of the ſacred writers upon this ſubject, the nature of the human mind, of conſcience, of conſciouſneſs, and of other affections and acts of our minds.—And moreover, to conſider particularly all the objections made to the doctrine of human freedom; when, we hope, it will appear that the juſt, the orderly government of the univerſe may be moſt wiſely carried on by him ("who ſearcheth the heart and reins," who perceives the very beginning of every thought and deſign) notwithſtanding it be his good-will and pleaſure that many of the actions of thinking beings ſhould be free, and *independent* of his power; for inaſmuch as he moſt clearly diſcerns all their evil purpoſes and determinations in the

* By unnatural, we mean, ſuch as no man can utter or perpetrate till long diſciplined and hardened by a continued ſeries of falſehoods and iniquities.

firſt

ſt beginning of their formation, he can check
d prevent all or any of them, when requiſite,
m taking effect; nay, can annihilate them ere
ey receive their full formation, or if permitted
produce their various effects, can divert evil
elf from its otherwiſe neceſſary conſequence*,
to

* The nature of vice is to ſpread and infect all around it; "evil communications corrupt good manners;" bad examples the moſt infectious of all things. In ſhort, ſo far is vice m having ſomething in its own nature which tends perpe-lly to diminiſh it, and at length to deſtroy it (as ſome writ-contend), that it would in all probability in a very ſhort e, without the conſtant care and over-ruling wiſdom of the ſt pure and holy God, infect the whole of the human race: he, like a kind and affectionate parent (as he moſt emi-ntly is, for who has given natural affection to all parents but ?) reſtrains and ſets bounds to it by many admirable ways, perceived by us; as well as by his divine laws and precepts, the remorſe of conſcience, by his boundleſs promiſes to the edient and kind-hearted, and by the moſt dreadful threaten-s "againſt every ſoul of man that doeth evil" and repente ! and when all theſe means fail, as they ſometimes have e, by the immediate interpoſition of his irreſiſtible power, at the general *Deluge!* The reality of which aſtoniſhing nt it is not difficult to demonſtrate by *unequivocal* marks of h a ſudden, violent, univerſal inundation! A total change of ation of the ſea and dry ground in a very ſhort time; not of radual and almoſt imperceptible change of places by the ſea l land in the couſe of many millions of years, as unbelievers y vainly dream, which can produce nothing ſimilar to the digious irreſiſtible force of a ſudden, rapid, total inundation, effects of which we find in places without number on the

face

to forward his own wiſe and benevolent deſigns, ſuch as (among many others unknown to us) the

face of this globe; ſuch as immenſe foreſts torn up and ſwe away together, then lifted high, and carried whole, root a branch, to the tops of the higheſt mountains, and there dep ſited in ſuch quantities that the inhabitants of thoſe hilly r gions have not nearly exhauſted them at this day, though th have uſed them for fuel for many ages. The Writer of th has often examined theſe wonderful magazines of antidiluvi foreſts upon very barren and high mountains, the air and ſoil which will not permit the hardieſt ſhrub, ſo much as a thorn, grow; much leſs would they ſuch very large timber as he h ſeen dug from the numerous bogs often found upon lofty a extenſive eminences, ſuch as are ever covered with clouds ſnow; theſe ſubterranean foreſts, therefore, as well as the m rine productions frequently diſcovered in the rocks and oth parts of ſuch mountains, muſt have been brought there from great diſtance. Theſe later productions conſiſt of innumera ſhells, petrified fiſh, and other marine ſubſtances which exhi not, like the *luſus naturæ*, rude imperfect reſemblances of ſhe fiſh, and other things, but are formed with the utmoſt exactn in a perfect likeneſs of the preſent ſhells and other productio of the ſea: the *luſus nataræ*, on the contrary, always requi the aſſiſtance of imagination, or of art, and often of both, make out their reſemblance. The preſent condition, and t great quantities ſtill remaining of this ſubterranean wood a timber, fully prove that this general deluge muſt have happe about the time mentioned in Geneſis at the fartheſt, and n many millions of ages paſt, as ſome are pleaſed to imagine. L thoſe who can reject this evidence, for what evidence is th that men who wiſh and ſtudy to diſbelieve an over-ruling P vidence, cannot reject * ? Let ſuch (for it becomes them) t

* See Locke, Bolingbroke, &c. &c.

ſhew uniformly to all rational nature his utter abhorrence, his eternal hatred of falſehood and iniquity

of quantities leſs than nothing; of there being no difference between moral good and evil, gratitude and ingratitude, if not ſucceeded by puniſhment; of man being a mere machine; of ideas being the only "materials" of real knowledge and truth; of a thing conſiſting of innumerable diſtinct parts, yet not diviſible even in thought; of an immenſe and cloſely connected *chain*, conſiſting of one real link only, and that ſo very ſmall * as to eſcape all human perception; and of innumerable *nothings*, part of which have been and are annihilated, the reſt have never had an exiſtence yet are puſhing themſelves very forcibly into it; of bodies acting where they are not, and therefore each of them *capable* of acting *every where* before they exiſted in any place: let them alſo reflect with wonder on the immenſe difference between the unknown qualities of unknown matter, and the occult qualities of the ancients. Let them contemplate, with extaſy and ſelf-applauſe, the wiſdom of the one, with the acknowledged abſurdity of the other opinion. O, the beautiful diſtinction between *occult* and unknown cauſes and qualities! upon which the main drift of Lord Bolingbroke's refined philoſophy depends. A ſublime diſtinction! which though inviſible to vulgar eyes, is clearly diſcerned by thoſe of *ideal* † philoſophy. Let theſe delicate, ſcrupulous philoſophers, contemplate ſuch charming myſteries! but let them not profane the *name* of *reaſon*, or of *common ſenſe*, as long as they live! Having mentioned Lord Bolingbroke, the Author thinks himſelf obliged in juſtice to ſay, that his Lordſhip appears to him to be by far the moſt acute and accurate of all the ideal philoſophers, or of thoſe who make ideas alone the materials of all

* See Locke's account of the ſimple ideas of ſpace and duration. Dr. Clarke, &c.

† Which lays the foundation of all knowledge in ideas alone.

our

iniquity of mind, by curbing and diſcountenancing every vice, ſoothing and encouraging every virtue (internally eſpecially) more and more continually as they appear, increaſe, and advance! till, in due time, by the wonderful ways of his all-wiſe Providence, wickedneſs be gradually depreſſed, diminiſhed, and at length totally annihilated *, and virtue reach that perfection

our knowledge; of thoſe who have adopted this moſt ſtrange opinion, with that other extravagance which neceſſarily flows from it, *viz.* "That the real world and every part thereof is inviſible, imperceptible to us; being, as is imagined, perceived only by proxy, and what is ſtill worſe, by the medium of a proxy (as his Lordſhip ſometimes acknowledges) in no wiſe reſembling it." It is grievous to think that a man endowed with ſuch eminent talents and natural abllities as Lord Bolingbroke was, ſhould unhappily never call in queſtion, but implicitly take for granted the truth of theſe favourite but unnatural hypotheſes, which are rendered, 'tis true, little leſs than ſacred by time and venerable names; but we might have reaſonably hoped that a man of his Lordſhip's penetration, ſagacity, and ſuperior genius, would have emancipated himſelf from ſuch random, ill-founded aſſumptions; but he did not, and his *hatred* to revelation was probably the cauſe: therefore, being hopeleſsly involved in theſe unſubſtantial dreams, ſurrounded by phantoms, by theſe baſeleſs "*fabrics* of viſionary" men, his Lordſhip's abilities and ſtrength of mind only ſerved to plunge him deeper and deeper, every ſtep, in the bogs and quagmires of error and deluſion.

* Revelation and experience both inform us, that many men become finally hardened and impenitent; therefore, however earneſtly all benevolent perſons muſt wiſh that all wicked ſpirits would

tion where it will be crowned with honour, glory, and perfect felicity, through all ages without end.

Thoſe philoſophers who have written of our mental freedom, have not given a juſt account (generally ſpeaking) either of the extent, or nature of it: freedom of mind requires not *that indifference* which they have deſcribed, in order to produce its moſt powerful and important effects, nor does it extend to every action of any human being, as we ſhall explain and prove in the proſecution of our deſign. It extends but to a very few of many perſons' actions, to ſcarce any of ſome men's, of ſuch as are enſlaved by inveterate *wrong aſſociations* of ideas, by overbearing prejudices and inclinations, now grown invincible by long indulgence, and unreſiſted ſway. Such men, in time, loſe their freedom of mind, and become neceſſary agents, like brutes; nay, in many acts, mechanical, like machines; therefore it is not improbable, that this monſtrous doctrine of univerſal neceſſity took its riſe firſt in the minds of ſuch men, who by their artful writings and dark ſpeeches, have puzzled and deceived others not well acquainted with ſubject; and by that

would at laſt repent, we have no reaſon to believe that all will; but let not that trouble us, for they will be finally diſpoſed of by the wiſdom and benevolence of him whoſe wiſdom is boundleſs, and whoſe mercy is over all his works.

means have propagated and perpetuated this hateful notion from age to age; whereas, were a ſelf-determining power in any act, a contradiction in nature, and all our deeds as neceſſary as the motions of mechanical machines; it is unaccountable how the idea of it could ever be formed in men's minds *any more* than in the balance, the wheel, the wedge, the ſcrew, a clock, watch, or any other tool or machine. But men, in many other inſtances, it may be ſaid, form inconſiſtent ideas of ſuch things as cannot poſſibly exiſt, 'tis true, and that is a further and a very cogent proof of the exiſtence of this ſelf-determining power; for without ſuch independent freedom, how would it be poſſible for any one to form ſuch notions as are in direct contradiction to all nature and real exiſtence, and even to a poſſibility of ſuch exiſtence? for what are theſe abſurdities, but the monſtrous creations of careleſs or perverſe minds, formed at a venture, or, through a perverſe whim, not only *independent* of, but in *defiance* often of all *nature*, reaſon and truth? But our conſiſtent philoſophers, though they make not the leaſt ſcruple of aſcribing theſe monſtrous abſurdities, which give the lie to all nature and poſſibility, as they do every vice, to the all-wiſe God; yet fall into the moſt violent fit of zeal for his honour, and expreſs the utmoſt horror and indignation againſt us for denying, as they ſay,

one

one of his moſt adorable attributes, the *Divine preſcience*: to which heavy charge we beg leave to offer two things more in our own defence, in addition to what we have ſaid above. And, firſt, we ſay that if this charge were true, it belongs not to us, if we are mere tools or puppets, as they repreſent us, nor do we in any degree deſerve that blame and condemnation which they ſo liberally and unjuſtly beſtow upon us; no, this ſevere cenſure and condemnation of theirs falls upon, O! horrible to think! the wiſeſt, beſt, and moſt benevolent of all Beings; who, through us, denies his own preſcience. And laſtly, we urge and maintain that their loud, hoſtile exclamation on this ſubject, is nothing more than a mere verbal contention, an idle logomachy, or quibbling with words; for *no man* ever denied the preſcience they contend for, which is nothing more than the Almighty's *knowing* what he *himſelf* is *determined* to do; a preſcience inferior, but *ſimilar* to this, is poſſeſſed by men in many inſtances; but with regard to the Supreme Being, we have never heard that any one who believes an intelligent Creator, ever denied that he poſſeſſes it in all its perfection and certainty. A preſcience totally different from this; a foreknowledge of the free thoughts and actions of other perſons, we *deny not*, but they *do*; though without any other proof than poſitive aſſertion.

It was this Author's extreme horror of this

doctrine, of univerſal fate and neceſſity, and making God the author of every monſtrous abſurdity and deteſtable wickedneſs, that firſt reconciled him fully to the reſolution of publiſhing his writings; and what is now printed is but a ſmall part of what he intends to lay before the public, if this be favourably received; if *not*, his hopes are that ſome men of ſuperior talents may be induced, by the very great importance of the ſubject, to ſtand forth ſpeedily in defence of the true religion or philoſophy of *nature* and of the goſpel, againſt the daily attempts of weak, ill-judging friends, and of deſperate enemies, to ſap the very foundations of them; to defend both, we ſay, for they cannot reaſonably be ſeparated, they explain, enforce, and confirm each other. They are indeed *one* (though differently revealed), as the Author and object of them is one, "equal in all "his ways!" uniform in all his thoughts! who beſtowed upon us that divine gift, the underſtanding! that *eye* of the mind, which diſtinguiſhes *good* from *evil*, duty from pleaſure and convenience; without which no revelation could ever have been *made*, but all morality (which in ſcripture is called righteouſneſs), and all religion, all difference between moral right and wrong, would have been as totally unknown to the whole human race, as now to the child unborn. Hence it appears, how much they err, who compare reaſon

ſon and ſcripture together, and prefer one to the other; not conſidering that ſcripture is the object of reaſon, or of the underſtanding; and that it, that is to ſay, the meaning of it, the truth therein contained, can no further be known, no further revealed, than the underſtanding diſcovers it. The ſame may be ſaid of every other truth; for no propoſition, but more eſpecially no religious truth whatever, can poſſibly enter any mind, which has no underſtanding; even an immediate revelation from heaven, can be received by the underſtanding only, being utterly incommunicable to a ſtock, a ſtone, an embryo, or a brute. Let every man, poſſeſſing common ſenſe, conſider well, whether "to be revealed" can ſignify either more or leſs, than to be made known to the underſtanding or reaſon; things revealed, and yet not comprehended by the underſtanding, or, as is commonly ſaid, "above the comprehenſion of reaſon" or of the underſtanding, are things diſcovered, and not diſcovered, known and not known; in ſhort, to ſpeak thus, is to utter palpable and direct contradictions, both in terms and meaning! and yet no language has been more common for many ages, throughout the Chriſtian world! a melancholy conſideration, to every truly rational man! and a ſtriking proof, among a thouſand others, of that falling off from the true faith, of that "myſtery of iniquity" which was expreſsly foretold in

the days of the Apoſtles, which ſoon appeared, and has ſince increaſed from age to age, in ſo extraordinary a manner, to ſo great a degree, as at length, with the careleſs and undiſtinguiſhing, to bring the Goſpel itſelf into contempt. This extraordinary, this wonderful corruption of the moſt ſimple, rational, and benevolent of all things, the Goſpel of Chriſt and his Apoſtles (more wonderful, even, than the corruption of natural religion long before, by the puerilities and ſenſeleſs abſurdities of the Pagan world), is a monſtrous *compoſition*, collected from the vulgar errors of the Gentiles and Jews, and intermixed with a large portion of that vain philoſophy or metaphyſics of the Greeks, againſt which the great Apoſtle of the Gentiles, ſo juſtly and ſo earneſtly, cautioned the firſt Chriſtians! Thoſe metaphyſics, with ſome alterations and additions, and theſe ſeldom for the better, prevail at this very day; and ſo bewitching have they been to the vanity and pride of mortals, as to ſeduce men of the greateſt genius and penetration through all the intermediate ages; among whom there are none whoſe ſeduction we ſo much lament as that of the learned, wiſe, and amiable author of the moſt excellent Letters on Toleration, of two very valuable treatiſes concerning Government, and other things of conſiderable merit. How can we ſufficiently deplore that ſuch a man ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be

be led aſtray by the ſtrange, fanciful, ſceptical dreams of the Corpuſcularian hypotheſis, explained in Opinion 10th; and by that other groundleſs and moſt inconſiſtent ſuppoſition, that *ideas* are the foundation, "the materials" * of all knowledge and all truth; which has a direct tendency to ſhove reality out of nature, if that were poſſible, and to involve all mankind in the wildeſt ſcepticiſm, the utmoſt uncertainty and delirium. By theſe two random, irrational hypotheſes, and their conſequences, true philoſophy, or the *real* knowledge of *real nature*, has been as much corrupted and debaſed, as the pure religion of the Goſpel has been, by ignorance, enthuſiaſm, and ſuperſtition; invidious and preſumptuous therefore as it may appear, this Author is obliged, though very reluctantly, to call in queſtion the truth of thoſe principles, upon which the whole ſyſtem of Mr. Locke, in his Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, is founded; a book long admired, but ſeldom, if ever thoroughly, underſtood; a ſyſtem upon which the *faſhionable* philophy, or rather materialiſm, ſcepticiſm, and infidelity of the preſent age, are acknowledged to be built; though *Locke himſelf*, was not *aware* that ſuch conſequences could readily, as we ſee, be drawn from his principles. Our grief and

* See Locke, Lord Bolingbroke, and almoſt all modern philoſophers.

aſtoniſhment that ſuch a man ſhould inconſiderately ſupport ſuch ſtrange and pernicious notions can hardly be expreſſed. But we muſt refute *theſe*, or our undertaking is at an end; for while the *root* and body of error remain, in vain will it be to lop off a few of the branches. Encouraged then, and animated by, the love of truth and common ſenſe (which always go hand in hand as far as real common ſenſe can reach), we here claim the benefit of our firſt Poſtulatum, begging leave freely to examine, and, if we can, refute the following principles of Mr. Locke, in his Eſſay abovementioned.

OPINIONS XIII. and XIV.

Opinion XIII. "That words can ſignify "nothing but the ideas in our minds." XIV. "That knowledge is nothing but the perception "of the connection and agreement, or diſagree-"ment and repugnancy of any of our ideas." (Locke's Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, which ſee.)

In the third Book of this Eſſay juſt mentioned, Chap. ii. Sect. 2. he lays it down as a fundamental principle and ſelf-evident truth, that "words "in their primary or immediate ſignification, "ſtand for nothing but *ideas* in the mind of him "that uſes them." And in Section 5, of the ſame Chapter, he goes further, and ſays, that "it is a

"perverting

"perverting the uſe of words, and brings una-
"voidable obſcurity and confuſion into their ſig-
"nification, to make them ſtand for any thing but
"thoſe ideas we have in our minds."

In Section the 7th of the ſame Chapter, he urges the ſame thing in the following words: "But ſo far as *words* are of uſe and ſignification, "ſo far is there a conſtant connection between "the ſound and the idea, and a deſignation that "the one ſtand for the other, without which ap-"plication of them they are *nothing* but ſo much "*inſignificant noiſe*."

Again, in Chap. x. Sect. 15, of the ſame Book, where he treats of the abuſe of words, he ſays, "That we ſhould have a great many fewer diſ-"putes in the world, if *words* were taken for "what they are, the ſigns of our *ideas only*, and "not for *things* themſelves." And, in Section 17, of the ſame Chapter, he writes thus: "Fifthly, "another abuſe of words is the ſetting them in "in the place of *things* which they do or can by "no means ſignify."

No perſon could be more highly prejudiced in favour of the Eſſay on the Human Under-ſtanding than he who writes this, when firſt he began to peruſe it; nor was his high opinion of it very much abated until he came to the paſ-ſages firſt quoted; for, though he found no ſmall obſcurity and difficulty in the chapters which

treat

treat of the ſimple modes of ſpace and duration; of our ideas of ſubſtances; and alſo in the Chapter entitled "Of Power," in which, in particular, he ſometimes imagined that he perceived direct contradictions, yet he dared not believe ſo at that time, chooſing rather to attribute the whole to his own miſconception of ſubjects ſo abſtruſe, and then ſo new to him; but when he found Mr. Locke repeatedly and ſolemnly maintaining "that words can ſignify nothing but "ideas alone; and that when we attempt to make "them ſignify any thing elſe, they are nothing "but ſo much inſignificant noiſe;" he was greatly ſurpriſed, and aſked himſelf the following queſtions* with much anxiety: If the meaning of all words be nothing but ideas, what is the meaning of the word God? When we worſhip or thank God, do we only worſhip or thank an idea, an idea *formed* in *our* minds? With regard to falſe, imaginary Gods, this may be the caſe, undoubt-

* He propoſed the ſame queſtions to his inſtructors and others many times, and was conſtantly anſwered, that no man in the world ever underſtood thoſe ſubjects ſo well as Mr. Locke, as every body allowed who knew any thing of the matter; then, ſmiling, with a mixture of pity, and ſomething ſtill more galling, they aſſured him, that ſuch ſubjects required long ſtudy and an uncommon penetration to be thoroughly comprehended. Charming encouragement to ſtudy philoſophy! How many ingenious young philoſophers it may have nipped in the bud, who can calculate?

edly

edly is, thought he; but when we mean to worſhip, to be thankful to *him* who is the ſource of real exiſtence, who has given us real life, and all the moſt valuable and ſubſtantial things which we enjoy, do we then worſhip and praiſe an *idea* alone? Or is our firſt and immediate adoration and thankfulneſs beſtowed on nothing more than an *idea*, according to another *notion*, ſometimes held forth by Mr. Locke, though inconſiſtently? Or is the word *God* on ſuch an occaſion "nothing "but ſo much inſignificant noiſe?" That it is no more than ſo much unmeaning, inſignificant noiſe, is (ſtrange to think) the only opinion which appears conſiſtent with that maintained by him in Book II. Chapter xxiii. of his Eſſay, in Section the firſt of which he ſays, "That taking "notice, that a certain number of our ſimple "ideas go conſtantly together, and not imagining "how theſe can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſ-"tom ourſelves to *ſuppoſe* ſome *ſubſtratum* wherein "they do ſubſiſt and from which they do reſult, "which therefore we call ſubſtance:" of which ſubſtance, he ſays, in the next Section, that we have no more knowledge "than children have "when they talk about ſomething which they "know not; which in truth ſignifies no more," continues he, "when ſo uſed, either by children "or men, but that they know not *what*; and that "the thing they *pretend* to know, and to talk of, "is, what they have no diſtinct idea of at all, and

"ſo

"ſo are perfectly *ignorant* of it, and in the *dark*." And, in Section 15, of the ſame Book, he maintains, "that with regard to material as well as imma-"terial ſubſtances," with regard to bodies as well as ſpirits, our idea of ſubſtance is equally obſcure, or *none* at *all*, in both.

Here the Writer of theſe Eſſays found himſelf bewildered in a labyrinth of uncertainty and ſcepticiſm, from which he made many efforts to extricate himſelf with much labour and pain; moſt earneſtly and anxiouſly longing for the comfortable dawn of reaſon and common ſenſe again. During this diſturbance and uneaſineſs of mind, he often took up and threw aſide the Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding; ſometimes reading a page or two only, ſometimes more, ſeveral times over, in hopes of finding at length one ray of light, by the help of which he might make his eſcape from the horrors of ſcepticiſm and Cimmerian darkneſs; darkneſs that could be felt, and very ſenſibly too. Thus he kept ſtruggling on with all the care and caution in his power, like the benighted Ruſs or Laplander, in a *tract* hitherto unexplored, ſurrounded by unfathomed bogs, impenetrable foreſts, and by ſprites and phantoms formed by the imagination which was impatiently ſeeking a reſting-place without finding any, but expanding itſelf without controul in the diſmal regions of *Idealiſm* and non-reality (if the expreſſions may be allowed); when, at length, after more pain and

and labour of mind than perhaps moſt readers will believe, he came to the place where *Reality* is treated of. Reality! cried he with eagerneſs; this is the place I want; this, ſurely, is inhabited by Beings more ſubſtantial than mere *phantoms*, and ideal *forms!* To drop the alluſion, what is the meaning of the word reality? cried he, with the greateſt earneſtneſs! An idea? No; I perceive that Mr. Locke gives here a very different meaning to *this word.* But how can that be? ſaid he again; for has he not laid it down repeatedly as a certain rule, an indubitable principle, that words can ſignify nothing but the ideas in our minds? that to give them any other meaning, is introducing "unavoidable obſcurity "and confuſion?" Nay, has he not further declared, that when we endeavour to make them ſignify any thing elſe, "they are of no uſe," "are nothing but ſo much *inſignificant noiſe*;" and alſo, "that a great abuſe of words is the ſetting "them in the place of *things* which," ſays he, "they *do* or *can* by no *means ſignify?*"

Words by no means ſignify things? cried the Author of theſe Eſſays, with extreme aſtoniſhment! Does not Mr. Locke himſelf, in this very ſentence, make uſe of a word, in the plural number, to ſignify *them?* Is not this word, *things*, here actually made uſe of by *him* for that very purpoſe? Is not *things*, as written by *him*, as it is in

this

this book, an Engliſh word, conſiſting of ſix letters of our alphabet? and does he not, in this very place, give this *word* a *meaning* which, in the ſame ſentence, he declares no word can have? Does he not make it *ſignify* what in the ſame moment he poſitively aſſerts "no word can by any "means ſignify?"

Nor is this a momentary, accidental blunder only, but is the fundamental *principle* of his *whole Eſſay*, which he frequently repeats, and which he had in view, referred to, built and depended upon in every chapter almoſt of this voluminous performance? a performance which he has himſelf leiſurely and deliberately reviewed, conſidered and reconſidered, corrected and recorrected, many times in the courſe of ſeveral years *.

But let us examine moſt attentively what he ſays of Reality, which alone is of any real value. Then the Author began to read as follows †: "I doubt not but my reader by this "time may be apt to think that I have been all "this while building a caſtle in the air; and be "ready to ſay to me, To what purpoſe all this "ſtir? Knowledge, ſay you, is only the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our

* See his Epiſtle to the Reader, prefixed to the 6th edition.

† See Locke, in Book IV. chap. iv. § 1. of his Eſſay.

N. B. The Author here puts *L.* for Mr. Locke; and *R.* for reader, viz. himſelf.

"own

" own *ideas*; but who knows what thoſe *ideas* " may be? Is there any thing ſo extravagant as " the imaginations of men's brains? Where is " the head that has no chimeras in it?"

Reader. Very true, Mr. Locke; I have for ſome time thought that you have been haunted by many chimeras; and that, with their aſſiſtance, you have been building the moſt extraordinary caſtle in the air that ever was formed by a thoroughly puzzled mortal; but now you ſpeak very reaſonably! very ſenſibly! which rejoices my heart; for all theſe ænigmas, I find, will be explained by you to our mutual ſatisfaction; therefore let us proceed as faſt as we can.

L. " To a man that enquires after the reality " of things, it matters not what men's *fancies* are; " 'tis the knowledge of things that is only to be " prized; 'tis this alone gives a value to our rea- " ſonings, and preference to one man's know- " ledge over another's, that it is of *things* as they " *really* are, and not of *dreams* and fancies."

R. Excellent, Mr. Locke, this is truly excellent; nothing was ever truer, or more clearly expreſſed; I am highly delighted.

L. " If our knowledge of our *ideas* terminate " in them, and reach no farther, where there is " ſomething farther intended, our moſt ſerious " thoughts will be of little more uſe than the " reveries of a crazy brain; and the truths built " thereon

" thereon of no more weight than the diſcourſes " of a man, who ſees things clearly in a dream, " and with great aſſurance utters them. But I " hope, before I have done, to make it evident " that this way of *certainty* by the knowledge of " our own ideas goes a little farther than bare " imagination; and I believe it will appear, that " all the *certainty* of *general truths* a man has lies " in *nothing elſe.*"

R. Stay, Mr. Locke, ſtay; let us conſider well what you have now ſaid: " If our knowledge of " our ideas terminate in them," and reach no farther, where there is ſomething farther intended; ſurely, our knowledge of our *ideas* alone can reach no farther than our *ideas* only; for how is it poſſible that any knowledge can reach beyond itſelf? Our knowledge of ideas *only* can reach to nothing beyond ideas alone, as our knowledge of things only (if you will allow that we have any ſuch) can reach no farther than things. " But," ſay you, " I hope, before I have done, to make " it evident, that this way of certainty by the " knowledge of our *own ideas* goes a little farther " than bare imagination; and I believe it will " appear, that all the certainty of *general* truths a " man has, lies in nothing elſe." In nothing elſe but imagination and ideas! Heaven forbid! for what are all the truths contained in the laws of ſociety, and in the Goſpel itſelf (except in the hiſtorical

hiſtorical parts), but general truths; all the moſt important truths we know are general truths. Do all theſe "lie in nothing elſe but *ideas*, or "bare imagination?" O yes, you "hope to "make it evident that it goes a little farther." But how can that be, if it *lies* in *nothing elſe?* as you declare in the next ſentence? You had ſaid, a few lines before, "that if our knowledge of our "ideas *terminate* in them;" it moſt certainly muſt terminate in them, if "it lies in nothing "elſe," "and reach no farther where there is "ſomething farther intended, our moſt ſerious "thoughts will be of no more uſe than the reve-"ries of a crazy brain." If this be as you ſay, all the certainty of all the general truths we know (which you poſitively affirm "lies in nothing elſe but ideas") is of no more value than the reveries of a madman! "If it reach no further;" "where is ſomething farther intended." You add, there is always ſomething further intended, excepting when a philoſopher writes a treatiſe (as you do) about ideas; or when two or more philoſophers confine their converſations to them: on all other occaſions men talk or write about their friends, themſelves, or ſome other perſons, about land, money, beaſts, meat, drink, illneſs, health, laws, religion, &c. and not about their own ideas alone. On all ſuch occaſions, we certainly *intend* at *leaſt* to ſpeak of ſomething more

than bare ideas. If, therefore, all the general truths we know concerning theſe things "lie in "nothing elſe but our own ideas," as you maintain, then all our *general knowledge* of perſons or things, of laws or religion, all (except what regards ideas only without intending any thing more) is of no more value than the reveries of a perſon out of his ſenſes: charming doctrine this! We ſeem to be getting here into a dreadful labyrinth again. Let us ſee how you endeavour to extricate yourſelf out of it.

L. "Our knowledge is real * *only ſo far* as "there is a conformity between our *ideas* and the "reality of things"

R. Indeed! this evidently contradicts what you have aſſerted four lines before; and alſo your general rule, your fundamental principle regarding knowledge, laid down by you in the firſt Chapter of this fourth Book, Section 2, as follows: "Knowledge then ſeems to me to be *no-* "*thing* but the perception of the connection and "agreement, or diſagreement and repugnancy "of any of our ideas. In this *alone* it conſiſts." But here all our real knowledge ſeems to conſiſt in the perception of "a conformity between our "*ideas* and the reality of things:" and not between ideas and ideas only. I ſay perception,

* Mr. Locke here acknowledges "that this ſeems not to "want difficulty."

becauſe,

becauſe, in the 2d Section of the 1ſt Chapter juſt mentioned, you ſay, "Where this *perception is*, there "is knowledge; and where it is not, there, "though we may fancy, gueſs, or believe, yet we "always come ſhort of knowledge." There it is affirmed, that where we have not perception, we have no knowledge; that in ſuch a caſe we can only "fancy, gueſs, or believe," and that ſeems *reaſonable* and *juſt*. But here it is no ſuch thing, here it is declared that all our *real knowledge*, all our knowledge that is of any more value or uſe than "chimeras, than the moſt extrava-"gant fancies, or the reveries of a crazy head," is without any perception at all; for it is aſked *, "How ſhall the mind, when it perceives *nothing*† "but its own *ideas*, *know* that they agree with "things themſelves?" How, indeed! According to your own general rule juſt quoted, and according to every reaſonable rule upon earth, it is impoſſible for any one to know it, if we perceive nothing but our own ideas. Thus, by the ſyſtem held forth in the Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, all our real knowledge of any *uſe*, is reduced at laſt to mere *gueſſing*, fancy, and random fanciful *belief*. But it is high time (and we are afraid that the reader has thought ſo before) to quit theſe over-refined, inconſiſtent ſubtleties,

* Sect. 3. of the ſame chapter. † Book IV. chap. 4. § 3.

theſe idle vanities! and to enquire how we actually get our knowledge of real things; how we become ſo intimately acquainted as we are with ſome of them, ſuch as our ownſelves, and all our own real actions and feelings, &c.

And firſt, How we get the intimate and clear perception and knowledge which we have of our own minds, our own perſons, our own lives. We get it in a very extraordinary manner, indeed! if we believe Mr. Locke and his diſciples (who are almoſt all the philoſophers this day on the earth). "We experiment in ourſelves," ſay they, "thinking. The *idea* of this *action*, or *mode* of *thinking*, "is inconſiſtent with the idea of *ſelf-ſubſiſtence*; "and therefore has a neceſſary connection with a "*ſupport*, or ſubject of inheſion: the idea of that "*ſupport* is what we call *ſubſtance*; and ſo from "*thinking* experimented in us, we have a proof of "a *thinking ſubſtance* in us."

If all the children born into this world muſt remain totally ignorant of their own real exiſtence, of their own real lives or perſons, until proved to them by ſuch a metaphyſical argument as this, how very few would ever know any thing of, ever be acquainted even with their own being; but muſt always remain as totally ſtrangers to their own *exiſtence*, as we all were when (according to Mr. Weſley and others) we actually exiſted in Adam, and thereby became guilty of his

his offence? But all this is the greateſt abſurdity in the world; it muſt at leaſt be equal to any; for what greater abſurdity can there be, than to ſuppoſe that a perſon may, nay muſt, become a moſt ſubtil metaphyſician, and argue as above about "modes of thinking inconſiſtent with ſelf-"ſubſiſtence;" about "ſupport, or ſubject of in-"heſion," ſubſtance, ſubſtratum, &c. before he can know, can be ſure, that he himſelf has any real being in this world, or any other? Will any man believe that John Locke himſelf did not know, was never ſure of his real, ſubſtantial exiſtence in the world before he underſtood the above proof of it, and was convinced by it? How, then, do we firſt attain to a real knowledge, a certainty of our own real being or exiſtence? our readers will aſk. The wonder is that any man ſhould have ever doubted, much leſs been totally ignorant of this, of the very thing that we experience in ourſelves every moment; for it is by the moſt clear, real, immediate perception of our own real minds, ſpirits, or ſouls, without all doubt, that we attain to it. Theſe we always perceive, moſt *ſenſibly* feel, and are conſcious of whenever we perceive at all, in the moſt diſtinct, clear, and immediate manner poſſible to us, without the intervention of ideas, or any thing elſe. One of the firſt, if not the very firſt thing a child knows, is his own living perſon, his own

real mind; and this he knows with the utmoſt certainty, before he learns to reflect ſo far as to conſider his thinking as diſtinct from himſelf: he forms no idea of himſelf at firſt, but clearly diſcerns and perceives; moſt intimately feels and knows his own real ſelf. The firſt moment that he begins to know at all, he knows his own real exiſtence, the actual real Being, which his wonderful and adorable Maker has created; he moſt diſtinctly and intimately feels it; and (if not then in pain) rejoices to find it with pure and ſincere joy. And this diſtinct infallible perception of our own real ſelves, our real exiſtence, continues with us through our lives, unleſs we become inſane, totally loſe the right uſe of our underſtanding; for even when their falſe ſyſtems of philoſophy require men to deny it as much as poſſible, it frequently forces itſelf upon them, againſt their wills and conſent; obliges them, in almoſt every period, to bear teſtimony to *it*; to confeſs it, though they will not believe it, but on the contrary, perſiſt in denying it the very next moment; for which reaſon their philoſophical writings are full of the moſt palpable contradictions that can poſſibly be: ſome of which we have already remarked in Mr. Locke's Eſſay. Innumerable other inſtances might be brought from him and other philoſophers. Take the following, and a ſhort review of thoſe already noticed, as a farther

ther confirmation of this aſtoniſhing truth: Mr. Locke, Lord Bolingbroke, and moſt other philoſophers, tell us that our ideas are the only principles, the only "materials of all our knowledge; "that they are all in our minds; that the mind "perceives them there, compares, compounds, "and performs many other acts regarding them; "that moſt of them enter the mind by the inlets "of our eyes, ears and other outward ſenſes; or "rather that, by the operations of bodies, or out-"ward things on our ſenſes, motions, or ſome "other things are conveyed into our brain, and "from thence to the mind, which there form "all our ideas of ſenſation: that beſides theſe, we "have alſo a perception of the operations of our "own minds within us; ſuch as *thinking*, doubt-"ing, believing, reaſoning, knowing, &c. which "we being conſcious of, and obſerving in our-"ſelves, do from theſe, receive into our under-"ſtandings as diſtinct ideas, as we do from bodies "affecting our ſenſes:" yet, that all this while "the mind perceives nothing but its own ideas:" "that our knowledge therefore is nothing but the "perception of the agreement, or diſagreement "of our ideas; that in this *alone* it conſiſts:" that we can never talk or write about any things, but our own ideas only, becauſe "words can ſignify "nothing elſe, and when we ignorantly intend "to give them any other meaning, they are uſe-

" leſs and mean nothing, are nothing but ſo much " unmeaning noiſe."

Now let us analyſe, as carefully as we can, this curious compoſition, this dark maſs! this chaos of inconſiſtencies. Firſt, if our words can ſignify only our ideas and nothing elſe, what can the words *we*, ourſelves, and the word *mind* ſignify, wherein all our ideas are? The words perceive, compare, &c. which the mind does to all our ideas, and the words, *thinking*, *believing*, *doubting*, *reaſoning*, knowing, and other *operations* of our minds, what can be the meaning of theſe? Not ideas; for it is allowed, that from the things which they ſignify, " we receive ideas into our underſtandings; " as diſtinct ideas as we do from bodies;" therefore, theſe things muſt, like bodies, be the cauſes of ideas, or their archetypes, and not ideas themſelves. In the next place, what do the words *outward things*, *bodies*, *objects*, *archetypes*, *affect*, *convey*, *inlets*, *eyes*, *outward ſenſes*, brain, &c. ſignify? for it is allowed, and declared expreſsly by Mr. Locke, and all his diſciples, in every page of their voluminous philoſophical writings, that the things ſignified by theſe laſt are all *without*; whereas ideas, as they allow, are all *within* the mind. Their fixed rules and principles require that they ſhould ſignify ideas only, and nothing elſe; yet they themſelves conſtantly uſe them, a thouſand and a thouſand times again, to ſignify

real

real things, which are all *without*; and not ideas, which they always uniformly avow to be *all* within our minds, in which we daily and hourly perceive them: now inaſmuch as we perceive ideas, and various internal operations, as mentioned above, within the mind, it is evident that the mind itſelf, wherein they are diſcerned, muſt be perceived alſo at the ſame time; for how can ſeveral things be ſeen or perceived in another, unleſs the thing itſelf, *wherein* they are ſeen, be perceived alſo? Can we ſee things or perſons in a houſe or ſtreet, without ſeeing the houſe or ſtreet wherein they are ſeen to be? Can we ſee words and ſyllables in a book, without ſeeing the book alſo in which they are? It is impoſſible; therefore the real mind itſelf muſt be continually perceived, whenever any idea, or other thing, is perceived within it. Indeed, the opinion long and ſtubbornly maintained by philoſophers, in contradiction to this firſt great truth, is ſo abſurd, ſo irrational, ſo unnatural, as to be impoſſible to be expreſſed in any conſiſtent language; the attempt to do it, always involves us in the moſt palpable contradictions. Let us try a very ſhort ſentence, as follows: "We perceive all our ideas in our "minds;" that is, *we* [an idea, or ideas] *perceive* [do an ideal, not a real action] to all ideas whatever; which, however, are all in another idea, ſignified by the word *mind*. What a ſtring of contradictions

tradictions in ſo few words! 'Tis the ſame throughout; therefore, in the name of reaſon and common ſenſe, let every ſober minded man caſt away theſe idle triflings, and worſe than triflings, theſe vanities of vanities; and let them take refuge from ſcepticiſm and deluſion in this infallible, original truth, upon which every other truth is founded; namely,

§ I. *Of the preception and knowledge of ourſelves.*

That we have the moſt immediate and the cleareſt *perception*, together with the moſt *ſenſible internal feeling* or *conſciouſneſs* of our own real ſelves, our real perſons, ſouls, ſpirits, or living exiſtences; all which words mean one and the ſame real thing, viz. what each of us commonly calls *I*, *me*, or *myſelf*.

This real thing, or ſubſtance, every man of ſound mind perceives at all times, whenever he perceives or thinks at all; and, if he does right, he never forms any idea of it; for his mind itſelf is ever preſent, in full view: and whenever he withdraws his attention from it (which he may do, though he cannot avoid perceiving it), and endeavours to form an idea of it, it is generally a totally falſe idea, always a very inadequate one: indeed every idea of it is uſeleſs, for, as the mind itſelf is for ever preſent; the only way to get a true and real knowledge of it, is to conſider, examine, and

and ſtudy carefully the real *mind* itſelf, and not a falſe, or at beſt a very imperfect repreſentation of it. The not obſerving this neceſſary rule, has been the ſource of innumerable and very extraordinary errors regarding our own minds. Without this primary, this certain perception and knowledge of our own minds, or thinking ſubſtances, we could never be certain of any thing elſe whatever; for to ſay, as our *ideal* philoſophers do, "that a man knows with more "certainty that one and one makes two, and ſuch "other ſelf-evident truths, than he does that any "real ſubſtance or thing exiſts, even his own mind "or ſelf," is ſaying that we are more certain that we know ſome truths, than that we exiſt, which is abſurd; for we muſt be ſure that we are, before we can be ſure that we know or do any thing.

§ II. *Of the conſciouſneſs or knowledge of other things.*

Our own minds, as juſt related, being continually perceived by us, and being both active and paſſive beings, we, from time to time, clearly and diſtinctly perceive many and various real internal operations and feelings, *of* and *in* our minds; theſe are immediately perceived by us as the mind itſelf is; in fact, what we perceive on theſe occaſions is the mind itſelf, acting or feeling, *e.g.* when we perceive thinking, it is not *thinking* alone that we ever perceive, but a thinking mind,

mind, or ſubſtance; in like manner, when we feel pain or grief, it is not pain or grief alone that we feel, but *ourſelves pained*, and *grieved*. None of theſe internal operations or ſenſations are always in the mind (except the perception and ſenſation of our own ſelves, our own mind, and of its preſent objects); but ſucceed each other, and appear by turns, ſometimes one or two, ſometimes a few more at the ſame time; which is likewiſe the caſe with material objects, they alſo preſent themſelves to our minds in ſucceſſion; therefore, in order that we may think of, conſider and contemplate them in their abſence, *two* kinds of memorials of them are formed in the mind (but by what means, or in what manner they are there formed, we know no more than we do how we were at firſt created); however, when formed, they are regiſtered and treaſured up in the mind, ready to be produced when wanted, unleſs we ſuffer them to be loſt, for want of due attention and care. The *firſt* kind, the moſt ſubſtantial memorials, thus treaſured up, conſiſt of the real conſciouſneſs or knowledge which the mind has of paſt real objects and tranſactions, as well as of its own paſt conditions; that this knowledge is real, and is entirely founded on real exiſtence, and not on ideas revived in the mind, and their agreement, &c. (though theſe ideas, as well as language, often aſſiſt us in bringing it to light) is

is evident from hence, that, with all the aſſiſtance they both can give us, we are frequently unable to recover it for a conſiderable time; nay, nothing is more common, than for the object itſelf, ſeen a ſecond time, to be unable to revive the knowledge of its having been ſeen before; as is alſo the *idea* of it revived, in its ſtrongeſt and moſt vivid ſtate, as ſoon as the object diſappears again; on ſuch occaſions the object, and its moſt vivid idea, raiſe often a ſuſpicion only that we have ſeen it before; this ſuſpicion ſerves to give the mind a hint, to conſult and examine itſelf, in order to recollect or regain that real knowledge, if poſſible, which, after ſome conſideration, we often do in a moment, when we are made ſure that we have ſeen that perſon or thing before, though we may not immediately recollect where or when; which additional knowledge we afterwards regain by degrees. Thus, we many times recover the full knowledge of things paſt, when the ideas of them are much leſs vivid, than when we could go no farther than bare ſuſpicion, or faint belief. In fact, ideas alone are mere *paſſive inſtruments* of the mind, in regaining the knowledge of paſt things; and can of *themſelves* do nothing, even the ſtrongeſt ideas poſſible, towards producing ſo much as the belief of real exiſtence in ſound, vigorous, and rational minds; witneſs, the ideas of ghoſts and goblins, &c. in their moſt

moſt terrific forms, with ſaucer-eyes, fiery mouths, raw-heads, and bloody limbs! all theſe, however powerful their effects may be on the imagination, cannot perſuade many ſenſible, ſober-minded people to entertain even the ſlighteſt belief of their real exiſtence, much leſs any thing like a *knowledge* of ſuch exiſtence: we ſay like it; for, as to genuine real knowledge itſelf, nothing can produce it at firſt but real exiſtence.

It is by that wonderful gift of God, the retroſpective power of the mind (which enables us to look back through many periods of our lives), that we can know, can actually diſcover, and are made conſcious of real paſt exiſtences, ſuch as our paſt actions, ſenſations, as well as of our paſt *ſtates* or *conditions*; namely, our conditions as children, boys, youths, &c. This is not done by reviving and comparing the ideas of them; for the ideas of many of our paſt deeds, &c. may be ſtrongly revived by the accounts given us of them by our ſchool-fellows, and other companions of our youth, without our being able to recover the actual conſciouſneſs of them as long perhaps as we live. We can only, on many ſuch occaſions, rely on the veracity and memory of our friends alone; but our own real internal ſenſe, or conſciouſneſs of our having done or ſaid what they relate, may be utterly loſt to us for ever; which ſhews that *ideas* alone (the moſt ſtriking and

and vivid ideas) have often no power at all to revive the actual ſenſibility and real knowledge of paſt actions and ſenſations. In like manner, we perceive that we have an intimate feeling, conſciouſneſs, and knowledge of our own paſt conditions; for inſtance, the man who writes this, feels, perceives, and knows, in the moſt certain and indubitable manner, that a particular little boy, who lived in a known ſituation, went to ſeveral ſchools, and many other places, is the very ſame identical perſon, being, or ſubſtance, which at this very moment commits theſe things to writing. It is not by a vague, ſubtil, metaphyſical argument, founded on the agreement or diſagreement of ideas, that he *knows*, that he is *ſure* of *this*; but by the moſt immediate, clear, undoubted preſent feeling and perception that he is the very ſame identical ſubſtance, or real being, without being in the leaſt adulterated or intermixed with any other being or ſubſtance of which he was then unconſcious. He moſt clearly perceives his own conſcious mind or ſpirit to be unchanged and unmixed, to be without the leaſt diminution or addition as to *ſubſtance* from the moment when he firſt became conſcious of his exiſtence to the preſent hour, though his body, and many other things belonging to him, be greatly, if not totally changed; and though many and various acquiſitions be annexed to him

as

as properties and appendages only; for the mind itſelf, this living, conſcious, knowing, ſpiritual being, is ſtill, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, for ever one and the ſame. The body of the ſame perſon, as man and as boy, have probably not an atom the ſame, being totally changed by food, perſpiration, &c. &c.; yet the mind, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe poſſible, is perceived, is known to be the very ſame real conſcious being, or real ſubſtance, that it was thirty or forty years paſt. In this manner, our all-mighty and all-wiſe Creator, has clearly revealed to us, by that wonderful retroſpective perception the *memory*, the unity, and unchangeableneſs of the mental ſubſtance, ſoul, or ſpirit, which we ſee and feel to remain for many years, in a continually changing body, the ſame identical, numerical being that it was when we firſt became conſcious of it. And as we find this perfect, unaltered unity, and ſameneſs of being, thing, or ſubſtance, to continue for a *period* of time fully ſufficient to alter or change *all* things elſe beneath the ſun, it is reaſonable to conclude that it will for ever ſo remain, unleſs annihilated by *him* who gave it being. In this we ſhall be further confirmed, if we conſider what endleſs contradictions it involves, to ſuppoſe a thinking, knowing, conſcious being *divided*; in which caſe, conſcious fragments of it might know that he who was the ſame identical perſon ſome time

time paſt, is now both ill and well, *dead* and *alive*, in *being* and not in *being*, at the ſame moment of time. Theſe things, we truſt, will appear clear and evident to every attentive lover of truth who ſhall carefully examine and conſider his own real mind itſelf, inſtead of taking a falſe view of it through the medium of ideas drawn from bodies to which the ſpiritual being or mind bears not the leaſt reſemblance, any more than it does to *ſounds*, *language*, time, or ideas, which are admirable means and inſtruments given to our minds or ſpirits to enable us to convey our thoughts and ſenſations to each other; for though ſpirits might exiſt as well *without* as *with* bodies, yet without them, or ſomething analogous to them, it is probable that there could be no intercourſe between minds. If this be ſo, as it evidently appears to be, it follows, that all created ſpirits have bodies; not ſuch bodies as we have, which are only fit for the purpoſes of this life; but the good and happy, for inſtance, have bodies, immortal like the mind itſelf, unchangeable as the ſtars of the firmament, and the ſun in heaven; and others, ſuch as are ſuitable to their ſituations? Nothing can can be more precipitate and ill founded than the notion, that ſpirits are impriſoned and clogged by their bodies, for it is by their means that, in this world at leaſt, they can have any communication with each other. No, the powers of man

are much confined, are *wiſely* reſtrained *by his* Maker alone, in this firſt ſtate of trial and diſcipline, to prevent univerſal deſtruction; for even with the powers which men have, what violences, cruelties, and barbarities do they not (oh! horrible to think!) often, very often, commit.

§ III. *Of Ideas.*

Having, in the laſt chapter, given a ſhort account, ſuch as this Preliminary Eſſay will admit, of the wonderful conſciouſneſs, mental ſenſation, and knowledge which the mind retains of its real objects, operations, and conditions, though paſt, which we call the firſt or primary memorials of paſt things; we come now to the *ſecond kind* of memorials of real *things*, once or oftener perceived, but no longer actually preſent.

And theſe are ideas which are of much uſe and importance, as we ſhall preſently ſee.

Ideas are alſo of two ſorts; namely, the ideas of things, and the ideas of their names; for when we think of abſent, or paſt objects, and actions, we almoſt always think in ſome language, generally in the language in which we oftenеſt converſe; ſtrictly ſpeaking, not in that real language in which we converſe with others, but in the ſilent, ideal language of the mind, which exactly repreſents the real language, though it be of

of quite a different nature, being perfectly ſilent, and not amounting even to the loweſt whiſper: the ideas of our internal operations and feelings muſt alſo be of a ſimilar nature to theſe, if, properly ſpeaking, we have ideas of them; if we have any other memorials of them beſides thoſe mentioned in the laſt chapter; namely, the real conſciouſneſs, or recollection of their real paſt exiſtence. The other ſort of ideas conſiſts of mental pictures, which the mind can form of abſent bodies; as bodies, in general, conſiſt of many and various parts, theſe ideas of them were neceſſary in order to recall with more exactneſs the real *knowledge*, or, if you will, the real *memory* of them to the mind: but inaſmuch as the operations and feeling of the mind have much more of unity and ſimplicity at any one given moment than bodies have; of them we have no pictures, perhaps, no other ideas than the ideas of their names, which may always immediately recall the real conſciouſneſs or memories of them, as they certainly do at times, and that not unfrequently.

Another, and very important, uſe of ideas, is to enable us to form with them, in our minds, *plans*, patterns, or repreſentations of future atchievments, operations, improvements, arguments, laws, rules, reforms, compoſitions, &c. in ſhort, of whatever we intend to utter or perform. Here-

in eſpecial caution and care are neceſſary; for ideas being but ſhadowy, unſubſtantial things, liable every moment to change or vaniſh, it requires a firm, ſteady, ſagacious mind, whoſe imagination is under the beſt diſcipline and controul, in order to form theſe plans in a ſkilful, juſt, rational manner, and ſo to preſerve them as to be in exact conformity to the real exiſtence of things, ſuch as we have experienced things themſelves to be in times paſt, or agreeable to the rational and authentic accounts which we have received of them from men or books. To the teſt of real knowledge and exiſtence, all plans formed in the mind ſhould be conſtantly brought, and by that teſt they ſhould be ſcrupulouſly examined, carefully corrected and adjuſted, before we put them in execution; or our deſigns and opinions may be as irrational and wild as thoſe of children, running with all their might in order to reach the azure arch of heaven which ſeems to touch the hills, or to catch the admired rainbow, which fly before them as they advance, and in the end mock and fruſtrate all their endeavours. To theſe fanciful children may be aptly compared thoſe philoſophers, whoſe reſtleſs, uncorrected imaginations, inflamed by vanity and luſt of fame, hurry them forth in purſuit of uncommon, heroic adventures, in the ſeducing flowery fields of ſeeming but counterfeit ſcience.

§ IV.

§ IV. *Perception and Knowledge not the ſame.*

If we reflect attentively on the mind itſelf, and its real powers (inſtead of forming a moſt falſe *idea* of it, copied from material objects), we ſhall find that it is capable of feeling pain and many other ſenſations, that it is capable of barely *perceiving* various things long before it is capable of *knowing* or underſtanding any thing; as in the womb, and for a conſiderable time after our birth, when we neither know nor underſtand any one thing; are not even conſcious; have no knowledge of our own exiſtence, which we begin to know at two years old, or thereabout. The Author of this knew a man of veracity, and ſagacity too, who aſſured him and others, that he never knew that he breathed till he was between ſeven and nine years old; that he was walking alone in a lawn near his father's houſe when he firſt became acquainted with it; that he was much alarmed at it, and thought that it was ſome diſorder that had juſt ſeized him; upon which he ran to the houſe, breathed ſtrongly before the firſt perſon he met, and aſked, with much agitation, what was the matter with him. Upon which the perſon whom he enquired of breathed ſtoutly alſo, and aſſured him that every body did the ſame; which, however, could not ſatisfy him till he had tried ſeveral others. And

will any one venture to ſay, that Mr. Locke and his diſciples have never once been ſenſible, never for a moment perceived that *things*, *reality*, *archetypes*, &c. are *words?* yet have they conſtantly (thoſe of them who are departed hence during their lives) made uſe of theſe and many other words to ſignify what they as conſtantly have denied any words can poſſibly ſignify; this they have done every day of their lives, without knowing it.

From this, and from innumerable other inſtances that might be brought, it is ſelf-evident that mere perception and real *knowledge* are quite different things; and though there can probably be no knowledge without a previous perception, yet that very often there is perception without the leaſt knowledge, and that men can, if they chooſe, avoid knowing, *refuſe* to know many things which they cannot but perceive every day of their lives. Here is one evident and ſtriking effect of that freedom of mind, that ſelf-determining power, which the Judge Supreme has given to all moral agents; to whom, in effect, he continually ſays, as he did to Iſrael through his prophet Moſes, "Behold I ſet before you this day a bleſſing and a curſe," ignorance and knowledge, good and evil, chooſe ye which you will, I force you not; I only adviſe and direct; obey or diſobey; but remember well, that I will hereafter require

require a ſtrict account of all your actions, and that your lot ſhall be according to your deeds.

Man has not only a power of thus refuſing to draw knowledge from what he daily perceives; but, what is ſtill more remarkable, he can form the moſt ſtubborn, incurable opinions, in direct contradiction to what is daily and hourly preſented to his view: opinions not only deſtitute of real foundation, but militating againſt all the evidence of nature and real exiſtence, and even the *poſſibility* of ſuch exiſtence; nay, many men (and we wiſh that we might not ſay moſt men) will conſtantly hold opinions, that ſhall be directly contrary to their own true principles and real knowledge on other occaſions; for inſtance, Mr. Locke, and all his implicit admirers, muſt not only have perceived, but ſome muſt have known, that a line which is *crooked* is not *ſtraight*; and that a line which is *really ſtraight* cannot be *crooked*, or have any curvature; that the *one quality always excludes* and *annihilates* the *other*; yet they maintain, that they can form the idea of a line that is both crooked and ſtraight, and neither crooked nor ſtraight at the ſame time. (See their account of abſtract ideas.)

Lord Bolingbroke had ſufficient ſagacity to reject this groſs abſurdity; and the renowned Biſhop Berkley had before ſhewn the impoſſibility of it, in the Introduction to his Principles of

man Knowledge, which Lord B. had probably ſeen.

§ V. *Real Knowledge what. And 1ſt, Of ſimple or immediate Knowledge.*

Real knowledge is a certain intimate acquaintance which the mind of man is capable of having with its own real exiſtence, its own real ſelf; and alſo with its own internal actions and affections, and with all the other real things which it perceives, or which any ways affect it; this immediate ſimple knowledge requires only a certain degree of *mental exertion*, or of *active attention* to our mere perceptions, in order to attain it; but no meditation, or any *compariſon* of two or more things. This mental *acquaintance* with our own ſelves, and with other particular real things, which preſent themſelves to our minds, is the firſt kind or degree of knowledge; which we begin to acquire when children, from whence we immediately proceed to comparative knowledge, of which we ſhall treat immediately, and ſoon after to general knowledge; the account of which we muſt defer to a future publication. Next, then, to our immediate knowledge of the exiſtence of real particular things, is comparative knowledge; which, in many inſtances, follows the other ſo ſoon as to ſeem coeval with it; that is to ſay, when children have juſt got the knowledge of

of their own exiſtence, of their own perſons, and of ſome other things about them; they, inſtantaneouſly as it were, by the moſt ſudden reflection imaginable, find that ſome of them reſemble each other more or leſs, and that ſome ſeem to have no reſemblance at all. This is our ſecond degree of real knowledge, which requires minute attention, reflection, and much care to be formed with truth and exactneſs. To this belongs our knowledge of morals; ſome degree of which children ſoon acquire, though it has been called in queſtion by great philoſophers, when thoroughly *puzzled*, completely *giddy* and *bewildered* in the dark, inextricable labyrinths of their own random, unnatural ſyſtems. Children very ſoon perceive, even previous to all argument, and *conſideration* of *conſequences*, a very great difference between the act of ſhewing kindneſs for kindneſs, and doing an ill turn for kindneſs; nay, they inſtantly find a total contradiction between theſe two kinds of actions; which contradiction they afterwards find, when they come to acquire a general knowledge, to be an univerſal, invariable, eternal truth.

§ VI. *Of Liberty.*

Beſides the perpetual contrariety of theſe actions in themſelves, they alſo immediately find a very great difference between doing either of them (but eſpecially the laſt) deſignedly, and doing

doing them by accident. If a child happens to hurt or vex his benefactor by mere accident, nature and reaſon inſtantly furniſh him with a full excuſe and a juſtification of himſelf; and he urges, with conſcious innocence, though with ſorrow for the accident, that he could not poſſibly help it; and this he does when no *puniſhment* can be *dreaded*, as *well* as when it can. This obvious reaſon and juſtification no child was ever ſo ſtupid, if not an idiot, as not to find and underſtand inſtantly of himſelf, without having been taught it by any one. If, on the contrary, he has hurt his benefactor on purpoſe, and with a full deſign, how different is his conduct—he ſhuns all explanation if he can; if not, conſcious guilt appears in all his expreſſions and behaviour: ſtill further, if the accident has been owing to the want of care and proper attention, though it be *really* an accident, and not at all deſigned, he perceives and knows himſelf to be blameable in proportion to the degree of his inattention and want of care; for children as well as moſt men, not only ſlightly and tranſiently perceive, but certainly know that they have a power of beſtowing various degrees of attention and conſideration on the ſelf ſame object, at any given moment, and even of turning their whole attention many times from one object to another in ſucceſſion, and of fixing it at laſt where and when they pleaſe; not perhaps

haps on the laſt object in the chain of reflections, though *that*, being laſt in the mind, ought for that reaſon, on *material* principles, infinitely to outweigh all thoſe which are out of it, which are no longer in view; and ſo ought *each* of them to *have done* in its turn. But what is the motive for this choice? cry our philoſophers. The motive, or rather the reaſon of their chooſing that one at laſt, out of many things which have paſſed ſucceſſively in review before the mind, is very frequently a general indefinite reaſon or motive, and not a definite one, as they maintain; namely, becauſe they can perceive no difference, nothing to prefer in all theſe objects, towards attaining the end they have in view; becauſe it appears perfectly immaterial which of them they adopt, or put in execution, provided they do either; which may be a matter of much weight and conſequence, though which of them it be, may not appear to be of the leaſt conſequence imaginable. In ſuch caſes (and they are innumerable, as we ſhall preſently ſee), when we are equally inclined to act a thouſand different ways, what can we do? According to the doctrine of neceſſity, we muſt ſtand ſtill for ever; but a rational man will not do ſo, but will, immediately, by virtue of his ſelf-moving power, chooſe either of them, he cares not which, and may the next moment perhaps forget which; the reaſons for choice being ſo entirely equal,

or

or rather none at all, that no other perſon living ſhall ever be able to know which he has choſen, unleſs informed by him before he forgets it. Let us give here an unequivocal example of this, and a very common one, which daily and hourly comes to paſs in England, during a good part of the year (the Author has done it himſelf more than once, ſome years paſt, before he had fully conſidered the tendency of lotteries). A perſon has ſolemnly promiſed his friend or relation, to whom he is under a great obligation, and whom he would not diſoblige on any account, to chooſe and buy for him a lottery-ticket, or two or three, &c. (Would to Heaven! there was no ſuch ſnare as a lottery on the face of the earth, but as unhappily there is, we may innocently mention it.) This perſon, then, is bound by the moſt ſolemn engagement and other reaſons to chooſe a ticket, or tickets, for his friend; what ſhall he do? He is equally inclined ſixty thouſand ways. If he was a neceſſary or mechanical agent, he muſt remain here in total inaction to all eternity; for the preſſure of the obligation to his friend ſuffers him not to recede with any honour, and thereby to avoid acting at all for him.

Here, then, the free, ſelf-determining, internal, ſelf-moving power, the power of a free agent, relieves him in a moment, where nothing elſe ever can; for we ſuppoſe this perſon to be one

of

of thoſe men of ſound common ſenſe, who well know that, before the drawing of a lottery begins, it is utterly impoſſible for any man on earth to find out that any particular ticket has a better chance, the leaſt imaginable better chance, than any other; which is the fact, notwithſtanding ſilly people are ſometimes impoſed upon by falſe, deceitful calculators, who pretend the contrary. And this gentleman can, with the ſame eaſe, chooſe a number for his friend, by a letter to an office-keeper, as if he were there in perſon, and ſaw ſeveral numbers. The Author here begs leave to think of a number for him.

If any reader can ever find out (after carefully tracing the chain, as it is called, of his thoughts and ideas from the beginning of this Eſſay to the moment of his thinking of it); if he can find, we ſay, what number it is, with certainty, and give any thing like a reaſon for it, he will give up free-will; though, at this moment, he perceives it in himſelf, as diſtinctly and clearly, as he does his own living ſelf, his own exiſtence. But, ſays Doctor Prieſtly in his correſpondence with Doctor Price, page 145, "Every human volition is in-"variably directed by the circumſtances in which "a man is, and what we call motives. It appears "to me," adds he, "that we have no more rea-"ſon, from *fact* or *obſervation*, to conclude that a "man *can move himſelf*, that he *can* will without "motives, than that a *ſtone* can move itſelf!"

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The fact which we have juſt produced diſproves this, and invincibly proves the direct contrary; namely, that a man may have the ſtrongeſt motive or reaſon for doing one of many thouſand actions, all, at the ſame moment, equally in his power, he having no reaſon whatever to prefer any one to any other; and that, if he is a man of ſenſe, he can immediately do it, without heſitation; but if he be a man of a weak and fanciful mind, imagining the poſſibility of a difference, where there can be none, he may heſitate perhaps a little while, before he clearly *perceives* that there can be *none*, and then he preſently determines. Well, ſay our Neceſſitarians, if we ſhould admit, that there may be a few inſtances, where the reaſon for acting different ways are exactly equal, that happens ſo very ſeldom, and in inſtances of ſo little conſequence, that it will very little ſerve your cauſe. But the truth is, that experience, nature and facts, are always for ever againſt them herein, and ſhew the contrary in almoſt every act of man, from his birth to his laſt breath; if not in every one without exception, as we ſhall preſently ſee.

Monſieur Leibnitz, in his correſpondence with Dr. Clarke, page 102, aſſerts (for theſe are mighty men at random, bold aſſertions, without proof or knowledge) " Lors que deux choſes in-" compatibles, ſont egalement bonnes, & que tant

en

" en elles, que par leur combinaiſon avec d'autres, " l'une n'a point d'avantage ſur l'autre; Dieu " n'en produira aucune," *i. e.* when two things which cannot be made into one, or be in one place, are equally good, and neither in themſelves, nor by their combination with other things, has the one any advantage over the other; God will produce neither. And, in his Theodicæa, page 11, he ſays, " That if there was not a beſt " (optimum) among all poſſible worlds, God " would not have made any one." And in the correſpondence, page, 169, he maintains, " That a " man never has a ſufficient reaſon to act, when " he has not alſo a ſufficient reaſon to act in a cer- " tain particular manner (pour agir tellement)." But facts as frequently diſprove this as actual *motions* do the pretended demonſtration of him who denied them. If what Mr. Leibnitz here aſſerts were true, there never could have been any ſuch thing as action in the univerſe; for *firſt*, there does not appear the leaſt reaſon for believing that if this or any other world had the hundredth part of a grain of duſt, or of a drop of water, more or leſs than it actually has, that it would not have been to the full as good and as perfect as it is; would have thoroughly anſwered all the purpoſes it now does; and the only good reaſon that can be imagined why it contains the exact number of grains of *ſand*, or *duſt*, or of *drops* of water that it does,

is,

is, becauſe this particular number of grains is as as good as many millions of other numbers more or leſs.

Can there be a more groundleſs, daring, raſh aſſertion, than to ſay "that the Almighty cannot "make any two things; two cubes (for inſtance) "perfectly equal and alike, becauſe there is no "way to find any reaſon for aſſigning them dif-"ferent places*?" for even men can make many things alike, or fully *believe* ſo, which, with regard to them, is the ſame thing; men being, in moſt acts, guided by *belief* alone, and not by certainty. Can there be a better reaſon for a wiſe being for doing a thing immediately, without heſitation, than this great rule of free agents, that a good thing, or any thing which they judge *ought* to be done, *ſhall* be done, though they believe that there are many different ways of doing it, *all equally good?* If any one heſitates on ſuch occaſions, he muſt be a very weak, ſilly being, who pays too much attention to things not worth a thought; to perfect *nullities*. A wiſe man always acts immediately when he is thoroughly convinced that the *various* ways of doing a *good* action are all *equal*; and, for *that* reaſon *alone*. He will often ſuſpend acting till he is convinced of *that*, and then he acts without delay, and without hindrance.

* See Leibnitz, Paper 5, page 227.

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Were it not for this free power, man would never be able to act at all; for what action of man is there that may not be done equally well with ſome varieties often with many; ſometimes with endleſs varieties? For inſtance, when a man eats his dinner, 'tis perfectly immaterial whether all the bits he takes be exactly equal, or have ſome inequalities in weight or ſize; 'tis equally indifferent whether the *firſt* bit be an atom *greater*, or an atom *leſs* than the *ſecond*; and ſo on of all the bits he takes: 'tis of no manner of conſequence which of them is a trifle greater or a trifle leſs than another; and yet men eat their dinners with all imaginable eaſe, notwithſtanding the many ways of doing it, and all equally good, equally fit for their purpoſe. 'Tis the ſame in walking, writing, &c. When we write we never conſider the exact ſize of our letters to the $\frac{1}{500}$ part of an inch, but write on without being at all affected or influenced by that conſideration; yet we write all of ſome particular ſize. Why? From what motive? from this alone, becauſe it anſwers our purpoſe as well as many other ſizes differing a viſible point from this, therefore we wiſely chooſe this particular ſize at *hazard*, without *knowing*, or *caring* which it is; and from no *other* motive, or for no *other reaſon* whatever; therefore this particular ſize is produced by the ſelf-determining, ſelf-moving power alone, guided by the ſaid general reaſon only,

without any particular one. But can a man do any act without a motive? Yes, he may; for he can ſometimes act without *thinking*, or at all *conſidering* what he is about; but in ſo doing he certainly does not act wiſely. When he acts rationally, he *always*, or *almoſt* always, directs his courſe by the light and guidance of a *general* good motive or reaſon, as a man of ſenſe and prudence when he travels always does ſo, by the light of the ſun or moon, &c. and not in total darkneſs, or a total abſence of mind, without looking before him.

§ VII. *Human Freedom farther conſidered.*

What is particularly extraordinary in the opinion of the Neceſſitarians is *this*; namely, that they imagine *circumſtances*, *non-entities*; that is to ſay, the ends or views which a man, &c. has in acting, and which as yet have no exiſtence till he gives it them, to be endowed with the greateſt force and powers imaginable, with all *poſſible* powers, ſo as to be the *only real agents* in the univerſe, and to govern ('tis almoſt too bad to be mentioned) both God and man with abſolute ſway, yet deny any internal real power at all to ſpirits, ſubſtances, or real beings, which they maintain can never act without being previouſly acted upon, and that *irreſiſtibly*, in the following manner: that is to ſay, That there are in the creation continued chains of

cauſes

cauſes and effects, from the beginning to this moment, all neceſſarily ſucceeding each other: therefore, "That from a man's birth to his death, "there is an unalterable chain of ſituations and "volitions invariably depending on one another." (See Dr. Prieſtley's Anſwer to Mr. Palmer, page 77.) But if all the actions of man, particularly, his *thoughts* and *opinions*, which have ſo much influence on his bodily acts, proceeded neceſſarily from this chain of *natural* cauſes, how comes it to paſs that many, very many, human thoughts and opinions are in direct *contradiction* to all *nature*, all *real exiſtence*, and even to the *poſſibility* of exiſtence? as we have before obſerved. From what ſource do theſe abſurdities proceed? If from a chain of cauſes, eſtabliſhed in nature, they would be conformable to them, inſtead of giving them the lie continually to their faces. Beſides, this imagined chain of tranſitory cauſes and effects by turns (if ſuch a chain there could be), cannot be the original cauſe of any thing, but muſt itſelf have received its whole force and exiſtence from another, and a totally different cauſe; becauſe all the changes and motions whatever which are in nature or in the creation, muſt have had a determinate *beginning*, beyond which they had no exiſtence; for this plain, this moſt evident reaſon; becauſe every actual motion, and every change always implies, that the thing changed or moved

has been in another ſtate or ſituation prior to that in which it is at the preſent moment; therefore, if change and motion could be from eternity, the things firſt changed and moved muſt have exiſted before eternity, in that previous ſtate of exiſtence, which is *impoſſible*; from whence it follows, undeniably, that all motions and changes muſt have had a determinate beginning. What then could firſt give exiſtence to all motion and change? The firſt, unchangeable, immoveable cauſe, aſſuredly; beſides whom there was once no being; therefore he acted entirely from himſelf when he created all things; conſequently in the freeſt manner. He produced the firſt motion and the firſt change by his own uncommunicated force or power which he ever had, that is by *himſelf*; for he and his power are one; he and his wiſdom are one; he and all his perfections are one; they are only different ways which finite minds have of conſidering him; who made all other things within the compaſs of exiſtence; who is the Univerſal Father of intelligent ſpirits, to whom he has given the power of beginning motion, of giving the firſt exiſtence to thoughts and actions (but wiſely in a limited degree) as we have already ſhewn, from its continual effects, and ſhall continue to ſhew, in the courſe of theſe Eſſays, if life and health continue; indeed, if the men againſt whom we argue had not abuſed the

the very power we are ſpeaking of, there never could have been any occaſion to prove its exiſtence from its effects, for the power itſelf is as clearly perceived within us as our own exiſtence, or lives; and our oppoſers themſelves acknowledge, that we are all under the neceſſity of believing that we perceive it; "of aſcribing our actions to "ourſelves, and of feeling a remorſe of con- "ſcience when we do wrong, till we arrive at "ſuch a comprehenſion of mind as will enable "us habitually to aſcribe *every* thing to God, and "that when we are arrived at this ſtate we ſhall "live in communion with God," ſays Dr. Prieſt- ley in his Anſwer to the Reverend Mr. Palmer, page 61 and 62. And Dr. Hartley (from whom he ſays that he has taken his philoſophy) affirms, in his Theory of the Mind, page 356, that in this ſtate a man would immediately become "partaker of the divine nature, and be *one* with "God." To which very extraordinary preten- ſions we anſwer: that if every man muſt (as they freely declare) believe that he has full liberty to *begin*, or *not* to *begin*, to *do*, or *not to* do, many actions, till he partakes of the divine nature, all men are under an abſolute neceſſity of believing ſo to all eternity, for no man can ever really par- take of the divine nature. He who is a *created* being can never be an *uncreated* being. It can never be true, that a thing that was *made* was

never made; that an exiſtence, or nature *received entirely* from another was never at any time received from any one; for all theſe, and other endleſs impoſſibilities, or abſurdities, muſt be true, before a man, or any other created being, can partake of uncreated, ſelf-exiſtent nature.

In a highly figurative ſenſe, a man is ſaid to be one with God, in Scripture, when he imitates God in his goodneſs and benevolence; in like manner as we continually ſay of men who agree in their views, diſpoſitions, and principles, that they have one heart and one mind, &c. But that does not ſeem to be their meaning; for *many* ſuch men, if not all or almoſt all *ſuch* men, in our days, pretend to no communications with God, nor ever imagine that they partake of the Divine nature. Beſides, theſe gentlemen tell us, that the inſtant before, or the ſame inſtant that a man becomes partaker of that nature, "he annihilates "himſelf, and refers or aſcribes all, or every thing, "to God;" of conſequence, among other things, all *lies*, *cruelties*, *blaſphemies*, and every evil deed, if that opinion be a *preparation* for, a conſtant attendant on this *Divine ſtate*, this *union* with God, they muſt mean ſomething very uncommon by it, ſomething very myſtical and impoſſible. On this occaſion, one cannot help recollecting what the ſubtil Jeſuit, Mumford, ſays, in defence of Tranſubſtantiation, which, as he allows, contradicts

dicts all the evidence of our ſenſes, underſtandings, or reaſon, and all former faith; for which reaſon, any man of common ſenſe, of ſound, unpuzzled, unconfounded mind, would ſay that it muſt undoubtedly be falſe. But myſtic theologians are not to be ſo foiled; and our Jeſuit *heroically* maintains that for that very reaſon it muſt be true; namely, becauſe no man, in the face of ſo much *evidence* to the contrary, could ever have believed it without ſupernatural means, without being induced and obliged to believe ſo by the irreſiſtible influence of Supreme Power; ſo that without this ſupreme irreſiſtible influence every man muſt diſbelieve Tranſubſtantiation. In like manner our Doctors tell us, that we muſt "refer "or aſcribe all our actions to ourſelves;" muſt believe free-will, and feel all the remorſe of conſcience; and ſo *muſt always* (according to them) *believe* and *maintain* the moſt painful and cruel *falſehoods*, "until we live in communion with "God, and partake of the Divine nature:" and thoſe of us who arrive not at that ſtate at any age, muſt do ſo all our lives here (by their account); to all eternity, we ſay; for no man can ever arrive at it.

But, ſay they, *all* in *communion* with God refer every thing to him. "Which doctrine," ſays Dr. Hartley, p. 344, "has a tendency to abate all re-"ſentment againſt men. Since all that they do

"againſt us is by the appointment of God, it is "*rebellion* againſt him to be *offended* with them." Theſe are ſmooth words; but are theſe divine philoſophers' actions conformable to their words? To us, mere men, it appears that they are not; for even Dr. Hartley, in page 358, makes uſe of epithets, which do not *intimate* much *complacency*; and calls an unhappy, abuſed, *deluded* man, "The reſtleſs, ſelfiſh, objecting creature." And as to Dr. Prieſtley, he, according to this rule of his admired Hartley, ſets the *ſtandard* of rebellion on high—condemns in ſevere terms; liberally beſtows degrading epithets on thoſe who dare diſſent from his favorite opinions—witneſs his anſwer to Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Oſwald. And what is all this, according to his and Hartley's opinion? but the All-wiſe, through *him*, *condemning himſelf* through *them*; a degree of *ſelf-oppoſition*, folly, and wonderful extravagance, *which* even *Satan* himſelf (as our bleſſed Saviour declares) is not ſo *abſurd* as to adopt. Such is their conſiſtency: but we who happily believe the reverſe of their doctrines; namely, that all the folly and villany of men, proceed entirely from themſelves—we ſhould certainly be not only excuſed, but juſtified in being highly offended, and, full of indignation, to ſee our *kindeſt benefactor*, our Heavenly Father, the moſt adorable *ſource* of *purity* and *truth*, charged with ſuch extreme *folly*, extreme

treme falſehood, and with every odious deteſtable crime, were there not *reaſon* to *hope*, that the very *ſtrange things*, which they frequently utter, indicate a partial inſanity, a derangement of mind, *quoad hoc*. We have already mentioned ſeveral of theſe; but one thing hinted in page 349 of Dr. Hartley's Theory, as publiſhed by Dr. Prieſtley, ſeems to equal at leaſt any of them; namely, a ſuppoſition that thoſe who are denied the ability to obey the precepts of religion at "preſent, will "obtain it hereafter; and that they who ſhall ob- "tain it at any *diſtant future time*, may be ſaid to "*have obtained* it *already*, in the eye of him, to "whom, paſt, preſent, and future, are all "preſent." Which words, if they *mean any* thing, muſt mean, that it may be ſaid to be the ſame thing, in the eye of him who judges men and angels, whether a man obey his commands or not in this life, provided he does ſo at ſome diſtant future time. What an additional temptation is here! what an encouragement; what future comforts and happineſs are here held forth, to all who ſhall, while on earth, not only diſregard, but live in open defiance of God's commandments; who ſhall treat his holy ordinances, and earneſt warnings, with neglect and diſdain; who ſhall blaſpheme his name, and treat his exiſtence with ridicule! And what a heart muſt a man have (if not totally beſide himſelf) who

can

can look upon the commiſſion of the moſt horrible, and ſavage iniquities, even for one day, much more for a whole life, as a matter of *indifference*, provided they be left off "at any diſtant "future time?" On the contrary, can any thing be more heart-breaking, to a truly good man, than to have been ſurpriſed, even for *one moment*, into any mean or injurious deed; into any diſreſpect to his Maker, injuſtice or cruelty towards any man, of whatever complexion, condition, or country he be?—Theſe, and many other things for the preſent omitted, change our indignation into pity and ſorrow; nor would theſe laſt obſervations have been written, did not many men (men of parts and influence too) in whom there appears no inſanity, defend theſe puzzled bewildered men's opinions, and ſpeak in high terms of approbation of their doctrine of Neceſſity, which we hope is already ſhewn, in this Eſſay, to be very ill founded, being contrary to real facts and nature. It took its riſe principally from men's paying a great deal more attention to bodies, and their effects on each other, than to minds, and their peculiar *powers*. When men have long ſtudied and made ſome diſcoveries in mechanics, chymiſtry, and other branches of knowledge, regarding bodies (which are certainly very uſeful in their *ſphere*, though infinitely inadequate to produce univerſal knowledge and wiſdom)

om), and have thereby acquired ſome fame, d the title of philoſopher; (How often do les, alas! deprive us poor mortals of common nſe?) they preſently fancy, or rather dream, at all the *laws of nature*, all the powers, even ſpiritual ſubſtances themſelves, are derived om the *few rules* which they obſerve in that nfined mechanical *branch* of knowledge which ch of them has chiefly ſtudied; and ſo from oſe *paſſive*, material objects, which *alone* they now, they have framed deſpotic laws, and forged damantine chains, not only for men and angels, ut alſo for the all-wiſe, all-powerful, firſt cauſe, e Creator himſelf.—The motion of the ſame dy, when exactly the ſame force, in the ſame rection, is repeatedly applied to it, and when l other circumſtances remain unaltered, will ways be the ſame; but it is not ſo with minds, ſeen above, where ſeveral of the *effects* of our ental freedom are ſet forth; or rather, properly peaking, of the effects, produced by the mind, ſpirit itſelf, by means of its freedom; for the *wers* of the mind can do nothing of themſelves; ey are only means and inſtruments, as already entioned. The daily improving nature of this lf-governing power of the mind, when it is pro-rly cultivated, we have not yet explained, nor s mighty force when in a ſtate of conſiderable provement, from whence it grows continually

to

to more and more ſtrength, until it becomes ſu-
perior to all temptations, to every act of meanneſs
of deliberate falſehood and injuſtice, much more
ſo to thoſe of cruelty, inhumanity, and barbarity.
A further account of this, and other powers of
our minds or ſpirits (which alone are active
beings), as alſo of morals and religion; together
with the dreadful effects of ſuperſtition and falſe
philoſophy, on thoſe perſons who ſuffer them-
ſelves to be enſlaved by them; of avarice, ambition,
and other corrupted paſſions, are the ſubjects of
the following Eſſays, which are there contraſted
with the purity and excellence of the Goſpel, of
true humanity and benevolence: moreover, if the
preſent publication ſucceed, and ſeem to produce
ſome of the good effects which the author in-
tends; and if life and health continue, he will in
ſome future publications endeavour to throw ad-
ditional light on theſe, and many other parts of
uſeful knowledge and true philoſophy, which have
hitherto been much obſcured, often totally eclipſ-
ed by ideal, falſe hypotheſes; for philoſophers have
attempted to explain them in a way and by means
the very reverſe of what they ſhould have made
uſe of. This has been the cauſe of their errors, and
not any want of natural underſtanding and emi-
nent talents, in which many of them have abound-
ed: and if this Author undertakes to correct and
refute many of their errors (and very extraordi-
nary

ary errors too), let it be remembered that a much weaker eye, in an advantageous and clear light, may ſee things infinitely more diſtinctly, than the ſtrongeſt ſight that ever was, when placed in obſcurity and darkneſs.

Concluſion, being a Caution to Anſwerers.

If theſe Eſſays ſhould attract public notice, anſwers, no doubt, will be publiſhed to ſome things herein maintained: in which caſe the Author begs the favour of thoſe gentlemen who may differ from him in principles, and publickly defend their own, that they will be ſo good as to examine accurately their arguments, and make uſe of none but ſuch as are ſound, ſolid, and good, in order to ſave themſelves and him much uſeleſs trouble: let them, above all things, beware of the *petitio principii*, the moſt unſound and vicious way of arguing in the whole world, but which is too often found in the arguments (or *demonſtrations* as they frequently call them) by which philoſophers *prove*, and upon which they found their curious ſyſtems; by exactly ſuch an argument, do Mr. Locke, Dr. Prieſtley, and all the philoſophers who lay the foundation of our knowledge in ideas only, prove the exiſtence of real outward things, of an outward inviſible world. Their main fundamental principle, the corner-ſtone of their whole philoſophy is, "That we per-

"ceive

"ceive *nothing* but our own ideas, which are i
"our minds." How then ſhall we know tha
there are real things actually exiſting without us
Nothing eaſier, they ſay, and prove it as follow
"One is invincibly conſcious" (ſays Mr. Lock
in the 2d Chap. of the 4th Book of his Eſſay
"of a different perception, when he looks on th
"ſun by day, and thinks on it by night:" and ſay
Dr. Prieſtley, in his remarks on Harris's Syſtem
(Correſpondence, page 339) "Judging" ſays he
"by the moſt obvious *facts* and univerſal *experi-*
"*ence*, nothing is more evident than that the
"*principle* which we call *mind*, whether it be ma-
"terial or immaterial, is of ſuch a nature, that
"it can be affected by external objects, and
"that its perceptions correſpond to the ſtate
"of the corporeal ſyſtem, eſpecially that of the
"brain; and there is the ſame reaſon to con-
"clude, that this affection is natural and neceſ-
"ſary, as that the ſound of a muſical chord is
"the natural and neceſſary effect of a plectrum.
"If my eye be *open* and a houſe be before me,"
ſaith he, "I as neceſſarily perceive the *idea* of a
"houſe; or if fire be applied to any part of my
"body, I as neceſſarily perceive the *ſenſation* of
"*burning*, as ſound follows the ſtroke above men-
"tioned." Here the actual exiſtence of the real
outward *ſun*; of the real *eye*, the real *houſe* and *fire*,
&c. is *aſſumed*; is previouſly *taken* for *granted*, in
order

order to prove that *very* exiſtence, and the exiſtence of other material things without us. "If "my eye be open," ſays the Doctor, "and a houſe "be before me." But this real *eye* and real *houſe*, are two of the very things, the exiſtence of which is to be proved; and thus to aſſume the exiſtence of them in order to prove it, is one of the moſt barefaced begging of the queſtion that ever was known. Prove to us, firſt, the exiſtence of the real eye, and the real houſe; of the real fire and body, and your argument is a good proof of the exiſtence of other "external objects, of that cor-"poreal ſyſtem" (the actual being of all which you took for granted above), otherwiſe it is good for nothing; and as to the example of the *plectrum*, and the ſound of the muſical *chord*, by which you endeavour to illuſtrate this matter, it bears no ſimilitude to it; for what you call *plectrum*, if you mean by it what you actually ſee, is as immediately perceived as the muſical chord and its ſound; but the real external *houſe* is not perceived, according to your principles; and, therefore, not only its actual being, but its being oppoſite to your eye, muſt alſo be proved before you can rationally form any compariſon, or draw any inference from thence. But endleſs are the aſſumptions of the idealiſts: for every thing that they either ſpeak or write about real beings can be nothing more than merely begging the queſtion; thus

thus the Doctor takes for granted, above, not only the actual being of external corporeal objects, but alſo, that they effect ſomething, either material or immaterial, which he calls *mind*; which mind, according to him, can neither be perceived nor immediately known, any more than the real external objects, which, ſay the idealiſts, are the imperceptible archetypes of our ſenſations. But herein they differ, *toto cælo* from common ſenſe and continual experience; which clearly evinces, that the real external things, as well as our minds, and their powers and actions, &c. are immediately perceived by us, in the moſt ſimple and direct manner; therefore, that the real *world* wherein we live, the *real cities*, the *real houſes*, and all the real things within *it* and *them*, are no other than the very things which we actually ſee and feel immediately, and not by pictures and repreſentations;—of which more hereafter, if health continue. In this place, one inſtance more of the *petitio principii*, and we put an end to this Eſſay, already much longer than at firſt intended.

Dr. Prieſtley ſomewhere ſays, that if a perſon can do more than "one definite act in definite "circumſtances, it is an effect without a cauſe." But that is the very thing in debate, put into other words; for if there be a ſelf-moving, ſelf-determining power in the mind, *there* is the very ſufficient cauſe of all ſuch effects; but he takes for

for granted, that one cauſe, or one combination of cauſes, can never produce more than one determinate effect; which is the very thing to be proved; yet he makes this an argument to prove itſelf: but nothing is clearer, from experience, than that one ſingle *living* cauſe can produce a multiplicity of effects; and upon experience alone he ſometimes very properly reſts the argument, upon which ground we have met him, and hope to meet him again.

Many other inſtances of ſuch aſſumptions might be here brought from the writings of the greateſt philoſophers, and may in future Eſſays. At preſent we can only recommend to the young, unprejudiced reader, who earneſtly ſeeks for real knowledge, to examine well, and reconcile himſelf, if he can, to the great deviations here already made, from the common ideal philoſophy ſo prevalent in the world: if he can do this, many other comfortable things may, with the bleſſing of heaven, be ſome time or another, ſhewn to him, and alſo diſcovered by himſelf—not in a dubious and dark manner, but in a clear light. Let him at all times be well aware of dark and profound ſciences. Whatever their pretenſions may be, they are always to be ſuſpected; for whatever ſtudy and pains it may coſt us to gain knowledge; *when gained*, if it be *real knowledge*, it is all light and clearneſs. In things themſelves,

ſelves, or in the true and thorough knowledge of them, there is no darkneſs; the darkneſs is always in the minds of thoſe who talk or write about things which they underſtand very *imperfectly*, or *not* at *all*. All theſe matters we beg leave to recommend to the careful and impartial conſideration of ingenuous young men who love knowledge, and to all others who are tired of uncertainty and ſcepticiſm; but as to thoſe who have for many years looked with profound reverence on the opinions here combated, we can hardly hope that the generality of them will readily give them up, however groundleſs they may be; however remote from the truth of nature, or the reality of things.

POETICAL ESSAYS

ON THE

FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

VIZ.

I. THE PRINCIPAL ERRORS AND CORRUPTIONS OF MEN.

II. THE EXCELLENCE OF REASON AND OF VIRTUE.

III. THE FREEDOM AND OTHER POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

IV. THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF THE SOUL.

V. THE FOUNDATION AND REALITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, AND OF HUMAN HAPPINESS.

"Yet ye say the way of the Lord is not equal. Is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal?" EZEK.

"My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways." ISA.

ESSAY II.

ARGUMENT.

INVOCATION of Truth and Benevolence.—Origin of moral evil.—The extreme abſurdity of the opinion "that God is the Author of vice and folly, clearly ſhewn."—The principal ſource of the errors of mankind explained viz. That they ariſe from wilfully *harbouring deceit, and all the arts of deluſion in their minds, which corrupt their hearts, darken and pervert their underſtandings, and not from any* natural weakneſs *of* reaſon.—*The freedom of the mind further examined and defended.—The excellence and happineſs of innocence contraſted with the miſery and madneſs of ambition.*

ESSAY I.

HENCE Phœbus! and hence all the fabled Nine!
Come ſacred Truth! my heart be wholly thine!
Arm'd with thy awful pow'r, which nought with-
ſtands,
Which blaſts the ſtrong and nerves the feeble hands,
Let me at tyrants threats unmov'd remain,
And view the bribes of int'reſt with diſdain.

5.—*Let me at tyrants threats, &c.*]

By tyrants are not here principally meant, deſpotic and tyrannical rulers of nations and ſocieties; but thoſe literary tyrants, who ſet themſelves up as dictators and oracles of human opinions and faith, to whom the following deſcription in our animated poet, Shakeſpeare, is very ſuitable:

"There are a ſort of men whoſe viſages
"Do cream and mantle like a ſtanding pond,
"With purpoſe to be dreſt in an opinion,
"Of wiſdom, gravity, profound conceit;
"As who ſhould ſay, I am Sir Oracle!"

Theſe *Oracles* (ſtill more vindictive than thoſe of old) ſeldom or never pardon a doubt regarding their *dictates*; much leſs an open, public oppoſition to them; and they very rarely ſcruple to make uſe of any means, whether legal or illegal, even the moſt groundleſs inventions, in order to hang up, if they can, to eternal infamy, every man who ſhall be daring enough to do it.

O Sun of Spirits! let thy heav'nly ray
It's pureſt luſtre o'er my mind diſplay;
All phantoms form'd by prejudice expel,
All ſtorms allay, all rebel paſſions quell,
And bring the virtues, chief the Queen of love!
Not the feign'd Harlot with her Cyprian dove,
No; but that Maid divine, whoſe bleſſed ſight
Charms Heav'n, and fills Archangels with delight,
Benevolence! whoſe goodneſs knows no bound,
But helps and cheers the whole creation round;
Friend to the friendleſs! to the hopeleſs kind!
The fairest image of th' Eternal Mind!
Let her have full dominion o'er my ſoul,
My words, my actions, and my thoughts control.

True guides of nature! who benignly ſmile
On thoſe bleſt few alone who know no guile!
Belov'd, divine inſtructors firſt diſcloſe
The ſource of man's diſtreſs and mental woes,
Which in each land and clime diſtract the ſoul,
And like a deluge rage from Pole to Pole:
Whence, in this fair creation, can ariſe,
Of God, the only good and only wiſe,
Such monſtrous evils! Follies without end,
And errors which no ſenſe can comprehend?

From wilful minds! who, wonderful to ſay!
The profer'd *good* perverſely ſpurn away;
Yes, from the good they know, the light they ſee,
Deſign'dly turn! and then give birth to thee,

34.—*Deſign'dly turn, &c.*] That knowledge and faith, eſpecially the knowledge and belief of

Abhorred evil! filth of minds ingrate!
Fair nature's curſe and God's eternal hate,
Proud, fooliſh, vain philoſophy forbear,
Againſt the God of Wiſdom canſt thou rear
Thy impious creſt? Preſumptuous, dar'ſt thou ſay
That He compels his ſons to diſobey
His own commands? O! ſtubborneſs of mind!
To ſhame, to virtue, and to reaſon blind!
Say'ſt thou He lifts (the thought makes nature ſtart)
The *Sons* curſt hand againſt his *Father*'s heart?
Does He, the ſource of tenderneſs, employ
The dire, relentleſs Mother to deſtroy
Her helpleſs, weeping infant? He, whoſe care
To all the beaſts, and all the birds of air,
Hath giv'n parental love? who fram'd each part
Of worlds immenſe with ſo divine an art,
That pureſt truth and wiſdom unconfin'd
Shine thro' the whole, and ſtrike the thinking mind
With wonder, love and joy! Say, can he move
And teach abandon'd Atheiſts to diſprove

of moral and religious truths, are not forced into the minds of men; but that it depends on their own *free choice* to admit them or not, or, in their ſtead, to admit the *belief* of the moſt palpable contradictions and impoſſibilities, is evident from continual experience: if men's opinions and faith were the neceſſary reſult of cauſes, or chains of cauſes, *actually exiſting* in *nature*, they would be always conformable to what is *natural*, or *poſſible* at leaſt; which every man knows to be otherwiſe. This is treated of more at large in the Preliminary Eſſay.

His

His own exiſtence? prove the *Sun's no* light,
That his black beams produce the darkeſt night;
Say there's no thought or *life* beneath the ſkies,
No, nor in heav'n; but ſay not God's unwiſe,
Unjuſt, or cruel! Loſt to truth, awake!
Burſt folly's bounds, and freedom's joys partake:
Awake to reaſon, in good ſenſe excel,
Send ſophiſtry and cunning back to hell;
Shun each deluding art and baſe diſguiſe;
Scorn fame, love knowledge, and be truly wiſe:
Let not, ah! let not foul deceit remain
One moment on thy mind, thy ſoul to ſtain,
To warp thy reaſon, blind the mental eye;
Chooſe rather bonds or death, than frame a lie;
For, O how foul the taint it leaves behind!
It rots the heart, and ruins all the mind;
Yes, utterly perverts, if harbour'd long,
The God-like pow'r of knowing *right* from *wrong*,

59.—*But ſay not God's unwiſe.*]

That is to ſay—If thou believeſt a God, an intelligent Creator poſſeſſing all poſſible wiſdom (which every conſiderate man, of common ſenſe, does) thou canſt not, without the utmoſt extravagance and contradiction, *attribute* to him, make him the *author*, of all the wild nonſenſe and mad follies of every man upon earth, even of denying his own exiſtence; *which*, according to the Neceſſarian principles, he does in every age, with eagerneſs and violence. If a compariſon can be made between two of the greateſt abſurdities ever known it ſeems, rather leſs extravagant to deny the Supreme Being's very exiſtence, than to maintain that he denies it *himſelf*.

'Till

'Till darkneſs and its friends poſſeſs the whole,
And drive all light and comfort from the ſoul.
As when the Seraph, from the realms of bliſs
Deſcending, opens wide the dread abiſs,
From the dark gulph Gehenna's vapours riſe,
And ſpread the gloom infernal o'er the ſkies,
From Pole to Pole Hell's deepeſt horrors run,
Quench all the ſtars and blot th'all-cheering ſun!
So, in that brighter heav'n, the reas'ning mind,
When evil, dark deſigns an entrance find,
With foul accurſed deeds, the ſacred ray
Which guides immortal ſpirits on their way
To truth and good, e'en reaſon's holy light
Is dimm'd, then loſt, in error's tenfold night.
Ah! prone to error, ceaſe, blaſpheme no more,
Learn nature's laws and nature's God adore
The truly juſt and wiſe; from whom proceed
Pure light alone and ev'ry perfect deed;
Let no falſe tongue, O more than madneſs! ſay
The Source of light and truth leads man aſtray;
On his own ſons deceitful lights beſtows,
To odious crimes betrays, and hopeleſs woes;
With fury, malice, and with murder fires;
With ev'ry lie and treachery inſpires;
Forceth to hate integrity and worth,
And teacheth all that's infamous on earth. [voice!
Ceaſe, wretched man! hear truth, hear nature's
Thy vice and folly are thy own free choice;

75.—In the Revelations.

Or

Or what is conſcience? Say, from whence ariſe
The pangs of guilt? the worm which never dies?
And whence the difference infinite explain
Of error's ſorrow, and the direful pain
Of wilful crimes? Why all with hate purſue
Thoſe, with malignant purpoſe who imbrue
Their hands in brothers blood? who friends betray,
And kindeſt love with woes and death repay?
But *him*, unhappy, to all knowledge blind,
When ſenſe is loſt and madneſs fires the mind,
Tho' her who gave him life he ſhould annoy,
His brethren, friends, or children ſhould deſtroy,
With the leaſt guilt or blame his bitt'reſt foes
Can never charge, while he no longer knows,
The leaſt diſtinction between ill and good
More than the ſword he draws, or raging flood;
Which, ſwelled by tempeſts, ruins all the plains,
O'erwhelms a thouſand cots and weeping ſwains:
Nor him, unhappier far, whoſe erring dart,
Aim'd at the foe, has pierc'd the deareſt heart,

103.—Every man of a ſound and ſober mind as clearly perceives that he can often *do*, or *not do*, many actions, as he does that he ever thinks or performs any action at all: if this were not *fact*, nothing can be conceived more unjuſt, deceitful and cruel, than to make us believe ſo; and, by that deception, inflict upon us a puniſhment, contrary to truth, contrary to nature, which we in no manner or degree deſerve. And who are they who ſay we are ſo deceived, but thoſe who hold that man, a *created* Being, can partake of the *Divine* or *Uncreated* nature; or ſuch other things, equally remote from common ſenſe? All which are conſidered elſewhere.

Much

Much dearer than his own! his only child,
Fair as the morn, as ſmiling cherubs mild,
Has ſlain! while he, cold, pale, diſtracted ſtands,
Stretch'd to the foe, to earth, to heav'n his hands!
And prays for inſtant death! which all deny,
But tend'reſt pity ſtreams from every eye;
All hate forgot, moves e'en his mortal foe
To ſoothe his anguiſh, and partake his woe;
Till innocence and time his pangs allay,
Eaſe all his cares, and chaſe each gloom away.

O Innocence! what language can expreſs
Thy worth? thou heav'nly comfort in diſtreſs!
What tongue! what tongue of Seraph can define,
To human thought, thy excellence divine?
Pure ſource of happineſs without alloy!
Thou life of life, and ſoul of ev'ry joy!
When o'er Creation ſhines thy cheering light,
We feel exiſtence with ſincere delight;
From bitter draughts the cup of life's refin'd,
And bliſs eternal dawns upon the mind:
Benevolence (each evil wiſh deſtroy'd)
Flows thro' the heart, and fills its ample *void*;
That void where earth's whole treaſure diſappears,
And leaves the world's great conqu'rors nought but tears,
With bitter ſighs, and heart-corroding care,
Deep anguiſh, diſappointment, and deſpair.
Ah! men unbleſt! unutterably blind
To all true greatneſs, which exalts the mind!

From

From whoſe degraded hearts compaſſion's fled;
To virtue, truth, and real honour dead!
Who, loſt to feeling, and to honeſt ſhame,
On miſery and ruin build your fame!
And, paſt deſcription barbarous, with pride
Behold your boaſted carnage far and wide!
Fair, happy regions, all deform'd with gore,
And deſolation ſpread from ſhore to ſhore!
Late peaceful regions, where thoſe joys ſerene,
Thoſe purer joys which bleſs the rural ſcene,
Each harmleſs breaſt with life's true comforts charm'd;
Where love ſincere, and ſacred friendſhip warm'd
The ſocial boſom; where each day's increaſe
Of heart-felt union, crown'd the land with peace;
Where tender parents ſaw, with ſouls elate,
Their infants' ſmiles, and heard their guileleſs prate;
And health-bleſt peaſants, as they hied along,
Expreſs'd the mind's content in artleſs ſong.
Such ſcenes, ſo pleaſing, ſo devoid of harm,
As might, if aught, the very fiends diſarm,
Conqu'rors, with thoughts imperial, ſoaring high,
Far beyond pity's call and mercy's cry,
Relentleſs bid deſtruction overflow,
And plunge in all the depths of human woe.
Nor ſo content; but rave, with ſavage joy,
To ſee their mighty power to deſtroy:
Imagine nature moving at their nod,
Blaſpheme their Maker, and aſſume the God.

As

As well—where mighty Niger rolls his flood,
A noxious reptile, nurs'd in filth and mud,
Which from life-blaſting fens the venom drains,
And ſcatters death and ruin o'er the plains;
When by his touch accurs'd the lion dies,
And ſtrong Behemoth of enormous ſize;
When man himſelf, with all his vaunted might,
In tortures falls, or ſafety ſeeks by flight—
As well this deadly aſp, were language giv'n,
Might call himſelf the lord of earth and heav'n!
O earth! O heav'n! be utterly amaz'd,
To ſee each trace of ſenſe and truth eraz'd,
E'en from the human thought! All nature hear!
And for ſuch madneſs ſhed the gen'ral tear,
That duſt-form'd mortal man, who dies each hour,
Corruption's victim, which the worms devour,
To whom th' All-wiſe, to curb his pride and rage,
Grants but by moments all his fleeting age;
His age, which oft decays, ere well begun,
Like vernal inſects in the ſetting ſun;
That ſuch an helpleſs worm himſelf ſhould dare
With life's eternal Fountain to compare;
To whom unnumber'd worlds their glories owe;
From *whom* the everlaſting ages flow;

192.——*Corruption's victim, &c.*]

That is, as to his *body*, or *corporeal* nature; as to all his *might* and bodily excellencies in this life.

200.——*From whom, &c.*]

Some critics have made it a rule that the *e* in the particle *the* ought always to be cut off before words that begin with a vowel; but in

Without whoſe care, and ſtill-preſerving pow'r,
All life would ceaſe, and nature be no more!
E'en the bleſt Seraphs, all the heav'nly hoſt
Would periſh, and the univerſe be loſt!

in a language like ours, which abounds with conſonants, that is ſometimes very harſh, eſpecially when a conſiderable emphaſis is to be put on the word immediately following; therefore it is not done before the words *everlaſting* and *univerſe*, in the lines 200 and 204; and, in this, the Author is ſupported by the authority of Milton, Shakeſpeare, Pope, &c. How harſh would the laſt line be as follows?

" E'en the bleſt Seraphs, the bright heav'nly hoſt
" Would periſh all—and th' univerſe be loſt."

202.——*All life would ceaſe, &c.*]

N. B. The ſame exception to this general expreſſion is to be made here, as the Apoſtle Paul makes when he ſays, that God has put *all* things under the Meſſiah, emphatically called *His Son*, whom he hath appointed ruler and judge of the living and the dead. " It is manifeſt," ſays the Apoſtle, " that *He* is *excepted* who did put all things under him." Indeed, ſuch general expreſſions as " *all things*, *all* the *world*," &c. are frequently uſed in a limited ſenſe; a ſenſe not ſtrictly literal, and have always been ſo uſed in every country and every language; but, wherever they are ſo uſed, the exceptions ought to be obvious and manifeſt, as the Apoſtle obſerves. It was thought proper to make this obſervation, once for all, here, in order to give ſome check, if poſſible, to that ever-reſtleſs and malignant ſpirit of cavilling which continually haunts far the greater part of the children of men; and happy, thrice happy, would it be for the world, could we except from this charge men of eminence and abilities, who, it is to be feared, are as often, if not oftener, poſſeſſed by it than even their inferiors.

END OF THE FIRST ESSAY.

ESSAY II.

ARGUMENT.

INVOCATION.—The errors of this world in its preſent ſtate.—Ambition and ſuperſtition delineated in their natural forms and colours—Their progreſs, co-operation, and their wonderful influence over the hearts and minds of thoſe miſerable mortals who are ſeduced and enſlaved by them.—The extreme ſuperſtition of the greater part of Chriſtians particularly ſet forth, together with their tenets of divine right and non-reſiſtance regarding government.—The Eſſay concludes with obſervations on the incomparable perverſeneſs, folly, and violence of thoſe who give themſelves up to enthuſiaſm and wild fanatical ſuperſtition, and thereby become incurably deaf to all the dictates of reaſon and humanity.

ESSAY II.

DIVINE Inſpirers, whoſe unclouded ray
Fills all the heav'n of heav'ns with endleſs day!
O! grant each moment your celeſtial light,
To ſoothe my ſoul, and guide my ſteps aright,
Leſt in this wilderneſs of death I ſtray,
Where Ill's fell monſters ſeek their daily prey;
Where frauds, ſnares, falſehoods, numberleſs are found,
And pits Tartarean mine the faithleſs ground;
Where hell's falſe lights with dread chimæras roll,
Where dire fanatic yells appal the ſoul;
Idolatry her ſorceries diſplays,
Deludes the nations and the world betrays;
And Ath'iſm blind, the fouleſt monſter bred
In utter darkneſs, rears his ruthleſs head!
And where, paſt all the wonders thought can frame,
Vile, noxious worms aſſume th' Almighty's name,

1.—*Divine inſpirers, &c.*] Truth and Benevolence.

And all groſs, ancient errors to enlarge,
Him with each folly, all their madneſs charge
  Reveal, immortal guides, whoſe heav'nly eye
The ſecret ways of darkneſs can deſcry;
Reveal how reaſ'ning ſouls become ſo blind,
And how ſuch boundleſs frenzies ſeize the mind!
  As the brute monſters of the wilds and wood,
Mad o'er the prey, and rioting in blood,
Their ſavage joys expreſs with hideous roars,
Which fill the plains and reach the diſtant ſhores;
Men, far more cruel by ambition made,
Thro' brother's blood to fame and empire wade,
Whole guiltleſs nations eagerly deſtroy,
Exulting with a *pure* infernal joy,
While ſlaves applauding with each martial ſound,
Proclaim their *triumphs* thro' the world around,
Laviſh all praiſe, all flattery refine,
And hail them with each epithet divine;
'Till the weak mind, by madd'ning follies toſt,
Is in wild ſtorms of brutal tranſports loſt.
  And when ſubſiding ſpirits theſe allay,
And ſacred reaſon caſts a diſtant ray,
Thro' all the realms of *ruin* half diſmay'd,
The pow'rs of darkneſs ſummon to their aid
The queen of ſorcerers, with all her train
Of conſecrated monſters of the brain,

30. —— *Exulting with a pure, &c.*]
Pure is here uſed adverbially for *purely*.

42. —— *Of conſecrated monſters, &c.*]
Though ſome of theſe ſaints and demi-gods bear the names of men

Saints, gods, and demi-gods, in numbers more
Than weeds on lands, or ſands upon the ſhore,
With flying atoms which, by whirlwinds driv'n
Obſcure the light and hide the face of heav'n;
All trembling hell's dread pow'rs her rule confeſs,
And with the lowlieſt reverence addreſs.

Queen of deluſions, whoſe imperial ſway
The race of man, and all but heav'n obey,

men who have really exiſted, ſome few thoſe of good men; yet, as objects of any kind of religious worſhip, ſuch as vows, prayers, religious kneelings, bowings, &c. they are mere phantoms of the imagination, or (figuratively) of the brain; this the Author hopes to demonſtrate in a Treatiſe in proſe, entitled "The "Verbal, or ſeeming Contradictions of the Holy Scriptures ex- "plained and reconciled."

43. —*Saints, gods, and demi-gods, &c.*]

The gods of the ancient Greeks and Romans are ſaid to have amounted to near thirty thouſand, beſides the Lares and Penates, which are ſuppoſed to have been all different in each different family; to which if we add all the gods, demi-gods, and ſaints of every other nation, and eſpecially the gods and guardian ſpirits of all the various tribes and nations of America, one of which is believed to attend not only every perſon but every tool and material object, the hyperbole in lines 44 and 45 will appear very moderate, or rather no hyperbole at all; which ſhews that the vagaries and extravagancies of man's imagination (when once fully diſengaged from reaſon, and not ſtrictly corrected and gui'ed by it according to the *rule* of *truth*, or of the *real ſtate* of things) are literally exceſſive and boundleſs, and can fairly bid defiance to the utmoſt *power* and *luxuriancy* of deſcription.

47.—*All trembling, &c.*]

"The devils believe and tremble," ſaith the Apoſtle James. But their belief produces neither juſtice nor benevolence. Such is

For glorious, myſtic, potent arts renown'd,
The light of *ſenſe* and nature to confound,
To baniſh reaſon, wiſdom to reverſe,
And rule without their aid the univerſe.
E'en Revelation's hated light thro' thee
To folly turns, and wond'rous blaſphemy!
Where'er thy glory ſhines, its pureſt light
Is ſoon eclips'd, and chang'd to mental night.
With mountains thou, or rivers canſt confine
Th' eternal *juſtice*, and the love divine:
On *this* ſide, mercy, grace, and peace remain;
On *that*, the wrath of God and endleſs pain;
'Till realms and empires (wonderful to tell!)
Nine-tenths of men are doom'd by us to hell;
Wretches predeſtin'd, ere their birth, to go
To ceaſeleſs howlings and ne'er ending woe!

the religion of devils and of wicked men; for the devils, as the Apoſtle here declares, are not ſo brutally ſtupid and fooliſh as ſome men are, and have been, who have not believed, at leaſt have denied the exiſtence of the Supreme Intelligent Creator and Ruler of the Univerſe, though "nature proclaims it aloud through all her works." But thoſe who love God and goodneſs are known by their *works*. "By their *fruits* ye ſhall know them," ſays our Saviour Chriſt. There are no other means by which we can poſſibly know other perſons, characters, or ſtate of mind; nor can any man know his own character with accuracy but by long and carefully watching and ſtudying his own actions.

52.——*The light of ſenſe, &c.*]

Diſcernment, good ſenſe. In the ſingular number this is generally the meaning of the word *ſenſe*; in the plural it ſignifies modes of ſenſation, ſuch as *ſeeing, feeling, hearing*, &c.

As

As in the map, by wand'ring fancy wrought,
Of the fair moon, we find wide tracts of drought,
Where never genial gales and fertile ſhow'rs,
Refreſh the land, but angry nature pours
A death like barrenneſs o'er all the plains,
Where horror dwells and deſolation reigns;
So in thy *pious* map of earth, we ſee,
Whole regions mark'd for curſe and miſery;
Deſign'dly made for everlaſting fire,
To ſhew Heav'n's righteous ways and holy ire!
Yet, taught by thee, th' elect their voices raiſe
To laud *this mercy!* and this goodneſs praiſe!
Goodneſs! not ſuch as man's, that heav'n-curſt clod!
Myſterious *goodneſs!* goodneſs of their God!
Thus man, with blindneſs infinite, receives
Thy dictates, and all myſteries believes;
Thy wonders! which no ſooner can diſplay [way.
Their charms, than e'en the pow'rs of Heav'n give
Thro' thee the Prince of Peace himſelf expir'd,
Tho' by vain truth and boundleſs love inſpir'd.

68.—*Of the fair Moon, &c.*]

See the common map of the Moon, with its "Terra Siccitatis and Sterilitatis," &c.

73.—*Of Earth, &c.*]

A poetical phraſe juſtified by the examples of many Engliſh poets. Thus Pope:

"Let earth, unbalanc'd, from her orbit fly."

ESSAY ON MAN.

86.—*Vain truth, &c.*]

Be it remembered that the powers of darkneſs ſpeak here, leſt the ever-reſtleſs ſpirit of cavilling diſturb itſelf and its gentle votaries in vain.

Ariſe, then, Queen of Goddeſſes, ariſe,
Thy earth reviſit, and thy much-lov'd ſkies.
Brave, godlike heroes, whom the world admire,
Great ſons of fame, thy inſtant aid require;
Who've ſpread *ruin*, like the general flood,
Beneath the Heav'ns, and dy'd the earth with blood;
Unnumber'd warriors by their valour fell!
But all their glory, time forbids to tell,
For reaſon names them, murd'rers of their kind,
And dire remorſe begins to ſeize the mind.
Haſte Superſtition, thy lov'd arts employ,
To change their riſing ſorrows into joy;
Say that on *them*, being Adam's eldeſt line,
Heav'n has beſtow'd an awful right divine;
To ſeize, to bind, and without mercy, throw,
To fatal dungeons, fraught with every woe,
Their helpleſs brethren; and their ſlaves employ,
By ev'ry ſtudied torture, to deſtroy,
At their high ſov'reign wills, and when they pleaſe,
Their wives, their children, and poſſeſſions ſeize;
To grant their ſacred troops to perpetrate
Such deeds as nature ſhudders to relate:

88.—*Much lov'd.*]

Becauſe the ſkies have in ancient times furniſhed her with many gods and goddeſſes; and both in antient and modern times with the elements of judical aſtrology, &c.

108.—*Such deeds as nature ſhudders, &c.*]

Leſt any one ſhould imagine it improper, for the powers of darkneſs to ſay, that their nature *ſhudders* at relating ſuch wonderfully brutal, and barbarous deeds, as armies have often committed; let

Yet, mov'd by th' endleſs miſeries and cries
Of friends, or kindred, ſhould ſome dare to riſe,
In oppoſition to thy chiefs and thee,
Stamp them all rebels to Heav'ns high decree;
For all, of right, beneath the ſun's their own,
For ever an appendage to the throne,
(Except thy *part*, by ev'ry pow'r on high
Giv'n to thy Prieſts, which if they touch they die.)
Perſuade that all authority is known,
To be the ruler's ſov'reign *will* alone;
For what is *law*, but a ſuperior's *will*
To bind inferiors, to give life or kill?
Himſelf, the *ſource* of law, no law can bind;
Hence by no compacts and no oaths confin'd;
His pleaſure's law, a lord of all by birth,
God's ſubſtitute, a mighty god on earth!

let him conſider that a great part, even of wicked ſpirits torments, ariſes from the agonies and horrors of conſcience, at the recollection of the unjuſt and cruel deeds which they have done or *promoted*.

118.—*To be the ruler's ſov'reign will alone.*]

His mere will alone, without any regard to juſtice or humanity, his bare, random will, however abſurd, cruel, or deſtructive. O glorious ſophiſtry, what canſt thou not maintain; what canſt *thou* not attempt to prove? But in the eye of reaſon, arbitrary government, whether of *one* or of many rulers, is contrary to every good *law* both *human* and *divine*: and particularly to that moſt *ſacred* and fundamental law—of doing to *all others* as we *would have them* do to us.

Nay

Nay more, we know the King Supreme above,
Bounds all his *acts* by equity and love.
Superior thou and thy brave chiefs appear,
Above control, ye rule alone by *fear!*
For right or wrong's your arbitrary nod,
Far, far above e'en all that's called God!
This teach, for nothing thou and we can tell,
Man will reject; that ridicule of Hell!
Creation's fool!—But *all things* to retain,
Within our potent sway and wide domain,
Be't our ambition;—and to rule with might
Unrivall'd, ever, ever our delight.
As thus the gloomy Kings express their wiles,
Well pleas'd, the Pow'r of Superstition smiles,
And, swift as human thought, or rays of light,
Arrives on earth, and vanishes from sight;
To change her dæmon-form a pow'r is giv'n;
Her form Hell's awe! th' eternal hate of Heav'n!
And now a lovely virgin she appears,
Meek, modest, simple, and all bath'd in tears,

126.—*Bounds all his acts by equity and love.*]

Nothing can be more absurd and impious than for any *men* to claim authority from God, or his laws, for making arbitrary and cruel rules, in order to oppress their brethren as often as they choose. He who does *one* deliberate *act* of cruelty and oppression, highly offends the Judge of the Living and the Dead, who considers it at all times, as done to himself. In what light, then, must *he* stand in the eye of the Supreme Judge, who *resolves*, who makes it a *fixed rule*, to *do so*, *whenever* and as *often* as he pleases? and *this* men impiously call *law* and *justice!*

Whom

Whom ſore affliction of all joy bereaves;
With deep affecting ſighs her boſom heaves;
To Heav'n ſhe lifts her ſad, imploring eyes,
Then rolls in duſt, and, agonizing, dies;
But ſoon revives amidſt a thouſand joys!
And plays with ardent zeal her ſacred toys;
By trivial, childiſh acts, Heav'n's favour draws;
With ſolemn follies, to all Hell gives laws;
With holy bones and rags forms myſtic tow'rs,
Impregnable to all th' infernal pow'rs;
Then waving her dread *Croſs*, at one vaſt ſweep
Drives all malignant ſpirits to the deep!
And---Oh! to tell this deed of darkneſs chills
The blood! and all the ſoul with horror fills!
A deed paſt all profaneneſs we can name!
Earth's curſe ſupreme and everlaſting ſhame!
Th' abandon'd ſhameleſs ſorcereſs can feign
Him (whom the Heav'n of Heav'ns cannot contain;
In whom the *ſum* of things live, move, and ſtand,
Who holds all ſpace and nature in his hand),
Him to delineate feign this monſter can,
To repreſent, by ſhapes, like mortal man,

166 *to* 174.—*Shapes like mortal man, &c.*

The abominable ſin and ungodlineſs here deſcribed, againſt which the Almighty through the whole of the ſcriptures, from the beginning to the end, wherever it is mentioned, declares his utmoſt diſpleaſure, and denounces the greateſt puniſhment;—this foundation and root of almoſt all the horrid crimes upon earth (as the Apoſtle Paul declares) is thus emphatically and moſt excellently ſet forth by him in the 1ſt Chapter of his Epiſtle to the Romans:

The Omnipreſent Spirit! and, like * *beaſts*
Which daily periſh to ſupply the feaſts
Of vile exceſs and riot: nay, deſigns
In figures †, which e'en children form with *lines*;
And repreſents by birds ‡ which trembling fly,
Feed on rank weeds, and in a moment die,
His boundleſs godhead! ſource of life and ſtrength,
By crumbling § bodies not a ſpan in length:
Yet thus, with headlong zeal, the crowd ſhe fires,
The crowd, which all extravagance admires:

Romans: "For the wrath of God," ſays the great Apoſtle of Gentiles, "is revealed from Heaven againſt all ungodlineſs of men "who *hold*," *that* is, "*who detain or withhold**," the truth in unrighteouſneſs; becauſe "that which may be known of God is "manifeſt in them, for God hath made it manifeſt unto them; for "the *inviſible* things of him, from the formation of the world, are "clearly perceived, being underſtood by the things that are made, "even his eternal power and godhead; ſo that they are without "excuſe; becauſe that when they knew God, they glorified him "not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their "imaginations and their fooliſh heart was darkened; profeſſing "themſelves to be wiſe†, they became fools, and changed the glory "of the incorruptible God into an *Image* made *like* to corruptible "*man*, and to *birds* and *four-footed beaſts*, and creeping things, "&c."—And for this cauſe God gave them up unto vile affections—to uncleanneſs through the luſts of their own hearts—"gave them over to a reprobate mind—being filled with all unrighteouſneſs."

* Lambs. † Triangles. ‡ Pigeons or Doves, which feed on weeds, and their ſeeds, as well as on grain. § Bits of bread, or wafers.

175.—*Yet thus with headlong zeal the crowd, &c.*]

By the word crowd are meant all perſons who are fondly attached to

* Κατεχοντων, *holding back*, detaining: *i e* concealing the truth.

† '*Wiſe*,' that is to ſay, *Philoſophers*.

vain,

Blind wonder utters in extatic roars,
Hates light and ſenſe, dark myſteries adores,
And now, than ſavages, inflam'd with wine,
More lawleſs far, with attributes divine,
As ſpouſe of God! *infallible!* they greet
Their idolized hag, and kiſs her feet;
Then to the clouds their deaf'ning voices raiſe
In acclamations and unbounded praiſe;
Whate'er's ſupremely mad with all their pow'r
Extol, and grow more frantic ev'ry hour;
Revile and threaten all who dare oppoſe,
As curs'd of God, and Heav'n's abandon'd foes.
Not with more noiſe and fury, near the main
Where icy winter holds her cheerleſs reign,
Or where the much-fam'd Atlas's ſeen to riſe,
And heave his bulk enormous to the ſkies;

vain, childiſh, and all irrational *ceremonies* or *modes* of external worſhip, ſuch as proceſſions; praying or doing any other act of worſhip towards a particular point of the compaſs; bowing or paying a ſuperior reſpect or reverence to a particular name of God or Chriſt, ſuch as *Jehovah* and *Jeſus*; praying in a ſuppoſed ſacred language not *well* or not at all underſtood by the people, as *Hebrew*, *Greek*, or *Latin*, &c. Setting prayers to muſic, and irreverently chaunting petitions to the Almighty; ſuperſtitious obſervations of holidays, ſpent, for the moſt part, in idleneſs and exceſſes; eating a particular food on certain days, and abſtaining from other kinds of food, even when permitted to drink ſtrong *liquors*; ſtrange affected voices and geſtures, long prayers, vain repetitions, and alſo, all who look upon any outward ceremony or cuſtom, however decent, as an *eſſential* part of religion, and on that account, are contentious, and break the bonds of Chriſtian peace and charity.

Or

Or endleſs rocks and mountains from the ſight
Of wond'ring nations hide the orb of night,
From their adoring eyes conceal too ſoon,
Her face, and thence call'd mountains of the moon;
Not with more fury ruthleſs and deform,
With horrid eye-balls glaring through the ſtorm,
The fierceſt beaſts of prey inceſſant roar,
'Till all the *rocks* reſound and all the dreary ſhore!
With reaſons words the ſons of truth in vain
Eſſay their growing frenzies to reſtrain;
In vain! (thro' enthuſiaſtic ravings blind,
Loſt in fanatic anarchy of mind)
Tho' reaſon's dictates higheſt Heav'n admire,
For ever honour'd by th' angelic choir,
Yet they her voice divine will hear no more,
Than ſtormy oceans, when they ceaſeleſs roar,
The cries and pray'rs of men! when air, ſeas, land
Are hurl'd together, till we deem at hand
The wreck of nature! ſenſe and truth they ſpurn,
And with inhuman, barb'rous *fury*, burn
Againſt their kind adviſers, fearleſs ſpill
The blood of innocence, nor ſpare to kill
Both *friends* and *brothers*: O thou *bleſſed* rage,
Of blind belief! which nought could e'er aſſuage;
Which far above all wolves and tigers brave,
Canſt tear the breathleſs body from the grave,

215.—*Bleſſed rage.*]

This ironical meaning of the word, *bleſſed*, in our language expreſſes the exact meaning of the word *ſacra* in Virgil, "Auri "ſacra fames!" Thou bleſſed love of gold!

To

To glut thy *vengeance!* thou, e'en thou alone
Canſt ſhew exceſs of joy to hear the *groan*
Of *good* men tortured, of the juſt who die
T'avoid profeſſing a delib'rate *lie*,
By vengeful pride impos'd; and now thy crowd,
As Bacchus and as Moloch's orgies *loud*,
The foulеſt ſorcereſs infernal brings
With tumults wild and triumph to thy kings.

220.—*Exceſs of joy, &c.*]

At the Autos de Fé in Spain, Portugal, and other countries where the moſt holy court of the Inquiſition (as the Popes and their bigotted adherents call it) *has*, or *lately had*, full power. See the learned Limborch's Hiſtory of the Inquiſition, in Latin, or the Tranſlation by Dr. Chandler.

END OF THE SECOND ESSAY.

ESSAY III.

ARGUMENT.

THAT vanity, avarice, and an inveterate hatred of truth (because it lays open their follies and iniquities) are very general among mortals, and almoſt without bounds in many individuals.—The dreadful cruelties *and devaſtations, produced by theſe* infernal vices.—*Theſe cruelties promoted and greatly increaſed, by the* love *of* ſenſual *pleaſure, however,* ſoft *and* refined *an appearance it may ſometimes wear; the devotees of pleaſure inſatiable in their love of money, which ſoon diveſts them of natural affections, of gratitude, fidelity and honour; theſe gay* villains *as cruel and barbarous as the gloomy, ſuperſtitious* hypocrite;—*the Author's concern and ſorrow for the oppreſſed.—He expreſſes his thankfulneſs, for being born in a land of freedom, of conſcience, as well as of perſon.—Expoſes the irrational extravagance of modern falſe Prophets and Enthuſiaſts.—Then endeavours to ſet forth the moſt* perfect *and wonderful character, ever known among men; namely,* that *of the Meſſiah, our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt;—ſhews the Jews the* extravagance *of their preſent* notions *and* ambition, *and concludes, with a ſhort deſcription of* what *mankind will be when arrived at the age of maturity and good ſenſe; at that ſtate of improvement, human nature is capable of; which will be, when the goſpel ſhall be every where profeſſed in its* purity, *and ſhall diffuſe univerſal freedom, which every page of it is calculated to do: through the want of which, namely, of the pure truth of the goſpel, and of rational liberty, the world has not hitherto attained to its age of perfect manhood and reaſon (juſt reaſoning having been very rare in any paſt times); it has only emerged from its* childhood, *and is yet a giddy* youth; *but lately begins to* think *and* conſider, *in* ſome *degree, from whence we have hopes that it will ere long attain to full age and ſenſe.*

ESSAY III.

TO ought of *infinite*, if mortal race
(Endleſs as time, unlimited as ſpace!)
Attain, 'tis vanity and hate of truth,
With love of follies, both in age and youth!
Fir'd by a luſt for *gold* and idle *ſtate*,
Which fatal evils, in the mind create;
For ſenſeleſs, childiſh pomp, and gay attire,
To make all idiots ſtare, all fools admire
See how (prepar'd for all extremes) they run
Beneath the riſing and the ſetting ſun,
With ſtill increaſing avarice of ſoul,
Wherever winds can blow, and oceans roll.
By any means to gain! and to adorn
Themſelves with gems, and all compunction ſcorn,
They hold it *wiſe!* at vulgar *pity* ſmile;
Call ſcruples weak; the laws of God revile!
Laugh at all conſcience, and its ſacred rules!
Made only, they maintain, to frighten fools.

1.—*To ought of infinite if mortal race.*]
Truth and benevolence, continue to ſpeake here.

3.—*Attain, &c.*]
'Tis that group of vices.

Rend'ring, leſt e'er compaſſion break their reſt,
Harder than tenfold adamant the breaſt;
Thus, ſafely guarded, view without a ſigh,
Whole millions periſh, guiltleſs nations die;
By them depriv'd of food, by want annoy'd,
By curſt, inſatiate avarice deſtroy'd
And as brave Nero, ſkill'd, to touch the lyre,
Tun'd the glad ſtring, when Rome was all on fire,
Theſe gallant ſons of Mammon and of glee,
Surrounded by a world in miſery,
Heedleſs of ſtarving mothers ſore diſtreſs'd,
Of infants dying at the dried-up breaſt,
Paſs undiſturb'd in melody and ſong,
Their ſportive hours, and gaily dance along,

20 *to* 34.—*inclusive*]

Some perſons may, no doubt be apt to look upon this dreadful account, as a poetical exaggeration; but alas! it is but too literally true; for a gentleman of the greateſt varacity, a relation of the author, who was at *Calcutta*, at the time of that almoſt unexampled *famine*, which aroſe from ſome of our honourable Nabobs's engroſſing the rice, (the common food of the people in the Eaſt-Indias), in a ſeaſon when there was not enough for them in all: that gentleman wrote to his mother, and told her "that he was obliged to walk with difficulty, over heaps of the bodies of thoſe who had died, and were dying every moment in the ſtreets of that city, through the exceſſive ſeverity of that moſt grievous *famine*" upon which he obſerved, that *thoſe*, and ſuch as *thoſe*, were often the *methods*, by which great and rapid fortunes were made in the Eaſt, "but, added he, humanely, to his eternal honour," "on theſe "terms, *I* never will make a fortune."

31.—*Their ſportive hours, and gaily dance along.*]

Another gentleman told a friend of the Author, that he was at a ball

Amidſt ſuch ſcenes as fiends themſelves might move;
They ſmile, and whiſper well-feign'd tales of love.
Raſh *wit* may ſneer; this truth we muſt impart:
A ruling love of pleaſure ſteels the heart,
T' avarice crying for an endleſs ſtore,
Tho' juſtice fail, and mercy be no more.
For *bribes* the glitt'ring ſons of *ſelfiſh* joy
Their deareſt *friends* and *country* would deſtroy;

a ball or concert at Calcutta when that ſhocking event took place, and that every time the muſical performers ſtopped, the groans of thoſe who were dying by thouſands in the ſtreets, through extreme want, were diſtinctly heard. The Author has alſo been told, that the Ganges was ſo full of dead bodies, that ſeveral of the Company's officers choſe rather to leave it and go by land in the hot burning ſeaſon than endure ſuch a ſight.

39 *to* 46 *inclusive.* —— *For bribes, &c.*]

To be convinced of this *fact*, ſee Lord Cheſterfield's Letters, and in him ſee the principles of almoſt all gay, ſmiling politicians and flouriſhing orators, who, though they have the words *humanity*, *juſtice*, *public good*, *truth*, *honour*, *candour*, *friendſhip*, and *affection*, &c. for ever in their mouths and writings, are loſt to all ſincerity and truth, and to every thing but accurſed avarice in every ſhape, and other ſuch ſelfiſh and ſcandalous vices. Would to heaven we could ſay, that the annals of parliament do not furniſh *ſuch* numerous examples of this truth *as almoſt* to petrify an honeſt man to think of ſuch hypocriſy and corruption. We hope, however, that what was lately related in the public papers cannot be true; namely, that when Mr. Wilberforce, and other humane gentlemen, related in a high aſſembly the wanton cruelties often exerciſed againſt our unhappy fellow-men, the black people, great numbers in the aſſembly burſt out a laughing. May Heaven avert ſo abandoned, ſo hopeleſs a ſtate of mind!

For true affection, ruin will beſtow,
For zeal and candour, infamy and woe;
Than *brutes* more ſavage; monſters to behold;
Each *gen'rous feeling* loſt in love of gold!
That "root of every ill," from whence ariſe
No leſs bright villains than the grave diſguiſe;
Of heav'n-inſulting hypocrites, who ſhow'r
Inceſſant tears, th' unwary to devour.
Hence the proud Spaniard, early taught to pray
In unknown tongue and croſs by night and day,
With *godleſs* piety and grave parade,
Of the New World a *bloody deſart* made.
And *hence* thoſe Britons, ſet from conſcience free,
By vain, *ideal*, falſe philoſophy,
Who, tho' not *learned*, glibly run along
The names of Locke and Leibnitz o'er the tongue;
Of unknown *matter* talk with daring hearts,
Of myſtic *atoms* with unnumber'd parts,

50.——*In unknown tongue and croſs by night and day.*]
A weak and ſuperſtitious practice of making croſſes with the fingers, &c. ſtill followed by moſt of the votaries of the Greek and Roman churches, &c. and like the fooliſh Amulets, charms, and enchantments of the Pagans, is believed to have a mighty effect againſt evil ſpirits, and for ſeveral other ſuch purpoſes. It was at firſt ſubſtituted, together with other ſilly practices, in the room of the Pagan charms, &c.

58.——*Of myſtic atoms, &c.*]
The antients held that bodies conſiſt of real *indiviſible* things, which, on that account, they called *atoms*; but modern philoſophers maintain that there are no ſuch things as indiviſible parts of bodies;

Of *brains* miraculous, where *forms* we ſee
Of all created *things*, if things there be.

bodies; therefore *what* bodies really conſiſt of it would puzzle *Anthropoſophus*, *Flood*, the great Teutonic Theoſopher Jacob *Behmen*, or even *Ralpho* himſelf, of renowned memory, to tell. The modern *atoms* it ſeems (as they are, not very *conſiſtently*, called) have themſelves an indefinite number of parts, as well as the groſs bodies which we ſee and feel; but we ſhould be glad to know what they mean by *parts*, whether they mean any real individual things by *them*, or whether they mean to lead us a wild gooſe chace after *their parts*, and *parts* of their parts, and ſo on ad infinitum; which is neither more nor leſs than explaining "*Ignotum* per *Ignotius*." We ſhould alſo be curious to know how they have found out this, by what means they have made this wonderful *diſcovery*? whether they were with the lynx-ey'd Ralpho, when, as he confeſſed,

"He ſaw *firſt matter* yet undreſt,
"And found her naked all alone,
"Before one rag of *form* was on."

The highly gifted and enlightened Ralpho, Hudibras's valiant 'ſquire,

"Who had the chaos too deſcried,
"And ſeen *quite thro'*, or *elſe* he *lied*."

We can never be ſufficiently aſtoniſhed that men of learning and talents ſhould invent ſuch *groundleſs*, dark, extravagant notions, and call them *philoſophy*, whereas they *ſhould* be called *Philoſkoty*, or *Love* of *Darkneſs*.

59.——*Of brains miraculous where forms we ſee.*]

In *which* all things are ſeen, though they themſelves are never ſeen by us.

60.——*Of all created things, if things there be.*]

Which cannot be proved on *their principles as we have already obſerved in the Preliminary Eſſay.*

Hence, *impious theſe*, where glowing ſun-beams ſhine
On Ganges' ſtreams, by Indians thought divine,
With thoſe hapleſs, murder'd Indians gore
Dy'd her vaſt floods, and choak'd from ſhore to ſhore
With heaps of *dead*, while o'er her waſted plain
Immenſe, lay tribes on tribes, whole nations ſlain.
Nor there alone, but where old ocean roars
On Afric's ſtrand, and cools her burning ſhores,
And in thoſe *iſles* where cruelty her throne
Delighted rears, amidſt eternal moan,
E'en *Britons* can behold, with jeſt and ſcorn,
Diſtracted parents from their children torn;
Loſt, friendleſs children, doom'd ne'er more to know
Parents or comfort in this world of woe,
They (death to think!) the agonies deride
Of thoſe for whom our bleſs'd Redeemer died.
The fruits we ſee, attend, ye prieſts, with ſhame,
Of *falſe* and *no* religion are the ſame;

73.——*Loſt, friendleſs children, doom'd*, &c.]
Not by fate or neceſſity, but by the unrelenting cruelty of their fellow-creatures, who, inſtead of being thus their tormentors ought to be their protectors and comforters. How ſhall theſe mercileſs men, or rather *devils*, meet the benevolent Judge's ſentence at the laſt day; his tremendous, juſt, and final ſentence: "I was hungry, and ye gave me *no meat*, a *ſtranger*, and ye *took me not* in, ſick, and ye *viſited me not*, *therefore*, depart from me ye *curſed*," &c. &c.

When

When reaſon's dictates, and the laws of heav'n
Man ſpurns, by love of wealth, to fury driv'n,
With darkneſs and confuſion guards his head,
Leſt truth he ſpy, by vice and folly led;
Reaſon thus quench'd, the *brute* with brutal deeds,
With unrelenting violence ſucceeds,
By which he keeps the trampled world in awe,
His wiſdom, *fraud*, and *force* alone, his *law!*
Celeſtial Guides, relieve my heart's diſtreſs,
My mind ſupport, and human ills redreſs,
O'er my griev'd ſoul thoſe hopes and comforts pour
With which ye have bleſs'd me from my natal hour;

83.——*Reaſon thus quench'd, the brute with brutal deeds.*]

The violence and cruelty of *brutal*, or, in other words, of *unreaſonable* power and dominion, are excellently and moſt ſtrikingly ſet forth in the viſions of the prophet, under the repreſentations of fierce, devouring, monſtrous beaſts: "the *firſt* of which was like "a lion with eagle's wings; the *ſecond* like a bear, with three "ribs between the teeth of it; the third like a leopard, with four "wings; and the fourth was dreadful, and terrible, and ſtrong "exceedingly; and it had great iron teeth; it devoured and "broke to pieces and ſtamped the reſidue with the feet of it." Thus the Prophet deſcribes that *power* which many renowned philoſophers and pious theologians have denominated *ſacred* and *divine*, and have freely condemned or damned all who ſhould reſiſt it.—Impiety, canſt thou go beyond this?

87.——*Celeſtial guides, &c.*]

Truth and Benevolence.

90.——*Natal hour.*]

This is an hyperbolical expreſſion ſimilar to that in ſcripture, "The ungodly goeth aſtray from his *mother's womb.*"

What,

What, tho' that hour, tremendous from the ſky,
Whole torrents pour'd, and thunders roll'd on high;
Has not your aid from that auſpicious day
Secur'd my paths, and ſmooth'd my proſp'rous way?
Bleſt be the day! diſtinguiſh'd may it ſmile,
Which ſaw me born in freedom's favour'd iſle,
Where ſtill her heav'nly light and ſacred fire
Shine fair abroad, and noble minds inſpire,
'Till o'er th' Atlantic ſounds her glorious name,
And the *brave Franks* have caught the gen'rous flame;

91.——*What, tho' that hour.*]

That hour and day were remarkably tempeſtuous, which is here mentioned in order to ſhew the folly of *omens* and *portents*, and to introduce the Author's thankfulneſs for the uncommon comforts of his life, and the cauſes of them.

100.——*And the brave Franks, &c.*]

A gentleman highly diſtinguiſhed in this country for his oratorical powers, &c. has in a long and laboured publication undertaken to condemn, in the ſevereſt terms, the late Revolution in France, and has beſtowed every vile, outrageous epithet that the utmoſt rage and violence ever ſuggeſted, even to low, uncultivated minds, on the National Aſſembly of that great people. What his real *motive* can be for ſo doing, no one, perhaps, but he who ſearcheth the heart can with certainty tell; for this gentleman cannot but know that riots and diſorders, with thoſe acts of violence which are ſometimes offered even to ſuſpected, but innocent men, unhappily attend all Revolutions, more eſpecially *thoſe* from ſlavery to liberty (and that generally in a much greater degree than they did lately in France), principally for *two* reaſons: Firſt, Becauſe tyrants, both lay and eccleſiaſtical, who hold their brethren in bondage,

Where heav'n's bleſt precepts to mankind reveal'd,
Are not by human craft, or hell's conceal'd;

bondage, always endeavour to keep them in the utmoſt ignorance, in order that they may not know and reflect on their condition any more, if poſſible, than the beaſts of burden; and from this forced ignorance, together with the recent ſenſe of the galling *ſcourge*, of ſore *oppreſſion*, proceed thoſe irregularities and violence which, on that account muſt, in ſome meaſure, be inſeparable from the beſt planned, the wiſeſt revolutions from bondage to freedom. The firſt reformation of the Chriſtian religion in Germany (which every *rational* man muſt *bleſs*), was attended at times with many extravagancies and conſiderable violence, as among the Anabaptiſts of Munſter, and other enthuſiaſts. The revolution in America was not without many outrages, which no candid man can juſtify; but ſuch evils we hope are *over*, or *nearly* ſo, in France, where ſuch unanimity prevails among the people at large as probably was never before ſeen among ſo many; but whether they are entirely over, or not, *no man* of *real humanity* can poſſibly wiſh for a counter-revolution, which Mr. Burke's *principles* directly tend to promote; for ſuch a revolution, or return to their old deſpotiſm, would be productive, according to all appearance, of the moſt dreadful carnage, of the moſt diſmal calamities ever ſeen, except at the deſtruction of the greater part, and the diſperſion of the reſt, of the Jewiſh nation, by the Romans. The *evils* of this paſt revolution would be *as nothing* to *them*. For this reaſon it does not appear that a ſpirit of humanity can, in any degree, influence this great man in his furious condemnation of the French Revolution; nor can it be a regard for religion, though he often pathetically mentions it; for in the eminent ſituations where he has been under our ſovereign, he muſt have ſworn, that he believes the *popiſh* religion to be *damnable* and heretical; and ſurely no man can be ſo *loſt* as ſeriouſly to lament that *hereſy* and *damnation* are daily more and more diſcountenanced among men. Beſides, What have the *great wealth* and *worldly pomp* of

ſome

Sure guides to all who love the *juſt* and *good*,
Regain'd by our forefathers ſacred blood.
How have theſe precepts, thine eternal truth,
With peace and gladneſs fill'd my happy youth!
O! how my healthful, chearful manhood ſped,
While malice's darts play harmleſs round my head.
O! might our Univerſal Father bleſs!
(Let all adore while we his name expreſs!)
Might God moſt High, whoſe gifts no limits know,
From whom all lives, all pow'rs, and all perfections flow;

ſome of the clergy (the *leſſening* of which he ſo bitterly deplores) while the greater and better part of them are in a ſtarving condition, to do with religion? Are they not the bane of all true religion? At times the enemies of this great revolution bitterly lament the misfortunes which it has brought upon a *nation*, at much greater misfortunes of which, we have often heard them rejoice on ſeveral occaſions. At other times, they tell us, that this revolution will very much hurt *us*; becauſe, if the French give conſiſtence and permanency to their preſent form of government, they will become very powerful, and overmatch us; but the truth is, that a people, with ſo truly free a government as that of the Franks at this time, muſt always abhor, and, if poſſible, avoid *war*; for to conquer, and hold *others* in *ſubjection*, is inconſiſtent with it; would be *deſtructive* to ſuch a government. On which account, every enlightened man, who is a ſincere *lover* of his *country*, and of the peace and proſperity of his fellow-creatures, muſt *moſt heartily* wiſh and *pray* that *ſuch* a government may remain and flouriſh for ever; and that all the kingdoms of the earth may, like it, become *kingdoms* of *freedom*, *peace*, and benevolence, inſtead of kingdoms of perpetual *intrigues*, violence, and

Who points their way, to all the orbs of night,
Bids day appear, and clothes the ſun with light

and wars, which deſtroy millions without the leaſt *ſcruple* or *feeling* for *them*; but, on the contrary, make great rejoicings and riot in their ſpoils.

113.—*Who points their way, &c.*]

The learned and judicious Dr. Samuel Clark, juſtly obſerves, that *gravity*, or the tendency which bodies have to approach each other, or a particular *center*, cannot be the effect of a *corporeal* agent; becauſe it acts with the *ſame* undiminiſhed force, at the very centers of the denſeſt bodies in nature, as it does upon their ſurfaces, which ſhews that it meets *not* with the leaſt reſiſtance, from the moſt ſolid bodies; therefore cannot poſſibly be a material ſubſtance, or being, either fluid, or not fluid, for all *ſuch* meet with ſome reſiſtance in pervading, or paſſing through each other. By this juſt, undeniable argument, has that truly great man, proved, that an immaterial agent continually moves and regulates the viſible heavens and earth, and produces all the general effects, or *general* rules of motions and changes which we obſerve in them; and, in as much as this mighty force is thus proved, to be that of a *ſpiritual* or immaterial being, ſuch as we perceive, and have proved our own minds to be, though, of incomparably ſuperior power, what good reaſon is there for ſuppſiong, that it moves not the planets in their orbits, by a ſimple *protruſive force*, or in the *readieſt*, *ſhorteſt*, and moſt *direct* manner, inſtead of having recourſe to an *indirect* mode; to a combination of *two* forces; namely, the centripetal and centrifugal, by the *joint actions* of which the Newtonians ſuppoſe the planets' *motions* round the ſun to be produced; which hypotheſis ſeems moreover to have ſuch *difficulties* in it, as ought to be removed, or the hypotheſis itſelf laid aſide; we ſhall juſt mention *one* only at preſent, for if that can be clearly got over, it will prepare the way for removing the reſt.—When the earth, for inſtance, in its annual elliptical revolution round the ſun, is at *equal* diſtances from its perihelion (or the point

O might he bliſs my thoughts, my mind inſpire,
But with one ſpark of that ſeraphic fire

point of its neareſt approach to it) on different ſides; it is alſo, at thoſe times, equally *diſtant* from the ſun; ſuppoſe at the Equator or the Equinoxial points; therefore, at theſe *two* points, the centripetal force is *equal*, and ſo is the centrifugal alſo, or, in other words, the combination of thoſe two forces, is equal at the ſaid two points; how then comes it to paſs, that the effects which they produce there are not the *ſame*, but the *reverſe* of each other; that is to ſay, at the Autumnal Equinox, the planet is made to *approach* the ſun, and, at the vernal, to recede from it; though the forces which then produce theſe contrary *effects*, are ſuppoſed to be exactly the *ſame*; how is *this* to be accounted for on mechanical principles?—See the annexed figure, where E ſtands for earth.



To

To that true wiſdom, heav'nly ardor raiſe,
With which the hoſts angelic ſing his praiſe;
Whereby thoſe ſons of light baſe thoughts repel,
And ſhame the imps of darkneſs quick to hell!
Then truth, tho' hated, pureſt truth ſhould ſhine
With all enlight'ning rays, on error's ſhrine,
Thro' her dark *dens*, its luſture full diſplay,
Reſiſtleſs, and pour in eternal day,
Diſpenſing comfort, light and freedom round,
To captives, long in chains of darkneſs bound;
Theſe bleſſings thro' the ſhades of death ſhould ſmile,
Till hypocrites themſelves no more beguile;
Then modern prophets, who diſtorted grin,
Start, ſtamp and roar; a *god*, a *god* within!
Furious, like heathen Sibylls ſcream and whine,
With voice ſcarce *human*, therefore thought *divine*,
Theſe ſpirits proud, *ſelf-deified*, ſhould learn,
To modeſt ſenſe, from fury to return,
Docile and mild, ſhould condeſcend to know,
Reaſon from God and beauteous *order* flow,
That he, who chaos to juſt rules confin'd,
Can ne'er be honour'd by a *frantic* mind,
By dark confuſion's ſons, who wildly ſquall,
Vain repetitions, like the prieſts of *Baal* *

140.—*Prieſts of Baal.*]

'And they called on the name of Baal from morning even until noon, ſaying, "O Baal, hear us." 'But there was no 'voice, nor any that anſwered, and they *leaped* upon the '*altar* which was made, and it came to paſs at noon that Elijah

'*mocked*

Who Chriſt's own *words*, O deed of endleſs ſhame!
His heav'nly precepts the *dead letter* name,
While their irrational *diſcordant lore*;
They *goſpel* call and bid the world adore.

' *mocked* themand ſaid, " Cry aloud, for he is a God, either " he is talking, or he is purſuing, or he is in a journey, or, per- " adventure, he ſleepeth and muſt be awaked." And they cried ' aloud, and cut themſelves after their manner, with knives and ' lancets until the blood guſhed out upon them. 1 Kings. c. xviii. v. 26, 27, and 28. ' and thus they continued 'till the evening ſa- ' crifice.' The only difference in the demeanour of theſe enthuſiaſtic worſhippers of Baal and our modern enthuſiaſts ſeems to be, their *cutting* themſelves with knives and lancets; for as to leaping (and all ſorts of violent motions and diſtortions) abundance of repetitions, crying aloud, &c. our enthuſiaſts ſeem to equal at leaſt, if not to excel, theſe prophets of *Baal*, or of the *Lord*, as they called themſelves; for it was the Lord of Iſrael whom they vainly imagined that they could thus worſhip; whereas it was really a phantom of their own imaginations which they honoured; a mere *phantom*, a mere *idea*, including neither the wiſdom, the love of order, reaſon and decency, nor any one of the attributes (except perhaps power) of the ever-bleſſed Jehovah. In like manner, the worſhippers of *Moloch*, or of the King of Heaven, wiſhed to be thought to worſhip the true God, the Ruler of Heaven and Earth; but as they did ſo in a cruel and impious manner, they are *juſtly* charged with worſhipping a falſe, imaginary god. The Heathen nations themſelves often intended, by their abſurd and impious ceremonies, to do homage to the *Maker* of all things, and frequently made uſe of his *true*, *real* names; but for the reaſons already mentioned they are always juſtly charged by the Prophets, and by the Meſſiah and his Apoſtles, with worſhipping a falſe god, an idol, even when they had no pictures or images before them; that is, when they were juſt going to engage in battle or on a journey.

Who wonders in mere figures can perceive
Which none but arrant idiots can believe;
Nay more, God's ſacred word, like fiends inſane,
With ſhameful Pagan ſorceries profane!

journey, &c. We wiſh that all perſons who intend to worſhip the God of reaſon and wiſdom in an *irrational* manner would well conſider this.

145.—*Who wonders in mere figures, &c.*]

Baretti, in his Travels through Spain, mentions a large book written in Latin by a Spaniſh prieſt named *Vieira*, wherein the moſt extravagant encomiums are beſtowed on the circular figure; and the famous Emanuel Swedenberg, founder of the ſect called the *New Jeruſalem*, tells us that heaven is in a human form, that every angel, and alſo each ſociety of angels, and all the ſocieties of angels taken together are in a human form likewiſe, becauſe it is the moſt perfect figure: and as to the wonders ſaid to be performed by the figure of a croſs, they would fill a thouſand volumes, if not many thouſands.

146.—*Idiots, &c.*]

Wilful, ſelf-made idiots, who are the greateſt of all idiots.

148.—*With ſhameful Pagan ſorceries profane.*]

The Pagan Greeks and Romans made uſe of the writings of Homer and Virgil, their principal poets, to foretell future events, by opening the books at hazard, and in ſo doing the *verſe* on which a perſon happened firſt to caſt his eye was to anſwer any queſtion or doubt regarding things to come, which he might then wiſh to be ſatisfied about. A great modern ſaint, the chief of a numerous ſect here, and in America, has often made uſe of the Holy Scriptures for the ſame preſumptuous and profane purpoſe; of which practice he gives the following account himſelf: 'I had 'no thought of leaving London when I received (after ſeveral 'others) a letter from Mr. Whitefield, and another from Mr. Seward, 'intreating me in the moſt preſſing manner to come to Briſtol with-'out delay. This I was not at all forward to do; and perhaps a little 'the leſs inclined to it (though I truſt I do not count my life '*dear* unto *myſelf*, ſo I may finiſh my courſe with joy) becauſe of

Then Iſrael's ſons, by God's all-ruling hand,
Diſpers'd to ev'ry clime and ev'ry land;

' the *remarkable* Scriptures which *offered* as often as we *enquired touching* the conſequence of this removal. Here he mentions ſeveral paſſages which, as he ſays, ' offered when they enquired;' ſome of which were theſe: " Get thee up into this mountain and " die in the mount, &c. And devout men carried Stephen to his " burial, and made great lamentation over him."

' Wed. 28. My journey was propoſed to our Society in Fetter-' Lane, but my brother Charles would ſcarce bear the mention of ' it, till *appealing* to the *Oracles* of God, he *received* theſe words ' as ſpoken to himſelf, and anſwered not again:' " Son of man, " behold I take from thee the deſire of thine eyes with a ſtroke: " yet ſhalt thou not mourn nor weep, neither ſhall thy tears run " down." But this not ſatisfying all the brethren, the Bible was opened again concerning the iſſue of this journey, and ſeveral portions of Scripture were preſented, among which were the following: " Now there was a long war between the houſe of Saul " and the houſe of David; but David waxed ſtronger and " ſtronger," &c.: " when wicked men have *ſlain* a *righteous* perſon " in his own houſe upon his bed, ſhall I not now require his " blood at your hands, &c." But, notwithſtanding theſe threats of ſlaughter and death, it does not appear that this *houſe* of *Saul*, namely, theſe *wicked* blood-thirſty *men* of *Briſtol* ever *ſlew* the *righteous perſon* John Weſley, either *upon* his *bed*, in *his houſe*, or any where elſe. See Extracts of the Rev. Mr. John Weſtley's Journals from Auguſt 12th, 1788, to Nov. 1, 1739, (ſecond edition, printed at Briſtol, and in London in 1478) p. 27, 28 and 29. In page 14 of which Extracts it appears, that he practiſed theſe moſt daring, aſtoniſhing *tricks* not only to predict the proſperous or unproſperous events of his journey, but to clear up his doubts in opinion and faith. ' I was troubled,' ſays he, ' I beg-' ged of God an anſwer of peace, and opened on thoſe words: " As *many as walk* according to this rule, peace be on them and " mercy, and upon the Iſrael of God."—' I was aſking in the even-

' ing

Thoſe firſt who Rabbins' myſtic dreams decline,
And to the Scriptures all their faith confine.
E'en Jews ſhould learn, thro' pride no longer blind,
That God's the common Father of mankind,
Whoſe boundleſs mercy flows in ev'ry place,
Who, as he form'd, ſtill loves all human race;
But chiefly thoſe who, like the bleſt above,
Embrace all nations in the bonds of love;
For *all* are his, the objects of his care,
Where-ever ſhines the ſun, or breathes the air:
Who, the bleſt image of his perfect mind,
His lov'd Meſſiah ſent to ſave mankind,
From impious tenets, monſtrous crimes to ſave,
And riſing prove his triumph o'er the *grave*;
To ſave not Jews alone, but Adam's line,
Thoſe dark with heat, or where cool *airs refine;
Each tongue, each nation, all of human birth,
All tribes and features o'er the ſpacious earth;
Not one rejected who will truth receive,
And in his gracious promiſes believe.
With that *true* faith which can our youth and age
To virtue form, and ſelfiſh luſts aſſwage;
No other faith avails; *this* mortals know,
But leads to blindneſs, cruelty and woe.

' ing that God would fulfil all his promiſes in my ſoul, when I ' opened my Teſtament on thoſe words: " My hour is not yet " come."—The like inſtances may be ſeen in other parts of his Journals.

* *N. B.* A black nation was never found in a cold climate.

174.—*But leads to blindneſs, cruelty and woe.*]

Thoſe who tell us that they have ſuddenly received an inward

Nor ſhall the good be loſt, who more ne,er knew,
Nor could believe than men from nature drew; 176

aſſurance of ſaving faith, of being born again, which *aſſurance* generally ſeizes them in the *ſame violent manner* as *hyſterical* or *epileptic fits* do other perſons (as fully appears in many parts of Mr. John Weſley's Journals as well as in a great number of other enthuſiaſtical writings;) ſuch perſons look upon all men who have not had this almoſt inſtantaneous violent *aſſurance* to be in a ſtate of *enmity* with God, and all thoſe who never feel ſuch ſtrange aſſurance to be doomed to utter perdition, whatever *good* outward works they may daily perform, though they ſhould be ſuch as Cornelius and the good Samaritan did, and were approved for. Mr. Weſley ſays, that "if a man be in the faith, or in Chriſt, he "no longer judges holineſs to conſiſt, *in doing no harm*, in *doing* "*good*, or *in uſing* the *ordinances* of God." See Extracts, page 10. But our bleſſed Saviour declares "that *corrupt* trees cannot "bring forth good fruits" (hypocriſy and *uniform* goodneſs being very different when cloſely and carefully examined,) and directs us to judge of *thoſe* who pretend to be prophets, but "are wolves "in ſheeps cloathing," by their fruits or outward works as we do of trees and ſhrubs; by which ſacred rule given us by our Saviour himſelf, any ſenſible, ſober-minded man may eaſily perceive *what ſpirit* theſe men of violent aſſurance are of; by means of outward *ſymptoms* of their *new birth* and *election*, which are frequently exhibited by them; an *example* or two from Mr. Weſley's Journal, already quoted, may ſuffice at preſent: 'To-day, Monday 21. our Lord anſwered for himſelf. For while I was enforcing theſe words, "Be ſtill, and know that I am God," he began *to make* 'bare his arm, not in a cloſe room, neither in private, but in the 'open air, before two thouſand witneſſes. One, and another, and 'another was ſtruck to the earth exceedingly trembling at the '*preſence of his power*. Others cried with a loud and bitter *cry*, "*What muſt we do to be ſaved?*" and in leſs than an hour ſeven perſons, wholly unknown to me till that time, were rejoicing and ſinging, &c. 'In the evening I was interrupted by the cries of

'one

Who would condemn them? fools and blind, say who,
For not performing what no man can do?

'one who was *pricked at the heart*, and ſtrongly groaned for 'pardon and peace. Another perſon dropped down cloſe to a '(gainſayer) while *he* ſtood aſtoniſhed at the ſight; a little boy 'near him was ſeized in the ſame manner. A young man who 'ſtood behind, fixed his eyes on *him* and ſunk down himſelf as 'one dead; but ſoon began to roar out and beat himſelf againſt 'the ground, ſo that ſix men could ſcarce hold him; his name was 'Thomas Maxfield, &c. Meanwhile many others began to cry 'out *to the Saviour of all* that he would come and help them, 'inſomuch that all the houſe (and indeed all the ſtreet for ſome 'ſpace) was all in an uproar. See page 50 of Extracts, &c.

In page 15 of theſe Extracts, &c. Mr. Weſley ſays, That he 'wrote to London to know how the work of God went on among 'the brethren there.' In the anſwer of one of his diſciples to him (who ſeems to be a woman), and who ſtiles him, "*Moſt dear and honoured father in Chriſt*,"—is the following account of the *new birth*:—"July 6. In the morning being "by myſelf, I found the work of the Spirit very powerful upon "me (although you know God does not deal with every ſoul in "the ſame way.) As my mother bore me with great pain, ſo "did I feel great pain in my ſoul in being born of God. In-"deed I thought the pains of death were upon me, &c.——In "this violent agony I continued above four hours: and then I "began to feel *the Spirit of God bearing witneſs with my ſpi-"rit that I was born of God. Becauſe I was a child of God, "he ſent forth the Spirit of his Son into me, crying, Abba, Fa-"ther. For that is the cry of every new-born ſoul.*—The love "of God was ſhed abroad in my heart, and a flame kindled "there, with *pains* ſo *violent*, yet ſo *raviſhing*, that my body "was almoſt *torn aſunder. I loved.* The Spirit cried ſtrong in

As juſtly might be damn'd (O mad decree!)
A man born blind becauſe he cannot ſee.
No creature can be blam'd, no ſoul deſtroy'd,
For mere misfortunes he could not avoid;
Misfortunes muſt move all but *brutal* hearts,
To that true pity which relief imparts
When poſſible; and *thoſe* who moſt will give
Have a *foretaſte* of heav'n while here they live;
What then to damn for mere miſhap and woe?
A deed ſo monſtrous devils hardly know!
Refrain, ye ſons of men, refrain, nor more
Blaſpheme God's righteous judgments, but adore!
Say all, who in juſt Abram's faith delight,
"Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right"?
Who, at his pray'r, would impious Sodom ſpare,
If yet remain'd *ten righteous heathen* there.
The Prince of Peace in whom all bounties blend
(Received from Him whose mercies know no end)
In love to man deſcended from above,
Meek as the lamb, and harmleſs as the dove,
To win the humble, Jews and Gentiles check,

" my heart, I ſweat, I trembled, I fainted, I ſung. My " ſoul was got up into the holy mount. I had no thoughts of " coming down again into the body.—O, I thought my head was " a fountain of water! I was diſſolved in love. *My beloved is " mine, and I am his*, He has all charms. He has *raviſhed* " my heart. He is now in his garden, feeding among the lilies. " O, I am ſick of love, &c."—With other extravagancies, not proper to be here mentioned,

Whoſe

Whoſe fables made God's laws of none effect.
His happineſs was mercy to beſtow
Relief to all in need, a tear for ev'ry woe:
Whoſe pure obedience to his Father's will
Muſt all who love their God with tranſports fill;
Who in his *life* has ev'ry virtue ſhewn
Clear as they ſhine before his Father's throne;
Loſt here in ſubtilties wherewith contend
Wiſe fools involv'd in mazes without end;
Who nought retain of virtue but the name,
With whom the fouleſt vice and virtue are the ſame,
In nature, both from one vile ſource proceed
From prejudice! Such is our wiſe men's creed!
Who reaſon, nature, all good ſenſe abuſe,
And bring for ev'ry deed a full excuſe;
For ev'ry curſed *act* which man can frame,
Such as our nature trembles but to name!
Theſe are all neceſſary, all decreed
By him who made us, tho' a parent bleed;
E'en when ſome wiſe men all their pow'rs employ
Our univerſal parent to deſtroy,

216.—*Our nature trembles, &c.*]
i. e. Until by habit and long practice it becomes hardened in extravagance and folly.

219.—*Wiſe men, &c.*
i. e. Philoſophers, as they call each other.

Thro' hate and fear inſult in ev'ry word,
And ridicule his eſſence as abſurd!

222.—*And ridicule his eſſence as abſurd!*]
This they do by means of the very abſurd notions commonly entertained regarding *matter*, *abſolute*, *infinite*, and *uncreated ſpace*; of minds, ideas, &c. See the Preliminary Eſſay, wherein we have already ſhewn, that changes and motions cannot poſſibly be from eternity, becauſe every thing *changed* or *moved* has been in another *ſtate* or ſituation *prior* to that in which it is when once changed or moved; and therefore that the firſt changes and motions in the univerſe muſt have been produced by an unchangeable ſelf-determining cauſe: in like manner it is demonſtrable, that neither men, nor the other animals, which are produced by *generation*, can be ſo produced from all eternity; becauſe, *to be born*, is to deſcend from parents *prior* to us in exiſtence; therefore, *to be born* from all eternity, would be to *deſcend* from parents who lived prior to all eternity, which is abſurd and impoſſible: from whence it undeniably follows, that men, and the other animals around us, were, at ſome *period*, *previous* to all generation, *made* or *created*, in a manner totally different from that in which they now receive life and being; which mode of producing animals, if it came to paſs at this time, would be as great a miracle as any recorded in the Scriptures: this evinces moſt clearly, that the greateſt of miracles muſt have exiſted in days of old. We may well call it the greateſt of *miraculous* deeds, for they muſt alſo have been made, man and woman *eſpecially*, with the *powers* and faculties which *grown* perſons now poſſeſs; for had they been at firſt made in the ſame diminutive weak ſtate, in the ſame helpleſs infirm condition in which new-born infants always are, they muſt have periſhed in a very ſhort time indeed, not *one* could have lived three days, nor probably one day, or even half a day; which ſhews that our *firſt* parents, were created with full *ſtrength* and underſtandings,

but

Thus all foul guilt, mad folly, monſtrous lies,
Are charged on him who rules the earth and ſkies;
And man's rudeſt log e'er made by heav'n
Quite motionleſs if not by vi'lence driv'n;
Like wrecks which ev'ry wind and wave impel:
Such *wiſdom*, ſure, is too abſurd for hell!
Such groundleſs errors all but men muſt ſee
Who quit the truth for * blind philoſophy.

but their Creator, for many wiſe *purpoſes*, determined to make mankind, &c. ſo no longer; therefore he created them *male and female*, that from thenceforth there might be children whom they ſhould nurſe, rear, take care of, and love; for which purpoſe, he has alſo given to parents *ſuitable feelings* and *affections*; all this invincibly demonſtrates that our Maker or Creator is an intelligent being; for no maker or cauſe, but an *intelligent one can have future views, ends*, or *intentions* in what he now does; all *future* purpoſes, views, or ends belong to forethought, reflection, underſtanding, or intelligence only, and can never proceed from undiſcerning, unthinking cauſes: *thus*, and by endleſs other proofs, it can be ſtrictly and clearly demonſtrated, that the Creator, the *Firſt Cauſe*, or Maker of all things, the Author of nature is unchangable, free, powerful, *intelligent*, and *wiſe* in the moſt perfect degree poſſible: "All "nature cries aloud (as the Poet ſays) through all the extent of the univerſe, I am *made* by—I am the *production* of the moſt *extenſive* and perfect *reflection*, *forethought*, and *deſign*. And the wiſe ends or purpoſes for which I am thus made, are numberleſs, therefore are not ſeen at *once*, or in a *ſhort time*, by any finite being, but are gradually diſplayed, are preſented in *due* order and *beautiful* ſucceſſion, through all ages!

* See the Preliminary Eſſay.

Chriſt

Chriſt ſays, ſhould all men's hearts be fill'd with lies,
Yet God is ever true and ever wiſe.
When ſtubborn mortals tread unequal ways,
" All his are equal," worthy equal praiſe;
Who made man *free* like all the ſons of day,
That as a ſon he freely might obey;
Obedience forc'd nor *goodneſs* has nor worth
Above the ſtocks, or ſtones, or clods of earth;
Therefore a pow'r is giv'n us to tranſgreſs,
Or to obey, to hate his laws or bleſs,
Our brethren oft to ruin, or to ſave;
But *limited*, like ocean's reſtleſs wave;
For he by endleſs ways, by death or fear,
Can ſtop the proudeſt in their full career.
'Tis clear, if nature carefully we ſcan,
That *guilt*'s th' *abuſe* of *freedom* giv'n to man;
Without which *gift* no virtue could be known,
Nor characters but thoſe of brutes alone;
For *this*, the Judge Supreme has *laws* employ'd,
Not *force*, leſt godlike freedom be deſtroy'd;
For this, at ſundry times, has prophets ſent
To warn mankind on deeds unrighteous bent;

231.—*Chriſt ſays, &c.*]
" Let God be true, and every man a lier."
251.—*has prophets ſent*]
If all the actions of men were produced and directed by the ſame neceſſity as the motions of air or water, the growth of animals, and ſome of their actions; ſending the prophets and our Saviour

To teach, adviſe, and all juſt meaſures uſe,
To ſave from vice, ſome hear, but moſt refuſe;
Intent on ill-got wealth and lawleſs ſway
With rage they ſpurn his meſſengers away;
Proud and impatient, of falſe ſcience vain,
Theſe ſons of God are by their fury ſlain.
E'en that rebellious race, the ſtubborn Jews,
God's laws perverting to their worldly views,
In many crimes and off'rings from their youth
Abound, to judgment loſt and heav'nly truth;

Saviour Jeſus Chriſt to ſhew men, and to exhort them to leave, their follies and unjuſt ways, and in ſo doing to ſuffer daily undeſerved inſults, barbarous indignities, and finally death itſelf, appears to be neither wiſer nor better than if they had been ſent to ſuffer all this, in order to adviſe men to eat, drink, and ſleep, to open their eyes, and to ſpeak ſometimes, not to grow to fifty or an hundred feet high, not to live for a thouſand years, or even to the age of Methuſelah, &c. &c.

259.—*Stubborn Jews,*]

For this ſee the prophets Iſaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, &c. Indeed ſee their whole hiſtory from the hour when Moſes delivered to them in the land of Egypt the meſſage from God, to this day; all which confirms what Moſes ſays of them, namely, That the generality of them are the moſt ſtubborn, the moſt ſtiffnecked (or prejudiced) of all nations; perpetually given to ſenſeleſs ſuperſtitions, contrary to the reaſonable or true meaning of God's eternal laws, thereby rendering them of none effect, nay, a "ſtumbling "block and a rock of offence" to the ignorant and viciouſly inclined over all the earth. Are not many of their monſtrous notions, their Rabbinical fables (like thoſe of the Pagans, Mahometans, and Paganiſed nominal Chriſtians) a diſgrace to human nature and to common ſenſe?

Juſtice

Juſtice rejecting, make the poor their prey,
And mercileſs their holy prophets ſlay:
All haſt'ning ev'ry hour from *bad* to *worſe*,
'Till each extreme of vice the nations curſe;
'Till ſignal puniſhments in vain are tried,
And mad ſucceſsful villians deified!
God quite forgot! men dev'liſh gods deviſe,
And ſwift to heav'n incens'd Aſtræa flies.
In this undone, this hopeleſs ſtate of things,
The world to ſave, appears the King of Kings!
Not in vain worldly ſtate and proud array
Of warlike pomp, his ſubjects to diſmay;
Such force had outward acts alone reſtrain'd,
While ev'ry evil in the mind remain'd;
Had all baſe *arts* and *frauds*, each foul *diſguiſe*
Increas'd, and fill'd the world with *ſlaves* and *lies*,
Not *truth* and *love*; can *love*, proud Rabbins tell,
Can *love* and odious *force* united dwell?
Forc'd love (whatever hypocrites may prate)
Is nought but rancour, well concealed hate!
By reaſon he would win, by kindneſs gain,
His Father's will, with meekneſs would explain;
Spurn'd not the poor away, like worldly pride,
But was their *friend*, their brother, and their guide;
Proud inſults daily bore, nor would complain,
Each heart ſincere from vengeance to reſtrain;
To teach us godlike *mercy*, mutual *love*,
Free and unfeign'd, as ſeen in heav'n above;

To

To God reſign'd, without offence or guile,
When mock'd forgave, nor injur'd, would revile:
For *this* he left the joys of Paradiſe
To live in humble ſtate and humble guiſe!

293.—*For this he left the joys of Paradiſe*]

Thoſe who maintain that Jeſus Chriſt had no life or exiſtence in heaven with God, before he came into this world, put ſuch a forced conſtruction on his language, have recourſe to ſuch double meaning and quibbles in reconciling his *words* with their notions as no man of integrity could ever make uſe of, much leſs *could* the moſt perfect pattern of honeſty, integrity and truth, our Saviour Chriſt. "Before Abraham *was* I *am*." By their rule of interpreting or rather obſcuring theſe words, it may with equal truth be ſaid, that the *end* of the world *was* or *is* before the beginning; that a man is dead and buried before he is born, and that he is judged and goes to heaven or elſewhere before he does any act good or evil. By this dreadful latitude of interpretation given to the verb, *To be*, *am*, was, &c. the order of all events may be changed till chronology and hiſtory be involved in univerſal confuſion. By this rule the uſe of language is reverſed, for hereby, inſtead of conveying real information, it becomes the vehicle of eternal quibbling, deception, confuſion and darkneſs. If the literal meaning of this declaration wanted confirmation, many might be produced; the firſt that now occurs is what he ſays to his diſciples as related in the 28th verſe of the xvi. chapter of St. John,—"I came forth from the Father and am come into the "world: Again I leave the world and go to the Father." To which his diſciples anſwered, "Now ſpeakeſt thou *plainly* and ſpeakeſt no proverb." Which he admitted, (for he contradicted them not as he conſtantly did when they erred) and which John has recorded for the right information of all careful and attentive Chriſtians, &c. &c.

But

But innocence, and peace, and goodneſs, ſpread
Ne'er-fading ſplendors round his ſacred head;
Such goodneſs as our God, and his had ſhown,
Could he deſcend from his eternal throne,

298.—*Could he deſcend from his eternal throne,*]

The author is very ſenſible that his opinion here expreſſed from line 297 to 204 inclusive, differs from that of the generality of Chriſtians for ages paſt, on which account he would not have ventured to expreſs himſelf in ſuch poſitive and decided terms on ſo awful, ſo extremely important a ſubject, as this fundamental principle of true religion, were not the teſtimonies of the royal prophet Solomon, of the prophet Iſaiah, of our Saviour himſelf, and of the great apoſtle of the Gentiles, when conſidered together, ſo perfectly clear on this *firſt* of all ſubjects as to be amply ſufficient (in this author's apprehenſion) to remove every doubt from the minds of all truly unprejudiced perſons who ſhall have thoroughly conſidered them; he only begs leave therefore to produce their evidence, and then to leave it to every faithful lover of truth to judge whether this his opinion be well founded, and whether a greater authority or clearer evidence can ever be had for any truth. The royal prophet abovementioned, called the wiſeſt of men, as to knowledge and judgment, at the dedication of that *vaſt*, that extremely magnificient temple which he had built, and which God himſelf had appointed him to build for his name, having ſummoned the heads of the tribes, the elders and all the chiefs of Iſrael to be preſent at the dedication of it to the worſhip of the true God; as he, and they, and all the prieſts and Levites offered to *him* the moſt ſolemn adoration and due praiſe. He, whoſe ſupreme and awful majeſty ſtoops low to view the very heavens themſelves, was pleaſed of his infinite condeſcenſion, to give them a ſign of his approbation, by filling the temple with a cloud and with his *glory*, in ſo wonderful a manner that the prieſts could not ſtand to miniſter; upon which the king cried out

in

Where, in immortal majesty divine,
In glory unexpress'd, must ever shine

in rapture "* The Lord hath said that he would dwell in thick "darkness. But I have built an *house* of habitation for thee, "and a place for thy dwelling for ever." Soon after however, like a wise and prudent director, fearing lest the people (always too prone to form narrow opinions of the Most High) should mistake his meaning, and imagine that God can be confined in temples or even in the whole world, he fully explained himself in this accurate and excellent manner: "But can God in very deed dwell with "men on the earth? Behold *heaven* and the *heaven* of *heavens* "cannot contain thee, much less this *house* which I have built!" May we not then with *equal truth* say, much less still a human body? Many, very many of which his spacious temple could contain. Here we clearly find that the whole universe cannot contain the Creator of all things, who hath said, by the mouth of the evangelical prophet Isaiah, "I am the *first*, and I am the *last*; "and besides me there is no God. Is there a God besides "me? Yea, there is no God. I know not any. I am God, "and there is none else; I am God, and there is none (or no one) "like me." Thus far the real immensity, unity and inimitable excellence of the God of nature and of Israel are clearly made known to us and explained;—of *him*, whom, in his *incommunicable* perfections, his *infinity*, his *independence* and *self-existence* no one can resemble. The best and greatest beings besides can only be like unto him, in some degree, in being *intelligent*, &c. and in his moral perfections, in *justice*, *benevolence*, and *truth*. But *who* and what is the God of nature and of Israel?

This is the important question which has often been asked and frequently debated: Is he *one* uncreated *nature*, or one All-mighty person alone? The Messiah himself has removed the doubt, having expressly told us that the adorable person whom he called his

* See v. and vi. Chap. of 2 Cron.
† Isaiah, Chap. xlvi. ver. 9, &c.

Father

The Lord of all! whom nor this earth contains,
Nor worlds paſt number o'er the ſtarry plains,

Father and our Father, his God and our God," was the God of Iſrael: for, when the Jews were queſtioning him concerning his dignity and authority, If he was greater than Abraham and the prophets*? "Whom makeſt thou thyſelf? ſaidthey;" he anſwered them ſaying, "If I honour *myſelf* my honour is *nothing*, it is my "*Father* that honoureth me; of *whom* ye ſay that he is *your* "God." By this declaration of Jeſus Chriſt himſelf, the *perſonal* unity of the God of nature and of Iſrael is made manifeſt; for here he tells the Jews in the plaineſt terms that his Father and their God was the ſame perſon, the very perſon who, by the mouths of his prophets, had proclaimed to all the world, "That beſides "him there is no God; that he, who knows all things, "knows "not any, nor any one like him." How can there be? for he alone has received neither power, authority nor dominion from any one: They have ever been his and muſt remain with him to everlaſting, for ages without end; being for ever *inſeparable* from *him* who is truly *ſupreme!* Whereas, the Meſſiah has received his power and dominion from God, even his Father, and when the glorious *end* for *which* they were given him is accompliſhed he will *reſign* them, will give them up into the hands of his Father, as the apoſtle of the Gentiles has informed us. "When "the Son alſo himſelf ſhall be ſubject unto *him* that put all things "under him." By whoſe inſtructions and commands he is alſo guided during the whole period wherein he exerciſeth his delegated divine authority and government; for, ſaith he, "I have "not ſpoken of myſelf, but the Father who ſent me, he gave "me a commandment what I ſhould ſay, and what I ſhall ſpeak."

Authorized by all theſe teſtimonies from the higheſt, the moſt infallible authority, can we err in believing ſtedfaſtly that the Supreme All-mighty Being (who has given to all their exiſtence and powers, and received them of none) the Lord Jehovah is *one perſon*

* John viii. 53, 54.

only,

Nor e'en the heaven of heav'ns, his boundleſs throne,
Where his tranſcendent excellence is known.

only, namely, the Father of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt? and that literally ſpeaking, he is God alone; "the only true God"? That "beſides him there is no God," nor can any one be likened unto him, as we have already obſerved? That he has given a divine power or authority to the Meſſiah for a certain determinate period, at the end of which it will be reſigned, will be delivered up to him who gave it? That the *immenſity* of the one moſt adorable, Divine Perſon or Spirit who ruleth over all, is ſuch as not to be contained in the whole univerſe; whereas our bleſſed Saviour Jeſus Chriſt has dwelt among us in this world, during which time he was often in the temple, in the ſynagogues, in houſes, and always in a human body?

It is true that he is often called God; ſo is Moſes, ſo are ſeveral others to whom the word of God came; ſo was the angel who went before the camp of Iſrael, in a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night; of whom the Lord ſaid "Beware of him, provoke him not, "for my name is in him." And the angels on mount Sinai, by whom the law was ſpoken and publiſhed, by whoſe "diſpoſition it was ordained," as appears in many parts of* Holy Writ, *they* alſo called themſelves by the name of Jehovah, and by other names of God;—all which and much more to the ſame purpoſe (to be found in the Scriptures) is to be interpreted by the *ſame* figure, by the *ſame* rule of ſpeech by which Solomon's expreſſions above related muſt be explained, namely, when he ſaid, "the Lord liveth in thick darkneſs, I have built an *houſe* of habi-"tation for thee," &c.—But ſtrictly and literally ſpeaking, the Scriptures manifeſtly declare that the moſt bleſſed and adorable Perſon called the Father of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt is God alone; that there is no other God, nor any one like him." That

* See Acts vii. 53. Gal. iii. 19. Heb. ii. 2.

Bleſt with ſuch perfect goodneſs, ſeen above
Thro' endleſs ages with the God love,

ſupreme power, authority, and dominion belong *at all times* to him alone, and to no one elſe.

God knows that it is not out of any unthankfulneſs or irreverence to *him* who came from God and brought divine wiſdom again from above, when loſt on earth, *loſt* even among Jews as well as Gentiles; who brought life and immortality to light, who lived a life of innocence, poverty and ſorrow, and died a miſerable death for our ſakes, to give us a wonderful example of perfect virtue and obedience, of reſignation and hope in every difficulty and diſtreſs, even in *death* itſelf, and for other purpoſes worthy of him from whom he came into this world, with whom he was "in the beginning;" which in Scripture-language means, at the creation of the world; being ſo uſed by Moſes and others, even by Chriſt himſelf: "He was then with God, and was called "God," God having communicated to him his divine creative power; for it was by him that he created the heavens and the earth (as mentioned by Moſes,) "and without *him* was not any thing "made that was made."—It is not therefore a want of the pureſt, moſt ſincere reverence and gratitude to a Being of ſuch *dignity, glory*, and boundleſs benevolence (if he knows any thing of his own heart) that this author believes as above explained; but the divine authorities, which he has produced for this his faith, appear ſo explicit and ſo full as to remove every doubt from his mind: for he *cannot*, he *will* not, knowingly *take away from*, or *add any thing to*, the ſacred Revelations of God, made known to us by the mouths of his prophets and apoſtles, and of his beloved Repreſentative, who lived with him in the beginning, was ſent by him into this world for the moſt benevolent purpoſes; which having accompliſhed he returned again to heaven where he was before, and where he now ſits at "the right-hand of God in glory"—where he will reign with ſupreme authority, with the *power* and *autho-*

rity

(By him made known to all the ſons of light,
With joy perceiv'd, ineffable delight!)
The true Meſſiah comes, with zeal reveals
His Father's will and man's afflictions heals;
All pain and all deſpairing ſorrows ſhun
His preſence as night's gloom th' enliv'ning ſun.
To heal, to ſave was ever his employ;
He caus'd the hopeleſs *heart* to ſing with joy!
Say then, how loſt in ſelfiſhneſs and ſin
Muſt be the *mind* ſuch goodneſs cannot win?
How ſavage, nay how infinitely worſe,
Muſt be the heart which can ſuch goodneſs curſe?

rity of his Father until all rebellion be ſubdued, all evil deſtroyed: 'till *death* and deſtruction be no more!

318.—*Muſt be the heart which can ſuch goodneſs curſe?*] See the violent things uttered againſt this beſt, this moſt amiable of all beings (our Heavenly Father excepted) by ſeveral modern philoſophers, and crafty fraudulent politicians; and particularly ſee and be aſtoniſhed at the ſhameful things lately written by the Jew David Levi, and ſome others of his long prejudiced, ambitious nation; who, though diſperſed over the whole earth, and moſt of them engaged in the meaneſt, ſeveral in the moſt ſcandalous offices, dream continually of empire, principalities, mighty dominions, and powers over the reſt of mankind; againſt whom the generality of them nurſe in their hearts the moſt ſavage hatred and thirſt of revenge, as well as a moſt eager longing for univerſal plunder; for the whole property, all the poſſeſſions of the Gentiles, ſay they, "are as a wilderneſs" (or an unſettled, uninhabited land) and *by right belong* to the Iſraelites, which they impatiently long

All this ſhould Iſrael know, nor longer burn
To Canaan's narrow limits to return
Thro' blood and ſlaughter, havoc and diſmay,
Of all the nations who reject their ſway,
There with revenge and violence to bleſs
The reſt, and all their property poſſeſs;
To force them ſwifter than the winds to run,
Swift as the rapid planets, or the ſun.
Thrice ev'ry year with ſacrifice to haſte
From earth's extremes, and leave the world a waſte,
To David's city haſte, which would contain
Scarce the one tenth of Jews that now remain.
But how could nations go and leave behind
All other cares, tho' borne on wings of wind?
They could not; think, ye Jews, what dire offence
To mar God's word with worſe than madmen's ſenſe,

to ſeize as ſoon as their imaginary, ſanguinary deſtroyer of other nations, ſhall appear. See BAVA BATHRA. Fol. 54. Col. 2. of the Talmud.

נְכָסֵי גוֹיִם הֵם כְּמִדְבָּר כֹּל הַמַּחֲזִיק בָּהֶן זָכָה בָּהֶן׃

Which is thus tranſlated by Buxtorf in his *Florilegium Hebraicum:* Article, *Divęs, Divitiæ, Opes, Facultates,* Page 71.

"Facultates Gentilium (Chriſtianorum) ſunt inſtar deſerti; "qui primus eas occupare poteſt earum Dominus eſt." And more literally thus by a friend of the author, who has an uncommonly accurate knowledge of the Hebrew tongue.

"The wealth of the Gentiles is like a wilderneſs; every one "who ſeizes it is free from blame on account of it.

While

While fondly nurſing in your breaſts each hour
Thirſt of revenge and luſt of boundleſs pow'r;
Which pow'r, if, for your curſe you could enjoy,
Would Jews as well as Chriſtians ſoon deſtroy.
Look thro' the world from Adam, and ye'll ſee
That mighty conqu'rors ne'er can long agree;
But brothers, when no other foes remain,
Wage war and by each other's hands are ſlain.
With holy Abram's faith to heav'n we rear
Our hands and by eternal wiſdom ſwear,
By that parental love known from our birth,
That ſuch a *curſe* ſhall ne'er lay waſte the earth,

345.—*By that parental love, &c.*]

We call upon every Jew of benevolence and good ſenſe, to whom this may ever come; we call upon him in the moſt revered and holy name of the God of Iſrael (who is alſo our God and the God of our Meſſiah) to imagine, to conceive, and then to ſhew us a character or doctrine more holy, more pure and excellent; that is to ſay, more *benevolent*, and calculated to produce *univerſal love* and *mutual kindneſs* among all men, (for *that alone*, literally ſpeaking, is *true holineſs*) than that of *our* Lord Jeſus Chriſt. If they can *do this*, we give up the point, and are ready to believe with them, that ſuch a moſt excellent Meſſiah (not ſuch a violent one as they expect) will yet appear; but if they cannot do this (which the learned Jew Orobio and others acknowledge that they cannot) then muſt *they* with *us* confeſs that *Jeſus* is the *Meſſiah, or be* without any *rational excuſe*. As to the blaſphemy with which they moſt raſhly and unjuſtly charge *him*, we have already ſhewn that it is totally groundleſs, and, that it exiſts only in the inventions and falſe doctrines of corrupted, *nominal* Chriſtians; and in *their* ſelfiſh, ambitious, *worldly*, prejudiced imaginations.

There

Such a deſtroyer hop'd for to reſtore
The Jews to Canaan thro' wide ſeas of gore.

There is no ſuch thing as blaſphemy in the goſpel any more than in the law and the prophets, in the New any more than in the Old Teſtament. The language of *both*, with regard to *thoſe* who were commiſſioned, who had received divine authority to reveal the will of God to men, being exactly the ſame in each; they are in both called by the name of *God*, Gods or ſons of God, men of God, Jehovah, &c. This is a *way*, a *rule* of ſpeaking common to all nations in every *tongue* and *dialect* upon the earth: "*Qui facit per alium facit per ſe*," ſay even the ſchoolmen; it is ſometimes in words a ſeeming contradiction, but in meaning it is perfectly conſiſtent, juſt, elegant and ſublime; without ſuch figures of ſpeech, human language would be lifeleſs and flat indeed; *cuſtom*, *reaſon*, and *common ſenſe* are the judges in the caſe, as they are with regard to the meaning of the *ſeparate words* of any language. Innumerable inſtances of this mode of ſpeaking might be given not only from the Scriptures and other writings, but from our daily and hourly converſations; thus we ſay of a ſon very much reſembling his father, "It is his father himſelf, I de-" clare; his very countenance, his very voice, &c. The *king* of " Great Britain has *declared* to ſuch a *power*, &c. The grand " *Seignior* is defeated by the *Empreſs*." And we continually ſay to children "My life! my ſoul, &c." which they never find any difficulty in underſtanding. Indeed there is hardly a poſſibility for a truly reaſonable creature to miſtake ſuch expreſſions; there certainly muſt be ſome bad inclinations, a narrow very narrow diſpoſition harboured and nurſed in the mind that can do it; it muſt be low prejudice and perverſeneſs, *ſtudied*, *willful*, *blindneſs* that can deſcend to ſuch an aſtoniſhing degree of *error* and *folly*: Nor can it be any thing leſs than ſuch *ſtudied voluntary* blindneſs that can induce the Jews to interpret literally, as they do, the following and ſimilar paſſages in the prophets of truth. "And it ſhall

" come

Ye nations! love the goſpel, caſt off fear,
For ſuch a tyrant never can appear.
Ye Jacob's ſons, your ear attentive lend!
And to a loving brother's voice attend.
'Tis true the Gentiles cruel wars have wag'd,
Deſpots and prieſts have without mercy rag'd
Againſt you unprepar'd, *moſt impious* thoſe!
That nam'd his name who ſaid; Forgive your foes,
Forgive! nay love your enemies, and ſtay
Their wrath by acts of kindneſs day by day.
Deaf to *his* voice, to reaſon, and to all
That's *juſt* and *good*, deaf e'en to nature's call.

" come to paſs in the laſt days that the *mountain* of the *Lord's* " *houſe* ſhall be eſtabliſhed in the *top* of the *mountains*, and ſhall " be exalted above the *hills*; and *all nations* ſhall flow to it." Iſaiah, chap. ii. v. 2. It is utterly impoſſible that all nations (literally ſpeaking) ſhould flow to any mountain whatever; and every man of common ſenſe muſt perceive that the language is here *allegorical* throughout, and that the rational meaning of it muſt be, that all nations ſhall turn to and embrace that pure moral law, that univerſal righteouſneſs which has been taught there by the prophets, and by the Meſſiah and his diſciples; this is proved by what the prophet ſays, at the end of the next verſe: " For out " of Zion ſhall *go forth* the law, and the word of the Lord " from Jeruſalem." And that our Lord Jeſus Chriſt muſt be the Meſſiah foretold by this great prophet, &c. is extremely clear from the prophecies contained in the 49 and 53 chapters of his book; where it is declared, that the Meſſiah's doctrine would be rejected of the Jews, received by the Gentiles, that he ſhould die, though " he had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth; yet that he ſhould prolong his days," and that " the " *pleaſure* (or *will*) of the Lord ſhould proſper in his hands."

Fanatic

Fanatic prieſts and tyrants' impious rage,
The deareſt ties of blood cannot aſſwage;
Nought is rever'd by pow'r when uncontroll'd,
It ſpares nor Jew, nor Gentile, young nor old:
E'en Iſrael, when they choſe, againſt God's will,
Deſpotic pow'r would blood relentleſs ſpill;
Swell'd high in pride by victory's full gale,
They ſlew whole nations, cut off ev'ry male!—
All have oppreſs'd and been oppreſs'd in turn,
No longer then let barb'rous vengeance burn;
But let all hatred and contentions ceaſe,
Let pure forgiveneſs huſh the world to peace;
Like ſons of one great parent let us be,
And ſtrive who ſhall excel in charity!
United let us our beſt pow'rs employ,
All vi'lence, and all ſlav'ry to deſtroy,
Through the whole earth, 'till freedom be compleat,
And laſt "our weapons into plough-ſhares beat;"
Then ſhall wide realms, by tyranny laid waſte,
With plenty ſmile, abundant harveſts taſte;
Then Iſrael, bleſt with love for all mankind,
Shall in each land an happier Caanan find.

THE END.